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Abstract 
 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 was the first infectious disease 
outbreak caused by a novel pathogen in the twenty-first century. The outbreak in Hong Kong was 
the second largest worldwide and was characterised by a large proportion of hospital infections and 
a super-spreading event caused by environmental factors in residential buildings.  
Hospitals treating SARS cases were at high risk for transmission. I found that hospital outbreaks 
triggered community transmission as well as the formation of spatial clusters of community cases. 
The size of the community outbreak in an area increased with the size of the outbreak in the nearest 
hospital treating SARS, and an area was more likely to have no community-infected cases if it was far 
from hospitals treating SARS, or had less hospital-infected cases within the area. 
To quantify the transmission between hospital and community, I developed a spatial epidemic-tree-
reconstruction method that uses gravity models to spatially define the probability of contact 
between individuals in the community. From the reconstructed probabilistic infection tree, I 
estimated that 24% of community transmission was likely to be infected by cases infected in 
hospitals, with infected patients discharged during their incubation period and hospital visitors the 
most important drivers of transmission from healthcare settings to the community. Healthcare 
workers were key drivers of hospital transmission, with the hospital-to-hospital reproduction 
number, excluding a single hospital super-spreading event, estimated to be 0.8. A typical 
community-acquired case was estimated to generate 0.6 cases in the community and 0.2 cases in 
the hospital in which they were subsequently hospitalised.  
My findings suggest that hospital infection control could be improved. Restricted hospital visitor 
policies could have been imposed for longer time during the outbreak and quarantine could be 
considered for those who recently visited or have been discharged from hospitals treating SARS 
cases. 
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Chapter 1. Background 
1.1 Introduction 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 was the first infectious disease 
outbreak caused by a novel pathogen in the twenty-first century, and was not the last. In eight 
months, it spread to 26 countries, causing 8,096 infections and 774 deaths. Hong Kong was the 
second region to be affected by SARS after China, and was the second most affected country 
worldwide, with 1,755 cases and 299 deaths (World Health Organisation (WHO). ; Leung, Hedley et 
al. 2004). Tackling epidemics caused by new infectious agents is complicated by limited knowledge 
of the nature of the pathogen, its transmission dynamics and the resulting implications for disease 
control strategies. Also the lack of a vaccine and limited treatment options restricts control to the 
use of infection control and public health interventions that reduce contact rates in the population - 
for instance, social distance measures.  
Understanding the spatial dynamics of epidemics is vital because of the localized nature of disease 
transmission and interactions, and because targeting limited control resources where they will have 
maximum impact is vital to curtail a fast-moving epidemic. Three aspects are important. Firstly, the 
spatial distribution of cases captures important facets of the nature of disease transmission and 
helps to reveal the transmission routes of the emerging epidemic, as in the early example of John 
Snow in the cholera outbreak investigation (Snow 1854). Secondly, prompt identification of spatial 
disease clusters is crucial in maximizing the effectiveness of quarantine and other control measures 
to reduce the morbidity of the epidemic, as in the evacuation of the Amoy Gardens Block E residents 
during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 
2003). Thirdly, the spatial dynamics of epidemics inform the construction of realistic mathematical 
models that capture the effects of spatial heterogeneity on the dynamics and control of the 
epidemic and which can be used to monitor and assess different control options (Ferguson, Donnelly 
et al. 2001; Keeling, Woolhouse et al. 2001; Ferguson, Cummings et al. 2006; Riley and Ferguson 
2006).  
Spatial models of disease transmission are increasingly in demand not only because of their 
capability to capture the complexity of transmission dynamics, but also because spatially 
heterogeneous interventions are being more frequently considered for cost-effectiveness and 
logistical reasons, especially during large-scale outbreaks (Wu, Riley et al. 2006). This is facilitated by 
the improved availability of spatially disaggregated incidence and demographic data and 
computational facilities (Riley 2007). However, empirical studies on the spatial dynamics of SARS 
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have been scarce (Lai, Wong et al. 2004; Meng, Wang et al. 2005; Wang, McMichael et al. 2006) with 
the limited availability of spatial data and lack of data sharing. Models of SARS transmission 
incorporating space have also been limited (Bauch, Lloyd-Smith et al. 2005), although the need of 
this kind of model has been highlighted (Dye and Gay 2003).  
A special feature of the SARS outbreak was the high proportion of hospital infection in most 
countries which were heavily affected by SARS (World Health Organisation (WHO) 2004), despite 
hospital infection control measures having been in place (Bell and In 2004). The significance of 
hospital infection lies in its potential to generate further transmission not only in the hospitals but 
also in the community (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003; Varia, Wilson et al. 2003; Wong, Lee et al. 
2004), and as the driving force of the spatial spread of the epidemic between districts (Meng, Wang 
et al. 2005). Therefore the aim of this study is to acquire a better understanding of the transmission 
dynamics between the hospital and the community, in particular its role in determining spatial 
spread of the disease. 
This following section reviews the key features of SARS and its outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003, 
followed by discussions of the current findings on the spatial dynamics of emerging respiratory 
infectious disease epidemics, and of the SARS outbreak in particular. This leads to the research 
questions for this study at the end of this chapter. 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 SARS 
1.2.1.1 Transmission dynamics 
The SARS coronavirus is believed to be zoonotic in origin, with the civet cat likely to be an important 
animal reservoir for the virus (Guan, Zheng et al. 2003). The virus is likely to have jumped host from 
animals to humans in the animal markets in China, especially those in Guangdong province (Webster 
2004), where the first human case was identified on 16 November 2002 (Zhong, Zheng et al. 2003). A 
probable case of SARS was defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) using three criteria: 
(1) a suspect case with radiographic evidence of infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or respiratory 
distress syndrome on chest X-ray; (2) a suspect case of SARS that is positive for SARS coronavirus by 
one or more assays; (3) a suspect case with autopsy findings consistent with the pathology of 
respiratory distress syndrome without an identifiable cause (World Health Organisation (WHO) 
2003).  
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The primary mode of SARS transmission in humans is through close contact and respiratory droplets. 
The mean incubation period was 4.4 days [95% CI: (3.7,5.1)] (Cowling, Muller et al. 2007). The mean 
serial interval, defined as the time from the onset of symptoms in an index case to the onset of 
symptoms in a subsequent case infected by the index patient, was 8.4 days (SD 3.8 days) (Lipsitch, 
Cohen et al. 2003). Common clinical symptoms at hospital admission include high fever, malaise, 
cough and headache. Most SARS patients received treatment that was based on previous experience 
with respiratory infections and evolved over the course of the epidemic, with ribavirin and 
corticosteroids being the most common treatments (Groneberg, Poutonen et al. 2005). Overall the 
case fatality ratio of SARS was 15% (World Health Organisation (WHO) 2003). The basic reproduction 
number of the SARS outbreak was around 3 based on estimates from various studies of the epidemic 
(Bauch, Lloyd-Smith et al. 2005).  
 The proportion of SARS cases in healthcare workers was high, estimated to be 57% in Vietnam, 43% 
in Canada, 41% in Singapore and 22% in Hong Kong (World Health Organisation (WHO)).  
Unrecognised SARS patients in the hospitals were the source that triggered some of the hospital 
outbreaks in Taiwan (Dwosh, Hong et al. 2003), Toronto (Svoboda, Henry et al. 2004), Beijing (Shen, 
Ning et al. 2004) and Hong Kong (Wong, Lee et al. 2004).  Some of these became super-spreading 
events (Varia, Wilson et al. 2003; Shen, Ning et al. 2004; Wong, Lee et al. 2004). In some of the 
hospital outbreaks around 42-57% of cases were in healthcare workers, 14-31% were in hospital 
visitors, and 12-14% were in inpatients (Varia, Wilson et al. 2003; Chen, Leo et al. 2006). Some of 
these hospital-acquired cases generated secondary  transmission in the community in household 
settings (Varia, Wilson et al. 2003), especially by hospital visitors (Lau, Lau et al. 2004) but least likely 
by healthcare workers (Ho, Sung et al. 2003; Goh, Lee et al. 2004; Lau, Lau et al. 2004; Wilson-Clark, 
Deeks et al. 2006). 
Public health measures implemented to control the SARS outbreak by various countries included: (1) 
contact tracing and isolation of close contacts; (2) decreasing the time from symptom onset to 
isolation of patients; (3) increasing social distance; (4) enhancement of infection control measures in 
healthcare and community settings; (5) International travel restriction and entry and exit screening 
(Bell and In 2004). The timing of the onset of symptoms relative to peak infectivity is likely to have 
been the most crucial factor in the success of these public health interventions in controlling the 
SARS epidemic (Fraser, Riley et al. 2004). In SARS patients, viral load peaked between 5 and 10 days 
after the onset of illness and overt clinical symptoms (Peiris, Chu et al. 2003). Subclinical infection 
was rare (Leung, Chung et al. 2004; Lai, Keung Ng et al. 2005; Lee, Wong et al. 2006; Leung, Lim et al. 
2006). Therefore, there is a period after symptom onset when SARS patients can be isolated and 
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quarantined before infectiousness increases, and the effectiveness of these measures to interrupt 
transmission is high.   
1.2.1.2 The Hong Kong outbreak 
Hong Kong is a former British colony, and since 1997 a Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China. Covering Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, the New Territories, the 
Lantau Island and other surrounding islands (Figure 1.1), it has a land area of 1,100 km2, and a 
population of 6.8 million in 2003. It is subdivided into 18 district council districts (Figure 1.1) for 
administrative purposes, and 292 tertiary planning units (TPU) [Figure 1.2] for town planning 
purposes. Hong Kong is the fourth most densely populated territory in the world (United Nations 
2006), with a population density of about 6,300 people per km2. With only less than 25% of the 
territory's landmass developed, Hong Kong has a concentrated high-rise environment. Most of the 
territory's urban development exists on Kowloon peninsula, along the northern edge of Hong Kong 
Island, and in scattered settlements throughout the New Territories. 97% of the population live in 
the urban area, and there is great variation in the population densities of the TPUs (Figure 1.2). Hong 
Kong has a highly developed transportation network, encompassing both public and private 
transport. Over 90% of daily journeys are on public transport (Transport Department. The 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2005). Situated at the south-eastern tip 
of China, it borders the city of Shenzhen in Guangdong Province and has close social and economic 
ties with the region. Cross-boundary traffic by land to and from Mainland China is about 250,000 
passengers on weekdays. 
The SARS outbreak in Hong Kong was traced to an infected professor from Guangzhou who arrived 
in Hong Kong in mid February 2003. During his stay at the Metropole Hotel in Kowloon (Figure 1.1), 
the infection spread to other guests and visitors, who subsequently triggered off a chain of 
outbreaks in Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada and Vietnam (Leo, Chen et al. 2003; Poutanen, Low et al. 
2003; Tsang, Ho et al. 2003). In Hong Kong the SARS outbreak lasted for around 3.5 months, caused 
1755 cases and 299 deaths, and the overall incidence rate was 0.026% per person. Figure 1.3 shows 
the epidemic curve of the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong. The outbreak was characterised by a 
significant proportion of transmission in hospitals and two super-spreading events – the outbreaks in 
Prince of Wales Hospital (PWH) in Sha Tin district which started at day 20 (where day 1 of the 
epidemic is defined as the symptom onset date of the first case in Hong Kong - 15 February 2003) 
and in the Amoy Gardens - a private housing estate in Kwun Tong district in Kowloon which started 
at day 28. The epidemic grew significantly with the PWH outbreak and peaked with the community  
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 Figure 1.1 Hong Kong in 18 district council districts and the location of the SARS treating hospitals, Amoy Gardens Block E, and Metropole Hotel.  
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Figure 1.2 Population density by tertiary planning units (TPUs) of Hong Kong.  
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Figure 1.3 Epidemic curve (daily incidence) of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong. Symptom onset date of the index case 
of Hong Kong, 15 February 2003, was set as day 1 of the epidemic. 
 
 
outbreak in Amoy Gardens. After that, it declined slowly in the initial period and accelerated into 
terminal decline by mid May. 
The Prince of Wales Hospital is a 1200-bed public hospital located in the New Territories East region. 
The outbreak first came to light when there were abnormal patterns of sick leave amongst staff 
working in ward 8A. At that time knowledge about SARS was limited. The index case of the outbreak 
was an inpatient in ward 8A who was linked to the professor from Guangzhou through his visit to the 
Metropole Hotel (Tsang, Ho et al. 2003). In ward 8A there were 123 healthcare workers, inpatients 
and visitors infected. The outbreak eventually spread to other wards, and by the end of the epidemic 
the total number of infections in PWH was 243 (data sourced from the data management work of 
this study, details are given in chapter 2). 
Around the time that the PWH outbreak started, there were outbreaks of smaller scale in other 
healthcare establishments. They were located in: Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital (PYN) 
and St Paul’s hospital (SPH) on the Hong Kong Island, Baptist Hospital (BTH) in the Kowloon City 
district, Queen Elizabeth Hospital (QEH) in the Yau Tsim Mong district, and the clinic of two general 
practitioners in Yau Tsim Mong district and Tai Po district (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Expert Committee 2003).  
Amidst the PWH outbreak and the smaller outbreaks in other healthcare settings was the Amoy 
Gardens outbreak. The housing estate has an estimated 19,000 residents, and is made of 19 housing 
blocks (Blocks A – S), and each block has 33 floors, with 8 units on each floor. Units in the same stack 
on different floors are served by plumbing and drainage piping systems running vertically along the 
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external wall. Adjacent units are separated by a narrow lightwell, where bathroom windows and 
exhaust fans face one another. The super-spreading event was first alerted at day 40, when 15 
suspected SARS cases from 7 households residing in the Amoy Gardens Block E were admitted to 
United Christian Hospital (UCH). Most of the cases were from units 7 and 8 of Block E. The index case 
of the outbreak was an inpatient in the 8A, 8C and 8D wards during the PWH outbreak, and stayed 
overnight in Amoy Gardens for 2 nights between his hospitalisations. Eventually it emerged that the 
vertical virus spread was related to the drainage and sewage system, and the running exhaust fan 
served to transport into the lightwell contaminated droplets from the bathroom evacuation 
(McKinney, Gong et al. 2006). All Block E residents were then evacuated to government holiday 
camps for 10 days for quarantine (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). The 
Amoy Gardens outbreak infected in total 447 cases, including those from other blocks of the Amoy 
Gardens, the Amoy shopping mall, and the residential buildings and housing estates nearby the 
Amoy Gardens (Lower and Upper Ngau Tau Kok Estates and Choi Ha Estate) (See Chapter 2 – Data 
management for the probable source of infection derivation). 
The Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) in Kwai Tsing district is a 1,200-bed acute hospital, and the 
only hospital in Hong Kong with dedicated infectious disease wards with 86 beds. At day 43 it was 
assigned as the designated hospital to treat new SARS cases, and throughout the epidemic it treated 
the highest number (593, 34%) of SARS patients. However, the unexpected surge in cases mainly 
from the Amoy Gardens outbreak stretched the hospital’s capacity to the limit, and eventually 
hospital transmission increased. Admission of new SARS cases to PMH was suspended at day 56, and 
new SARS cases were referred to Tuen Mun Hospital (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert 
Committee 2003). Throughout the epidemic, 85 cases were infected in the PMH (Chapter 2). 
Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital (AHN) in the Tai Po district is a sister hospital of PWH. The 
closure of the accident and emergency department in PWH at day 27 because of the 8A ward 
outbreak increased the workload in AHN, and an outbreak in the hospital was initiated at day 37 
when some of the patients admitted with other medical problems later turned out to have SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). There were 136 cases infected in 
AHN, and it was the second most infected hospital of the outbreak (Chapter 2). 
In the declining phase of the epidemic, there were a number of outbreaks in the hospitals and 
residential buildings in the community. The hospital outbreaks were in Tai Po Hospital (TPH) in Tai Po 
district, United Christian Hospital (UCH) in Kwun Tong district, Caritas Medical Centre (CMC) in Sham 
Shui Po district, Tuen Mun Hospital (TMH) in Tuen Mun district, North District Hospital (NDH) in 
North district, and a second outbreak in Baptist Hospital (BTH). Community outbreaks in residential 
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buildings were located in Koway Court in Eastern district on the Hong Kong Island, Hing Tung House 
in Tung Tau Estate situated in the Wong Tai Sin district of Kowloon, and Wing Shui House in Lek Yuen 
Estate in the Sha Tin district (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). 
There were also outbreaks in the community in 8 elderly care homes. Imported cases included those 
who had visited China or Taiwan, or were infected in flight (Chapter 2). 
The key public health control measured implemented at different stages of the Hong Kong epidemic 
included contact tracing and quarantine of close contacts, suspension of classes in childcare centres, 
schools and universities, travel advice and body temperature screening at the borders and 
encouraging enhanced infection control and personal hygiene in the community. Restricted hospital 
visitor policies were also implemented in some hospitals at the critical period of the epidemic 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). 
Compared to the general Hong Kong population, there was an excess of young adults, especially 
women, infected with SARS, with a significant proportion of them being nurses. There was relative 
deficit of children and adolescents, and over-representation of elderly men (aged 75+) in the SARS 
cases. The ratio of women to men in the infected individuals was 5:4. The case fatality ratio was 
17.2% (Leung, Hedley et al. 2004). 
1.2.2 Spatial dynamics of emerging respiratory infectious disease epidemics 
1.2.2.1 Patterns of spatial spread 
Previous studies on the spatial patterns of emerging respiratory infectious disease epidemics is very 
limited due to the lack of disaggregated spatial incidence data available, with the past pandemic 
influenza probably the only emerging respiratory infectious disease studied in detail. Interpandemic 
influenza and measles are recurring respiratory infectious diseases and their spatial spread and 
mechanisms have been extensively studied. Measles is known for its biennial pattern, its spatial 
diffusion being driven by the birth rate, critical community threshold and vaccination (Finkenstadt 
and Grenfell 1998; Finkenstadt, Keeling et al. 1998; Grenfell and Bolker 1998), which are not relevant 
to the epidemiological nature of SARS. Therefore I have focused primarily on the findings from 
pandemic and interpandemic influenza. 
Prior work (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986) has characterised phenomenologically the spatiotemporal 
spread of epidemics of respiratory infections as wave-like, hierarchical, or a mixture of both. In a 
wave-like process, disease spreads from its centre of introduction to the physically nearest 
neighbouring centres. In a hierarchical diffusion process, disease spreads progressively through the 
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population hierarchy, typically from large to small centres. A mixed diffusion process contains both 
the wave-like and hierarchical components of spread, and best described the patterns in the 
influenza pandemic in 1918-1919 in England and Wales (Smallman-Raynor, Johnson et al. 2002), the 
interpandemic influenza in the United States between 1972-2002 (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006), 
and influenza in Iceland from 1945-1970 (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986). Earlier onset in larger 
populations were observed (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986; Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Chowell, 
Bettencourt et al. 2008), and wave-like diffusion became more prominent as the pandemic in 
England and Wales and epidemics in Iceland progressed (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986; Smallman-Raynor, 
Johnson et al. 2002).  
Underlying these empirically observed spatiotemporal patterns are the mechanisms that drive the 
geographic dispersal of infection, which ultimately are related to human movement patterns. For 
pure wave-like diffusion, travel needs to decrease with geographic distance, while hierarchical 
diffusion requires travel to depend on destination population size.  
Gravity models are widely used in human geography to model the relationship between human 
movement patterns and their key driving factors (Haynes and Fotheringham 1984; Fotheringham 
and O'Kelly 1988). In studies of epidemics, they are often incorporated in mathematical models to 
capture both distance and population size dependence in human movement patterns, and can 
reproduce both wave-like and hierarchical spread (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Ferguson, Cummings et 
al. 2006; Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009; Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 2010; 
Merler and Ajelli 2010). Commuter flows from homes to workplaces are found to be predictive of 
the spatial patterns of influenza epidemics compared to other types of travel data, and it 
outperformed models that only assume coupling decays to be a simple function of geographical 
distance (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006).  
Application of gravity coupling in epidemic models are based on the assumption that heterogeneous 
contact rates between individuals divided into subpopulations are proportional to flow volume 
between the subpopulations. Flow patterns modelled by gravity models are directional (from origin 
to destination), therefore under the compartmental model framework spatial mixing assumption of 
who makes the move is required. Simple unilateral assumption that infectors move to the 
susceptible population (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 2010), or susceptible move 
to the infector subpopulation (Merler and Ajelli 2010) are applied in most of the studies. Only one 
study assumed the more realistic mixing that susceptible and infector both move (Balcan, Colizza et 
al. 2009). However, it is uncertain how different spatial mixing assumptions affect the model results, 
as all studies made the assumption without assessment. 
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In the Beijing SARS outbreak, it was suggested that spatial spread between districts was overall 
mostly driven by  hospital related factors (high numbers of doctors) and also by hierarchical spread 
(with effects of population density stronger than population size), while wave-like spread dominated 
at the early phase of the epidemic (Meng, Wang et al. 2005). However, the study used the joint-
count statistic (Moran 1948) to measure the spatial autocorrelation of having new cases reported in 
the districts on the same day, not taking into account the time gap of the serial interval if a case 
from a district had infected individuals from other district, and the within-district transmission that 
confounds the result. Establishing the dynamics of spatial spread within and between districts or 
transmission settings (e.g. hospital and community) is best achieved using infection tree inference 
(Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001; Wallinga and Teunis 2004), where the occurrence of infection 
between individuals is estimated probabilistically, taking into account the timeline of infection. More 
details about these methods are discussed in a later section. 
Two empirical measures used to characterise spatiotemporal spread are the velocity of the 
geographical spread of the epidemics (Smallman-Raynor, Johnson et al. 2002; Cliff, Haggett et al. 
2008), and the trajectories of the centroid of reported disease incidence (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986). 
The speed and trajectory of spread can inform the timing of local epidemic preparation, provided 
the measures are predictive in nature, and take into account the stochastic property of disease 
transmission. This requires understanding of the underlying drivers of spatiotemporal spread, 
otherwise the inference of these measures are restricted to the description of the unique happening 
of a single epidemic. A powerful tool that can capture and study the complexity of the transmission 
dynamics and incorporate the spatial components is mathematical modelling of epidemics, and it is 
discussed further in a later section. 
1.2.2.2 Spatial cluster 
A spatial cluster can be defined as “a geographically bounded group of occurrences of sufficient size 
and concentration to be unlikely to have occurred by chance” (Knox 1989). In infectious diseases, 
spatiotemporal clusters are usually studied, because the relative timing of the occurrence of the 
cases reflects the possible epidemiological links of the cases.  
Two properties of spatial clustering are of particular relevance to infectious disease epidemics – the 
spatial autocorrelation, and the location of disease clusters. The spatial distribution of the 
individuals infected with respiratory disease is likely to exhibit spatial autocorrelation. Global 
clustering tests study the existence of clustering in the patterns and indicate the extent of 
autocorrelation or spread in the patterns, allowing comparisons among various spatial clusters as in 
the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003 (Lai, Wong et al. 2004).  
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More than a hundred global clustering tests exist (Kulldorff 2006), of which some of the more 
popular are Moran’s I (Moran 1950), Geary’s C (Geary 1954), Whittemore’s test (Whittemore, Friend 
et al. 1987), Cuzick–Edward’s k-nearest neighbors method (Cuzick and Edwards 1990), Besag–
Newell’s R (Besag and Newell 1991), Swartz entropy (Swartz 1998), and Tango’s maximized excess 
events test (Tango 2000). Various studies have compared these methods (Oden, Jacquez et al. 1996; 
Hill, Ding et al. 2000; Kulldorff, Tango et al. 2003; Song and Kulldorff 2003). 
Identification of the location of disease clusters facilitates the formulation of control measures in 
highly affected areas of disease transmission. Cluster detection methods identify locations of 
excessive cases which are not due to chance. Current methods include Kulldorff’s scan statistic in 
circular or elliptic windows (Kulldorff 1997; Kulldorff, Huang et al. 2006), Tango’s flexibly shaped 
spatial scan statistic (Tango and Takahashi 2005), and the simulated annealing method (Duczmal and 
Assuncao 2005). The first three methods differ in the shape of the scan window, and the simulated 
annealing method uses graph-based techniques to detect spatial clusters of arbitrary geometric 
form. The circular scan statistic is most widely applied because of its power to detect spatial clusters, 
while being less computer intensive than the other methods. Power evaluations showed that circular 
scan statistics works very well even for non-circular clusters compared with the elliptic window scan 
statistic and the simulated annealing method (Duczmal, Kulldorff et al. 2006). Another study found 
that the circular scan statistic performed well for elliptic shaped clusters, and vice versa (Kulldorff, 
Huang et al. 2006). The flexibly shaped scan statistic has lower accuracy than the circular scan 
statistic in detecting circular clusters, and there is a restriction on the maximum cluster size it can 
detect (Tango and Takahashi 2005).  
A study of the spatial distribution of the SARS cases in Hong Kong (Lai, Wong et al. 2004) suggested 
that cases were clustered throughout the epidemic by the Moran’s I (Moran 1950) and the nearest 
neighbour statistics (Clark and Evans 1954). Spatiotemporal  clusters of the cases in the Hong Kong 
outbreak were identified visually from smoothed maps of the cases, but the precise geographic 
location of clusters were not identified nor proven significant statistically, and the method of 
smoothing and the kernel applied were not specified. Comparing the spatial range of the cases of 
the recognised disease clusters, Amoy Gardens cases were found to be more clustered than the 
PWH cases, and the descending order of clustering by the types of hospital infection was PWH ward 
8A inpatients, PWH healthcare workers, and PWH ward 8A visitors.  
The Amoy Gardens outbreak in Hong Kong highlighted the importance of real-time detection of case 
clusters during an epidemic, so that appropriate control measures can be implemented as early as 
possible. When the outbreak was first alerted, there were already more than 200 cases, and the 
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peak of the outbreak had passed. When an isolation order on the residential block was issued five 
days later, and evacuation of the residents two days after, there were almost 350 cases. Learning 
from this experience, health officials began to announce daily the names of residential buildings with 
new cases for public vigilance. A new outbreak data management system (e-SARS, MIIDSS and SARS-
CCIS) (described in Section 2.1.1) was subsequently set up, and high risk locations of SARS 
occurrence were identified by the system (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 
2003), though the criteria used to define a high risk location was unclear.  
The cluster detection methods mentioned above are usually applied retrospectively - the tests are 
run on the full dataset to detect the spatial or spatiotemporal clusters during the whole period 
covered by the dataset. If they are applied to mimic a prospective scan for real-time cluster 
detection by repeatedly running the tests whenever a dataset is updated with the latest data, 
statistical inference from such analyses has to be adjusted for the multiple testing of the previous 
analyses conducted. Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic (Kulldorff 2001) is the prospective version 
of the Kulldorff’s scan statistic (Kulldorff 1997; Kulldorff, Huang et al. 2006) with multiple testing 
adjustment to detect recently emerged clusters with high excess risks and long-existing clusters with 
moderately excess risks. Its application as a real-time cluster detection tool in a large-scale outbreak 
remains to be evaluated.  
1.2.2.3 Spatial heterogeneity 
Mathematical modelling of epidemics capturing spatial dynamics have been used as the scientific 
tools of epidemic monitoring and control strategy evaluation during recent emerging outbreaks like 
the foot and mouth epidemic (Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001; Keeling, Woolhouse et al. 2001), the 
SARS outbreak (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003), and the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (Fraser, Donnelly et al. 
2009; Ghani, Baguelin et al. 2009). Disease transmission and interactions are localized in nature, and 
are governed by epidemiological, environmental and social factors. Under homogeneous mixing, 
variations in these factors are averaged out, and each individual has an equal chance of being 
infected from each infected individual in the population (Anderson and May 1991). This assumption 
is often applied in standard epidemic models for simplicity and because of inadequate 
computational resources in the past, at the possible trade-off of missing the key determinants of the 
observed patterns of the epidemics when the effects of heterogeneities are influential.  
Heterogeneities can be of different forms. Spatial heterogeneity refers to the differences between 
populations or individuals at different geographic locations - which can arise from the underlying 
difference in the fundamental forces governing the population dynamics, for example different 
social structure leading to variation in contact rates, or from the emerging dynamic differences, such 
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as the proportion of the population that are infectious (Keeling and Rohani 2007). I classified spatial 
heterogeneities into those that arise from the exposure to the infected individuals, and from the 
susceptibility of the uninfected individuals. Considering the residential location of the individuals as 
the base location, spatial variation in exposure is primarily determined by the interactions of the 
movement and contact patterns of the susceptible and infected individuals leading to disease 
transmission, with reference to their base locations. Gravity models incorporated in metapopulation 
epidemic models where individuals are classified by spatial location and disease state have proven 
successful in capturing this heterogeneity as discussed previously. Spatial variation in susceptibility 
could be related to the geographic or demographic properties of the location where one is based, as 
well as individual’s attributes (e.g. high risk age group). In the SARS outbreak, it is possible that areas 
where hospitals treating SARS cases are located or nearby, or areas with high proportion of the 
population with the high risk attribute(s), could be more susceptible. Such hypotheses relating to 
spatial spread have not been formally investigated. 
1.2.3 Mechanistic spatiotemporal models  
Previous studies using mechanistic spatiotemporal models to fit epidemic data and capture the 
effects of spatial heterogeneity can be classified as statistically rigorous and ad-hoc fitting 
approaches. Statistically rigorous approaches include the work of Ferguson et al. (Ferguson, Donnelly 
et al. 2001), which used an extended infection tree inference method fitted with an expectation-
maximisation algorithm to fit a transmission model to data from the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) epidemic. In that analysis, the relative risk of transmission was considered to be 
driven by farm-specific factors of susceptibility and infectivity of disease transmission, and the 
spatial distance between farms. Spatiotemporal data on the host population was combined with the 
farm-based case data to estimate spatial transmission coefficients and other epidemiological 
parameters, as well as generating infection trees.  
Wallinga and Teunis (Wallinga and Teunis 2004) formalised the infection tree inference in a non-
spatial context, and used the probability distribution of the serial interval of cases (time interval 
between the symptom onset between the primary and the secondary cases) to infer the infection 
tree from data on the onset dates of individual SARS cases using a partial likelihood. Compared to 
Ferguson et al.’s method, Wallinga and Teunis method is individual-based, and it assumes all the 
infected cases of the same symptom onset date to be equal in their susceptibility and infectivity of 
disease transmission, regardless of their demographic attributes and spatial distance. To infer 
probabilistic infection trees that take into account the spatial heterogeneities of individuals, the 
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Wallinga and Teunis method has to be extended spatially to capture the heterogeneous contact 
rates between individuals based on their reference location. 
Other spatially explicit epidemic models includes the work of Gibson (Gibson 1997), which estimated 
the transmission parameters for a spatiotemporal  stochastic model in plant epidemiology using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, where the data was the status of the system at 
individual time points, rather than on individual cases. Chis Ster and colleagues modified Gibson’s 
approach to apply it to data on the location and timing of individual cases of the FMD epidemic, first 
assuming the epidemic was completely observed (Chis Ster and Ferguson 2007), then allowing for 
hidden infections using Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC) (Chis Ster, Singh et al. 
2009).Xia et al. (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004) fitted a time series susceptible-infected-recovered (TSIR) 
model, using a gravity model of coupling between patches, to the measles epidemics in England and 
Wales. Compared to these methods, the Wallinga and Teunis method is less computationally 
intensive and does not require the population data which are often not available but only the cases 
incident data.  
Studies using less rigorous fitting methods include the work of Haydon et al. (Haydon, Chase-Topping 
et al. 2003), which constructed the infection trees of the FMD epidemic by adopting rules based on 
geographic distance between farms to select the index farm from the list of possible candidates 
generated by the time of infection. Keeling et al. (Keeling, Woolhouse et al. 2001) used the contact 
tracing data to estimate the spatial kernel of transmission for the 2001 FMD epidemic, and fitted the 
simulation models to data using brute force (generating thousands of simulation runs per parameter 
point and searching parameter space for the best least square fits with regional incidence trends). 
Among the several dozen epidemic models studying the SARS outbreak at the country level, only one 
contained explicit spatial components (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003) to capture the effects of spatial 
heterogeneity, demonstrated by 70% of the cases distributed in 3 out of the 18 districts in Hong 
Kong in the midst of the epidemic. The stochastic metapopulation compartmental model structured 
the mixing into three levels: within district, between contiguous districts and between more remote 
districts, with the population within each district classified as susceptible, latent, infectious, 
hospitalized, recovered or dead. Brute force simulation was used to fit the model to the data. The 
lack of spatial models despite their importance in studying the SARS outbreak (Bauch, Lloyd-Smith et 
al. 2005) could be due to the lack of empirical findings of spatial dynamics that inform the model 
formulation, and the limited availability of spatial data.  
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The key outcome of the epidemic models is the reproduction number. The basic reproduction 
number, R0, also known as the basic reproductive number, rate or ratio, is one of the most important 
quantities governing the spread and the time-scale of an epidemic. It is defined as the expected 
number of secondary infections caused by a typical infected case during his or her entire infectious 
period in an entirely susceptible population. The threshold of R0=1 has important implications for the 
development of the epidemic, and therefore the extent of the control measures needed to contain 
it. With R0 < 1, the epidemic will not be able to sustain itself even without any intervention. Whereas 
a R0 > 1 implies that the epidemic will grow indefinitely, and the disease transmission will need to be 
reduced by a factor of (1-1/R0) to keep it under control, under the mass action assumption of 
epidemic transmission in a large community. Such reduction can be achieved by reducing social 
contacts (e.g. by quarantine and social distancing), reducing the susceptibility of individuals (e.g. by 
vaccination and prophylaxis if they are available), and reducing infectiousness (e.g. by treating the 
infected individuals).  
Factors affecting R0 are multi-faceted, because R0 by nature is subject to the biological properties of 
the underlying pathogen, the health-related factors of the infective and susceptible individuals, and 
also the behaviour and interactions between the hosts and susceptible. The biological nature of the 
pathogen determines the natural history of disease progression and provides the possible ranges of 
the timeline of transmission and virulence of the disease. Host factors like age and co-morbidities, 
and population structure like demography and contact patterns, affect individual’s variation on the 
timeline of transmission, and efficiency of the transmission between hosts and thus the timescale of 
transmission.  
The effective reproduction number, Rt, is the actual average number of secondary cases per primary 
case observed in a population following the start of the epidemic. Its value is typically smaller than 
that of the R0, because of depletion of the susceptible by the infection, and the impact of control 
measures. The effective reproduction number by transmission settings, for instance, hospital-to-
community transmission, community-to-community transmission etc, informs and facilitates the 
comparison of the transmission potential of the settings.  
Current studies (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003; Cori, Boelle et al. 2009) quantifying the 
transmission within and between community and hospital of the SARS outbreak have shown 
opposite results. In one study, healthcare workers were estimated to be the most important driving 
forces of disease transmission, and they could have generated transmission in both the hospital and 
community (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003). In the other study, it was estimated that the contact 
rate of individuals within hospitals was very low. The difference could possibly be attributed to 
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different model structures, and the more importantly the assumptions on who can infect who in the 
community and hospital settings. Validity of the latter assumptions is best informed by contact 
tracing and source of infection data of the epidemic (chapter 2), and methods that capture all the 
observed transmission routes in the epidemic are needed to quantify the relative role of hospital 
and community transmission. 
1.3 Study objectives 
The SARS outbreak in Hong Kong in 2003 comprised transmission in the hospitals and community 
settings and the environment-driven Amoy Gardens outbreak, and each of these sources exhibited 
different mechanisms of the spatial spread of the disease. The majority of the Amoy Garden cases 
were highly concentrated in the surrounding areas of the Amoy Gardens (Lai, Wong et al. 2004) 
because of environmental drivers of the outbreak. The spatial spread and disease transmission of 
other community settings could have been driven by the movement patterns of the population, and 
other factors of spatial heterogeneities arose from the demographic or geographical properties of 
the subpopulation or spatial location. In contrast, in hospitals where transmission took place 
between healthcare workers, inpatients and visitors, these infection subgroups could exhibit 
different levels of disease transmissibility in different transmission settings and hence act as 
different drivers for spatial spread in the community. 
This study has aimed to investigate in a more comprehensive framework the effects of hospital 
transmission to community transmission, in particular the research question of: 
“How did hospital-acquired infections drive onward spread in the community (spatial spread, spatial 
clustering, and the size of community transmission) and could this be attributed to factors in the 
hospital (such as type of hospital infections, i.e. healthcare workers, inpatients and visitors) versus 
properties of the community related to disease transmission (for instance population demographics 
and geographical properties)?” 
This question is best broken down into the following parts for investigation. 
I first studied the spatial distribution and identified spatiotemporal clusters of the SARS case using 
Kulldorff’s scan statistic in the overall, and by hospital and community transmission, to investigate 
any characteristics of the spatial patterns related to the transmission settings. Then using statistical 
modelling, I investigated the spatially-stratified risk factors – demographic, geographic and hospital 
transmission related – associated with the size of community outbreak.  
 36 
Additionally, given the importance of cluster detection in real-time during an epidemic on control 
policy formulation, I have evaluated the use of the Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic (Kulldorff 
2001) as such a tool for community transmission.   
I then developed a spatial Wallinga and Teunis method that captures the spatial heterogeneity and 
all the observed transmission routes in inferring the infection tree, to quantify the spatial spread 
within and between areas and the transmission settings (hospital and community). The method also 
allows me to compare the transmissibility of healthcare workers, inpatients, hospital visitors and 
also community-acquired cases. 
1.4 Outline of the remaining chapters 
Chapter 2 describes the datasets used in this study, and the algorithm used to derive the probable 
source of infection data – the core dataset used in this study, as well as the hospitalisation data that 
were applied in chapter 6. The probable source of infection data are summarised in the chapter. 
Knowledge of the transmission routes of the epidemics was also acquired through the data 
validation steps summarised in that chapter. 
In chapter 3 I first conducted exploratory analysis of the spatial distribution and spread of the 
outbreak, and then applied Kulldorff’s scan statistic to identify the spatiotemporal clusters. I also 
investigated the risk factors associated with community outbreaks using six statistical models of 
different structures. At the end of the chapter, I evaluated the use of Kulldorff’s prospective scan 
statistic as the real-time tool during the epidemic for spatial cluster detection. 
In chapter 4, I reviewed the incorporation of gravity models in epidemic models and derived gravity 
models that best describe the movement of the Hong Kong population based on different travel data 
and different forms of the gravity models. 
In chapter 5, I developed the partially extended spatial Wallinga and Teunis method incorporating 
the gravity models I derived in chapter 4, and studied the effects of the modifications and different 
spatial mixing assumptions that linked the gravity model to the heterogeneous contact rates of 
individuals on the model results. 
In chapter 6, I reviewed the current studies that quantified the relative role of hospital and 
community transmission, and further modified the spatial Wallinga and Teunis method with spatial 
details of individual hospitals and community. Based on the inferred infection tree, I estimated the 
transmissibility by transmission settings and type of hospital and community infection, the extent of 
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within-district transmission, and derived the mechanism of spatial spread between areas. All these 
together formed a bigger picture of the spatial dynamics of the outbreak. 
In chapter 7, I discuss the results and their implications, their limitations and potential future work. 
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Chapter 2. Data Validation and Summary 
Here I describe how I derived the core dataset for this study – the source of infection data, based on 
the available data from different sources and summarise the data. I also derived a hospitalisation 
dataset extracted from three sets of hospitalisation data generated under different criteria. The 
validated hospitalisation data was used in quantifying the hospital and community transmission in 
chapter 6. Other datasets used in this study, including the geographic information system (GIS) and 
demographic data, are also described. 
2.1 Outbreak data 
2.1.1 Data collection 
Collection of good quality outbreak data is of great importance and a pre-requisite for studying the 
outbreak to understand its dynamics and evaluate control strategies. In reality, given the urgency 
and uncertainties, especially at the beginning of the outbreak, this may not be easily achieved. In the 
SARS outbreak in 2003, Hong Kong had a relatively complete dataset compared to other countries 
(Anderson, Fraser et al. 2004), attributed to remarkable human efforts and the availability of existing 
hospital and police information systems and technologies. At the beginning of the outbreak, case 
investigation and contact tracing were carried out on patients reported to have SARS and 
hospitalized in Hong Kong by the Department of Health - the health advisor of the Hong Kong 
government responsible for the disease surveillance and control. Clinical and treatment data were 
collected by the Hospital Authority - a statutory and independent body responsible for the provision 
of public hospital services and 95% of total inpatient beds in Hong Kong, which has a well developed 
clinical information system.  
Real-time information exchange was not possible with these separate databases until April, when 
new data management systems (e-SARS, MIIDSS and SARS-CCIS) were set up, and real-time 
interaction between the data systems became feasible among all relevant parties (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). The e-SARS system is a web-based system capturing 
the clinical details of SARS patients who were admitted to hospitals, and was administered mainly by 
the Hospital Authority. The SARS – Case Contact Information System (SARS-CCIS) was managed by 
the Department of Health for contact tracing and construction of the cluster trees. The Major 
Incident Investigation and Disaster Support System (MIIDSS) is a crime investigation program used 
by the Hong Kong Police Force that had been adapted to facilitate quick identification of linkage 
between cases and contacts and high risk locations of SARS occurrence. The contribution of the e-
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SARS, MIIDSS and SARS-CCIS systems to disease control was recognised as the winner of the 
Stockholm Challenge Award in 2004. 
2.1.2 Data validation and reclassification 
The data used in this study were derived from the SARSID integrated database, which was 
coordinated by the Department of Community Medicine, University of Hong Kong on behalf of the 
Health, Welfare and Food Bureau. It was derived from the Hong Kong Hospital Authority e-SARS 
system and the Department of Health’s master list, which consisted of epidemiological and case 
contact data. Data in the SARSID database included demographic, clinical and hospitalization data, 
exposure history, travel history, probable source of infection from the contact tracing questionnaire, 
and epidemiological cluster defined by the Department of Health based on the contact tracing data 
they collected. The mechanism used for defining the epidemiological cluster was not available. 
On studying the epidemiological cluster variables on the SARSID, and cross-referencing with the 
epidemiological links of the early cases reported in the official report of the SARS outbreak in Hong 
Kong (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003), it was discovered that cluster 
variables in the database do not truly reflect the source of infection of the cases, as the indexes of 
the epidemiological clusters were classified into the clusters that they generated (e.g. index of the 
Amoy cluster who was infected in hospital was classified into the Amoy cluster, cases infected in 
household settings by hospital infected indexes were grouped into the hospital clusters). Validation 
and reclassification of the source of infection data were needed for the purpose of this study. 
The reclassification and validation algorithm developed makes use of all the relevant variables in the 
dataset and the epidemiological links on the SARS report. Subjects on the SARS report are 
anonymous and matching to the subjects on the SARS database was based on all the demographical 
and epidemiological data available. For those who were not matched on the SARS report, a 
hierarchy-based reclassification algorithm was used, with more reliable and informative variables 
checked first than the other variable to find out the probable source of infection of the cases. For 
instance, for cases indicated as infected from hospital from the original cluster variable, occupation 
as healthcare worker had the highest hierarchy to confirm the case was very likely to be infected in 
hospital and as healthcare worker, followed by hospitalisation record which showed the case was 
hospitalised before symptom onset (inpatient), and then any record indicating the cases had visited 
hospital during which an outbreak was ongoing. Based on this algorithm, certain proportion of cases 
originally classified as hospital infected were found to be more likely to be infected in household 
settings by an hospital infected index cases.  
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The reclassification was carried out by writing commands and validated manually when necessary, as 
some of the codes were not standardised, and some fields were truncated and the complete dataset 
was not available. All remaining subjects not classified by the algorithm were checked manually 
record-by-record for the most suitable classification of the source of infection. 
Besides the new variable on the possible source of infection, the data reclassification and validation 
work resulted in more detailed source of infection subgroups, including:  
(a)  Hospital subgroups of ongoing inpatients (those infected whilst an inpatient for other health 
conditions and who stayed in hospital throughout for the non-SARS and SARS conditions), 
inpatients released (those infected while admitted for non-SARS condition but discharged 
during the SARS incubation period), visitors, healthcare workers, healthcare supporting staff 
and medical students;  
(b)  PWH 8A ward outbreak;  
(c)  Individual elderly care home and the subgroups of residents, visitors and staff;  
(d)  Household (live in the same household) and close contact subgroups;  
(e)  Subgroups of outbreaks in residential buildings;  
(f)   Amoy nearby buildings subgroups.  
On the main group level, 239 cases had their new potential source of infection different from the 
epidemiological cluster variable by the Department of Health. Also coding of the new possible source 
of infection variable is more standardized and has higher information content. 
The new possible source of infection was then sent to the Department of Community Medicine, 
University of Hong Kong for validation and approval, who had actually conducted an independent 
reclassification of the source of infection for their own research purposes. 218 mismatches were 
found between the two versions of the source of infection variables. After looking into and 
discussing every discrepancy, my version of the source of infection was adopted except one change 
was made [used in (Kwok, Leung et al. 2007)]. 
2.1.3 Potential source of infection summary 
Based on the new potential source of infection, there were 772 (44.0%) hospital cases and 983 
(56.0%) community cases. Excluding the 447 (25.5%) Amoy Gardens cases, hospital cases accounted 
for 59.0% of the cases and community accounted for 41.0% of the cases. A breakdown of hospital 
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cases by hospitals is given in Figure 2.1. PWH accounted for 31.5% of cases, together with AHN they 
accounted for 49.1% of cases, and together with PMH accounted for 60.1% of all hospital cases. 
Amoy Gardens accounted for 45.5% of the community cases. Composition of community 
transmission excluding the Amoy Garden cases is given in Figure 2.2. General community (where the 
specific location of infection could not be identified and the subject had no travel history) accounted 
for 34.7%, household transmission 18.1% and imported cases 15.9%. 
Figure 2.1 Breakdown (in percentage of total number of hospital cases) of hospital infected cases by hospitals. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Breakdown (in percentage of total number of community cases excluding Amoy Garden cases) of the potential 
source of infection of the community infected cases. 
 
 
Epidemic curves by infection source are given in Figure 2.3. The first case onset of the Hong Kong 
outbreak was on 15 February 2003, and it was set as the first day of the epidemic throughout this 
study. There was a higher incidence of hospital-based infection than community-based infection 
throughout most of the epidemic, except from day 31 to 46. The first peak in hospital-based 
transmission on day 23 was fuelled by the PWH outbreak, and the second peak around day 51 was 
caused by AHN and PMH (Figure 2.4). Together with UCH, TPH, TMH and BTH which all had more 
than 30 cases, these 7 hospitals accounted for 79.0% of all hospital transmission. Hospital cases 
were dominated by healthcare workers who accounted for half of the hospital infection (Figure 2.5), 
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Figure 2.3 Epidemic curves (daily incidence) of the hospital, community and Amoy Gardens outbreaks. Day 1 refers to 15 
February 2003. 
 
Figure 2.4 Epidemic curves (daily number of cases) of the 3 major hospital outbreaks (PWH, AHN, PMH).  
 
Figure 2.5 Composition of hospital infection by infection subgroup. Inpatient (released): those discharged during SARS 
incubation. Inpatient: ongoing inpatient.  
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then inpatients (30.2%, ongoing inpatients: 16.5% and inpatient discharged during SARS incubation: 
13.7%), and visitors (20.4%). 
Figure 2.6 shows that healthcare workers were the most infected group until around day 57, when 
the number of inpatient infections started to increase. The diminishing infection of hospital visitors 
could be due to the restricted visiting policy implemented in the later stage of the epidemic. Within 
community transmission, excluding Amoy Gardens cases, household and close contact transmission 
roughly accounted for one-fifth of the cases at the middle phase of the epidemic, and grew in 
importance in the later stage (Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8). 
 
Figure 2.6 Composition of the hospital infection throughout the epidemic. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Community epidemic curves excluding Amoy Gardens cases. Community (others) includes workplace, elderly 
home, GP clinic, Metropole Hotel, community and unknown. 
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Figure 2.8 Composition of the community infection excluding Amoy Gardens cases throughout the epidemic.  
 
 
2.2 Geographic Information System (GIS) and demographic data 
The GIS data of the residential address of the SARS cases, and the location of the SARS treating 
hospitals, Amoy Gardens Block E and the Metropole Hotel were provided by Department of 
Community Medicine, University of Hong Kong. There were 34 (1.9%) missing data on the case GIS 
data. The digital maps of Hong Kong were obtained from the Hong Kong government. The 
geographical demarcation system used in the first half of this study was the tertiary planning unit 
(TPU) in 2001, which divides Hong Kong into 292 TPUs. TPU is for planning purposes and contains 
areas which did not actually exist yet. A modified TPU map was created by removing the non-existing 
areas. Centroids of the TPU were projected using ArcGIS software version 9.0. Restricted by the 
spatial resolution of the trip data available, the second half of the study which modelled the 
movement patterns of the Hong Kong population using gravity models, and which was subsequently 
incorporated into the spatial Wallinga and Teunis method in chapters 5 and 6, was based on the 
District Council District (DCD) - referred as “district” in the rest of the study. There are 18 districts in 
Hong Kong. 
Demographic data for Hong Kong residents by TPU and by district used in this study were obtained 
from the Hong Kong 2001 population census. When breakdowns of population by age group with 
small counts were not available, projection was made based on that of the total population 
distribution. 
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2.3 Hospitalisation data  
There are three sets of hospitalisation data from two datasets. The SARSID integrated dataset 
contains two sets of hospitalisation data including the name of hospital, admission and discharge 
dates, collected by the Hospital Authority (HA) and Department of Health (DH) respectively (referred 
as the HA and DH data). The hospital episode dataset contains the name of hospital, admission and 
discharge dates of all episodes of hospitalisation related to SARS for the cases (referred as the 
hospital episode data). It was derived by the University of Hong Kong, inferred by the changes in the 
hospitalisation data between the regular update of the case data during the epidemic, because the 
hospitalisation record of HA was not accessible. In the hospital episode data set, some cases have 
multiple entries because of hospital transfer for treatment or convalescence, or because of changes 
in hospitalisation protocols during the outbreak (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert 
Committee 2003). In the SARSID dataset both the HA and DH data only have a single entry for each 
case. The HA data was extracted by health officials during the outbreak from the full hospitalisation 
data of HA, apparently using the first admission date and the last discharge date of the cases, though 
the dates might refer to different hospitals. The HA data only contains hospital stays in the public 
hospitals, which are managed by HA. The DH data was collected using questionnaires administered 
to the cases or their family if the patient was too ill, and from the follow-up of the cases. It contains 
data on hospital stays in private hospitals if they were provided by the interviewees. There were 
inconsistencies among these three sets of data because of the ways they were collected and derived. 
I designed the following mechanism for data validation and extraction of the three sets of 
hospitalisation data. 
The hospital episode dataset was treated as the base data, because it contains the most detailed 
information which is not available in the other dataset. On an individual case level, the hospital, 
dates of admission and discharge were compared among the three sets of data. In dealing with 
inconsistencies between the datasets, the following guidelines were applied to revise the base data: 
1. Entries in private hospital from the DH data were inserted as the first hospitalisation 
episode. All of these entries have admission and discharge dates before the first public 
hospital admission in the HA data and the hospital episode data, and the transfer of SARS 
cases is known to be from private to public hospital only, but not the other way round 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). 
2. In dealing with inconsistencies between the DH and HA data on public hospital stays, the HA 
data is considered to be more reliable because it was collected by their computerised 
patient record system, while the DH data may subject to reporting errors. 
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3. For the cases whose episode data is totally missing, the HA data is applied. 
4. Hospital episodes in convalescence hospitals and for convalescent purpose were excluded 
because the cases were no longer infectious during that period. 
All three sets of the data take the date of death of the deceased cases as the date of discharge. 
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Chapter 3 - Spatial Distribution and Cluster Analysis 
In the last chapter, I validated the probable source of infection data and other datasets used in this 
study. In this chapter, I focus on exploring the spatiotemporal patterns and clusters of the epidemic 
in overall, hospital and community levels, based on the probable source of infection data. 
3.1 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
(1) To acquire understanding of the spatial distribution of SARS cases and clustering of these 
cases 
(2) Investigate the potential effects of hospital transmission on community transmission 
(3) Evaluate the application of Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic in real-time during an 
epidemic to detect spatiotemporal clusters in the community  
I first conduct an exploratory analysis of the spatial patterns of the outbreak, then detect and 
investigate the spatial clusters seen in the epidemic, with a focus on hospital and community 
transmission. Further investigation on the potential interactions between hospital and community 
infection are performed by statistical modelling methods. 
In the evaluation of the prospective scan statistic, I focus only on the community cases because 
hospital outbreaks are usually detected more easily and promptly by unexpected increase in 
reported illness of hospital staff, as observed in the SARS outbreak (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). Community outbreaks, on the other hand, usually need 
epidemiological information to establish any potential connection between the cases. Also 
formation of localised public health control measures requires the information on the focal point of 
outbreak and the spatial range affected, which can be attained from the spatial cluster detection 
method. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Exploratory analysis  
3.2.1.1 Distribution patterns and spread 
I illustrate the overall spatial patterns and weekly spatiotemporal development of the overall SARS 
epidemic by maps of incidence rate by TPU (Tertiary planning unit). Trends in the latter are 
interpreted by disaggregation by transmission source (hospital, community and the Amoy Gardens 
event) to explore the relationship between epidemic growth and spatial spread. Maps of the spatial 
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distributions of hospital and community infected incidence rates by TPU are also studied to explore 
the characteristics of the individual transmission sources. For hospital infection, the spatial 
distribution of the cases of the key hospital outbreaks – PWH (Prince of Wales Hospital), AHN (Alice 
Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital) and PMH (Princess Margaret Hospital), and the hospital infection 
subgroups (healthcare worker, inpatient and visitors) were compared. 
I define a TPU as infected if there was at least one SARS case living in the TPU, and the time that a 
TPU is infected as the symptom onset date of the first case living in that TPU. I then studied the 
trends in between-TPU spread by time.  
3.2.1.2 Spatiotemporal clusters 
I retrospectively detected the spatiotemporal clusters of the complete epidemic using Kulldorff’s 
spatial scan statistic with a circular window (Kulldorff 1997) through the SaTScanTM software version 
7.0 (www.satscan.org). In the space-time scan statistic method, a cylindrical window is scanned 
across the space of the study region , and time by the height of the cylinder. The window varies in 
volume during the scan, up to a pre-specified maximum value in percentage of population at risk or 
Cartesian units for the circular base, and up to a percentage of the study time period for the 
temporal window. At each location, the numbers of observed and expected observations inside the 
cylinder are noted. Using the likelihood ratio test, the alternative hypothesis that there is an 
elevated risk within the cylinder as compared to outside, conditional on the total number of cases 
observed in the study region is tested, and adjustment of inhomogenous population distribution or 
other covariates in the expected cases is allowed. Under the Poisson assumption for the number of 
cases in each location, the likelihood function for a specific cylinder is proportional to: 
( ) ( )
x N x
x N x
E x N E x
 
Where N is the total number of observed cases, x is the observed number of cases within the 
cylinder and E(x) is the covariate adjusted expected number of cases within the window under the 
null hypothesis. Monte Carlo simulation is used to perform the hypothesis testing, and the cylinder 
with the maximum likelihood is the most likely cluster and the p-value is calculated. Besides the 
most likely (primary) cluster, secondary clusters are detected and ordered according to their 
likelihood ratio test statistics. 
In this study the spatial scan statistic was applied on the TPU incidence which was geographically 
referenced by the centroid of the TPU. Cases of ongoing inpatients were excluded in the cluster 
detection as they had stayed in the hospital throughout the epidemic, making the residential 
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location a misleading measure of potential infection source. A Poisson distribution was assumed for 
the number of cases in the TPUs, and the number of expected cases in the TPU was adjusted by the 
age-sex distribution of the population in the TPU using indirect standardization.  
In setting the maximum circle sizes, I used relatively small circles compared to the default settings 
because large clusters can be captured as a combination of small clusters, but big maximum circle 
can lead to capturing false positive areas surrounding the truly positive areas. The maximum circle 
size was set as 5% of the population at risk (ie. 201,074 of 6,702,480 population), compared to the 
default setting of 50%. The maximum circle radius was set as 2 km, corresponding to a circle area of 
12.6 km2. This was justified given the total size of Hong Kong is 1068 km2, and 65% of TPUs are 
smaller than 3 km2, and 90% smaller than 10 km2. The maximum time window was 50% of the study 
period, which is the default setting. This allowed spatiotemporal clusters that lasted for half of the 
time of the epidemic to be detected. Monte Carlo simulation was repeated 999 times.  
The spatiotemporal clusters were identified for the overall epidemic, and then for hospital and 
community transmission. I also investigated the composition of the source of infection of the cases 
in the statistically significant clusters (p-value≤ 0.05) in the overall epidemic, and tested if there is 
any difference in the proportions of cases in different sources of infection being captured in the 
clusters. This is to test if cases of certain infection sources are more locally clustered than the others. 
3.2.2 Interactions between hospital and community transmission 
I first explored if the community spatial clusters were related to the location of hospitals with SARS 
cases, and to the hospital clusters, by comparing the location and timing of the hospital and 
community spatiotemporal clusters detected to explore any interaction between them. 
I then investigated the risk factors that were associated with the size of community infections in the 
TPUs. The incidence of community cases in the TPUs were modelled with risk factors related to both 
the local demographic characteristics of the TPUs and the hospital transmissions of TPUs. These 
included:  
(a) population size of the TPU (as the offset variable) 
(b) population density of the TPU 
(c) age distribution of the TPU (proportion of the age groups of 0-24, 25-49, 50-74, 75+ in the 
TPU population) 
(d) whether there is a SARS treating hospital in the TPU 
(e) the geographical distance of the TPU to the nearest SARS treating hospital (derived as the 
Euclidean distance between the Cartesian co-ordinates of the centroid of the TPU and the 
hospital) 
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(f) the number of hospital infection in the nearest SARS treating hospital 
(g) the numbers of hospital infected cases living in the TPU 
(h) the number of hospital infected healthcare workers living in the TPU 
(i) the number of infected inpatients discharged during the incubation period of SARS living in 
the TPU 
(j) the number of infected hospital visitors living in the TPU 
(k) the symptom onset day of the first case in the TPU to reflect the control measures 
implemented by that time 
Six statistical models were applied to the model the community case count by TPU, including: 
1) quasi-Poisson model 
2) negative binomial model  
3) zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model 
4) zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model  
5) hurdle Poisson (HP) 
6) hurdle negative binomial (HNB) model  
The generalized linear models with quasi-Poisson and negative binomial distributions were used to 
adjust for the overdispersion in the TPU incidence. The zero-inflated (Mullahy 1986; Lambert 1992) 
and hurdle models (Mullahy 1986) were used to capture the high zero counts in the TPUs incidence, 
because 61.5% of the populated TPUs had no community cases in the SARS epidemic. Both models 
are composed of a zero component, denoted as fzero(0;z, ), and a count component, denoted as  
fcount(y;x, ), where y is the count variable, x and z are the covariate vectors, and  and  are the 
corresponding vector of parameters. The main difference between the two models is how the zero 
count is modelled. The zero-inflated model can be expressed as: 
(0; , ) (1 (0; , )) (0; , )        if =0
( ; , , , )
(1 (0; , )) ( ; , )                              if >0  
zero zero count
zeroinfl
zero count
f z f z f x y
f y x z
f z f y x y
 
therefore in the public health concept, it can be considered that the zero counts can be from both 
the at-risk and not-at-risk populations (Rose, Martin et al. 2006). Whereas hurdle models consist of a 
left truncated count component for the positive counts, and a right-censored zero hurdle 
component that models the outcome of zero or non-zero. It can be written as:  
(0; , )                                                          if =0
( ; , , , ) ( ; , )
(1 (0; , ))                         if >0  
1 (0; , )
zero
hurdle count
zero
count
f z y
f y x z f y x
f z y
f x
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and it can be conceptualized as the zeros are only from the at risk population.  
In this study, I used both the Poisson and negative binomial distribution for fcount(y;x, ), and the 
logistic regression model for fzero(0;z, ).  Model parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood 
method. Covariates used in the zero and hurdle components of the zero augmented models were 
the same as in the count model, except the symptom onset date of the first case in the TPU was 
excluded. Amoy Gardens and imported cases were excluded in the analysis. The models were 
compared using the Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and 
the Vuong statistic (Vuong 1989). 
3.2.3 Real-time cluster detection  
I applied the Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic (Kulldorff 2001) to the data available by the start of 
each day of the epidemic to examine the spatiotemporal clusters detectable at each time point. The 
prospective scan statistic differs from retrospective scan statistic in the following ways: 
(a) Denote the study period covered by the data as (x1,xt), and the period scanned by the varying 
cylindrical window to detect any cluster to be (s1,s2). The retrospective scan statistic detects any 
cluster of time dimension x1  s1  s2  xt, whereas the prospective scan only detects clusters of 
time dimension x1  s1  s2 = xt,. Therefore the latter only identifies clusters with excess risk still 
present at day xt-1, which can be emerging clusters or long-existing clusters of moderate level of 
excess risks.  
(b) Repeated application of retrospective scan statistic periodically gives rise to multiple 
comparison issue in the statistical inference, leading to false positive errors. The prospective 
scan statistic overcomes this by taking the likelihood for the real data set as the maximum over 
all cylinders with s2 = xt-1 as described above, but in the random data sets, the likelihood is 
maximized over all cylinders used in previous analyses in addition to the current one, ie. s1  s2  
xt-1.  
(c) When the epidemic is still ongoing, prospective scan statistic being run on day k uses the most 
up-to-date dataset covering the study period (x1,xk-1). Whereas for the retrospective scan, 
because of the multiple comparison issue, it is usually run on dataset of completed event, 
covering the study period (x1,x2) where x2 is the last day of the epidemic, or the defined end day 
of the study and x2  xk-1. Because both scan statistics are conditional on the corresponding total 
number of cases, the thresholds used to define “excess risk” in the two methods are different. 
I applied the same settings of maximum circle size and temporal window as in the retrospective 
scan, and the inference was set to adjust for the previous prospective scan since the start of the 
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study period. The tests were run in the SaTScanTM software 102 times (days) to cover the whole 
period of the epidemic. 
Results of the prospective scans were compared to those detected from the data on the community 
cases of the full epidemic using the retrospective basis mentioned in Section 3.2.1.2. Though they 
are not directly comparable because the scan statistic is conditional on the total number of cases 
observed, it would still be insightful to compare between the two when interpreted with caution. 
The comparison was made on the TPU level as the prospective clusters changed over time, making 
comparison on the cluster level difficult. Information on the high risk locations identified by the 
outbreak data management system (e-SARS, MIIDSS and SARS-CCIS) were not openly accessible, 
therefore it was not possible to compare these with the identified clusters. The cluster involving the 
TPU where Amoy Gardens is located was studied further, and compared to the timeline health 
officials in Hong Kong was alert to the outbreak.    
3.3 Results 
In this section, I first present the results of the overall epidemic, and then on the hospital and 
community transmission. After that I will present the findings on the interactions between hospital 
and community transmission, and the evalualtion of real-time cluster detection method. 
3.3.1 Overall epidemic  
3.3.1.1 Spatiotemporal distribution and TPU spread 
The Hong Kong SARS cases were distributed in 143 TPUs (57.7%), and the TPU incidence rates varied 
greatly (Figure 3.1) compared to the average Hong Kong incidence rate of 26.2 per 105 population. 
Three TPUs were of extremely high incidence rate, located in the Sai Kung district (TPU 833), Yau 
Tsim Mong district (TPU 211), and Kwun Tong district (TPU 291) respectively. Except TPU 291 where 
the Amoy Gardens is located, the high incidence rates in other two coastal TPUs were due to small 
population sizes (TPU 833: 2 cases in 25 people; TPU 211: 3 cases in 14135 people).  
Early cases contributed significantly to spread between the TPUs (Figure 3.2), with the first 20% 
cases contributing 71.0% of the total TPU spread (65.7% excluding the Amoy Gardens cases), the 
first 30% of the cases 78.5% of the TPU spread (75.8% excluding the Amoy Gardens cases), and the 
first 40% of cases 79.7% of the TPU spread (77.5% excluding the Amoy Gardens cases).  
Figure 3.3 shows the trend of TPU spread by symptom onset date throughout the epidemic, which 
could be classified into 4 stages according the rate of TPU spread. Stage 1 was the initial growth of 
the epidemic which occurred before the PWH outbreak happened, defined as between day 1 to day 
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Figure 3.1 Spatial distribution of SARS cases in Hong Kong (TPU incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.2 TPU spread by incidence (both in cumulative percentages) for: (i) all cases (whose residential TPUs could be 
identified), (ii) excluding the Amoy Gardens cases. 
 
19, during which the first 1.1% of total cases had symptoms onset and first 11.1% of the TPUs were 
infected. Stage 2 was the period of rapid growth in TPU spread between day 20 and 33, coinciding 
with the prime period of the PWH outbreak, and accounted for the next 18.0% of the cases and 
58.0% of the TPU infected; stage 3 was characterised as the decelerated TPU spread between day 34 
and 60, which captured the peak of the Amoy Gardens outbreak, and accounted for the next 64.2% 
of incidence and 27.3% of the TPU spread. Stage 4 was the phase of relatively stagnant TPU spread 
between day 61 and 106, corresponding to the last 15.4% of the cases and 3.5% of the TPU spread. 
TPUs infected in the later stages of the epidemic had significantly lower mean population densities 
and also population size [both ordinary least square linear regression p-values=0.010, Figure 3.4 (a-
b)], and uninfected TPUs tend to have small population size and low population densities (Figure 
3.5), suggesting some form of the hierarchical spread of the epidemic. 
The spatiotemporal development of the epidemic is illustrated by the weekly TPU incidence rates in 
Figure 3.6 (a-c), during the first 3 weeks of the epidemic, which corresponded largely to stage 1 of 
the TPU spread, the cases were scattered in different TPUs over the territory. In the following 2 
weeks [Figure 3.6(d)-(e), week 4 and 5], which was mainly under the stage 2 of the TPU spread, there 
were sharp increases in both the incidence and TPU spread fuelled by the PWH outbreak (Figure 2.4) 
and then the increase in community transmissions (Figure 2.3), and the cases were more clustered in 
distribution than the previous weeks. Week 6 [Figure 3.6(f)] was under the stage 3 of the TPU 
spread, during which the Amoy Gardens outbreak reached its peak, and there were more 
community than hospital cases (Figure 2.3) as the PWH outbreak was subsiding (Figure 2.4). Cases 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%100%
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 %
 o
f i
n
fe
ct
ed
 T
P
U
s
Cumulative % of incidence
All
Excl. Amoy
First 40% of cases: 78%-80% of infected TPUs
First 30% of cases: 76%-79% of infected TPUs
First 20% of cases: 66%-71%of infected TPUs
 55 
Figure 3.3 Infected TPU and incidence by source of infection (both in cumulative percentages) by symptom onset day. 
 
Figure 3.4 Boxplot of the (a) population density, (b) population size of the new TPUs infected by stages. Black cross: 
mean; red line inside the box: median. 
(a) (b) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Scatter plot of the population size and population density by stage of infection. 
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were located in some of the previously infected TPUs, and also in TPUs contiguous to the previously 
infected TPUs. The next 2 weeks were still under stage 3 (Figure 3.6 (g)-(h), week 7 and 8), during 
which the AHN, PMH and UCH outbreaks peaked, while the Amoy Gardens outbreaks was subsiding 
(Figure 2.3), and some TPUs in the Tai Po and North districts were infected. The following 2 weeks 
(Figure 3.6(i)-(j), week 9 and 10) was the peaks of the TPH and TMH outbreaks, and new TPU 
infections were found in the Yuen Long district, while considerable cases appeared in the Tai Po 
district. Stage 4 of the TPU spread commenced during this period, and decrease in weekly incidence 
and TPU spread was reflected in Figure 3.6(i). The next 6 weeks (Figure 3.6 (k)-(p), week 11-16) 
showed the ending of the epidemic (Figure 2.3) and case distribution was scattered.  
3.3.1.2 Spatiotemporal clusters 
Twelve statistically significant spatiotemporal clusters based on all SARS cases (excluding ongoing 
inpatients) were identified and mapped in Figure 3.7. The clusters captured 48.8% of the cases 
where residential TPUs were identifiable. The TPU where the Amoy Gardens is located was identified 
as the primary cluster (cluster 1, p-value=0.001). For the other 11 secondary clusters (p-values 
ranged from 0.001 to 0.009), those surrounding the PWH and SH (clusters 3, 5, 6, 11, 12) formed an 
area of clusters, and cluster 2 was near AHN and TPH, and almost all of them had a high proportion 
of hospital infections of 58.8%-72.7%, except cluster 11 at 44.0% (Figure 3.8 and Table 3.1). Five 
other clusters (clusters 1, 4, 7, 9, 10) had a high proportion of community infection cases, and cluster 
10 was adjacent to the Amoy primary cluster.  
The temporal information on the clusters is given in Figure 3.9. 75% of the clusters started within 8 
days from day 20, which was the initial period of the PWH outbreak. Only clusters 1, 9 and 10 started 
later that this period. Cluster 2, which is near the AHN and TPH, was the longest cluster in duration 
which lasted for 51 days. Cluster 8, a pure hospital infection cluster, was the shortest cluster which 
lasted for only 1 day. Table 3.1 shows the composition of potential source of infection of each 
cluster. Cluster 2 had 37.9% of AHN and 11.4% of PWH cases in the cluster, and this explained the 
long duration of the cluster given the timing of the PWH and AHN outbreaks (Figure 2.4). Clusters 3, 
5, 6, 8, 11 and 12 had high PWH cases of 47.7%, 52.6%, 100.0%, 28.0% and 29.4% in the clusters 
respectively. Cluster 7 had 19.2% of the cases infected from PWH, and 23.1% from the general 
community where specific source could not be identified. Cluster 1 and 10 had 98.4% and 39.3% of 
Amoy Gardens cases, and clusters 4 and 9 had 91.7% and 70.6% of the cases sourced from outbreaks 
in buildings in the clusters. 
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Figure 3.6 (a)-(p): Weekly incidence rate (per 100,000 population) by TPUs (from left top to left bottom, then right top to 
right bottom). 
 
  
(a) Week 1 (b) Week 2
(c) Week 3 (d) Week 4
(e) Week 5 (f) Week 6
(g) Week 7 (h) Week 8
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(i) Week 9 (j) Week 10
(k) Week 11 (l) Week 12
(m) Week 13 (n) Week 14
(o) Week 15
(p) Week 16
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Figure 3.7 Spatiotemporal clusters of all cases excluding ongoing inpatients numbered in descending order of statistical significance (all with p-values < 0.05). The number of infections in the 
SARS treating hospitals was shown as circles (in proportion to the number of infections).  
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Figure 3.8 Composition of the clusters (hospital or community infections). 
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Figure 3.9 Start and end days and the duration (figure in the bar) of the spatiotemporal clusters of all cases (excluding ongoing inpatients). 
 
Table 3.1 Composition of the source of infection (in percentage of total number of cases in the cluster) of the spatiotemporal clusters of all cases (excluding ongoing inpatients). (Figures 
greater than 25% are in bold). 
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Table 3.2 shows the percentage of cases in each source of infection captured in the spatiotemporal 
clusters. Amoy Gardens cases had the highest proportion of cases in cluster (89.8%), followed by 
AHN cases (72.7%), elderly home cases (57.9%), buildings (56.1%), TPH (47.1%), household (46.4%), 
and PWH (45.7%) cases. 57.6% of the community cases including Amoy Gardens cases were 
captured in the clusters, which is significantly higher than that of the hospital cases (35.2%, p-value 
Table 3.2  Percentage of cases captured in clusters by source of infection. 
Sources of infection Description 
% of cases in 
clusters 
number of cases 
in the source 
amoy Amoy Gardens 89.8% 442 
ahn Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital 72.7% 99 
elderly homes Elderly care homes 57.9% 19 
buildings Residential buildings 56.1% 57 
tph Tai Po Hospital 47.1% 17 
household Household 46.4% 97 
pwh Prince of Wales Hospital 45.7% 223 
unknown Unknown 37.5% 24 
close contact Close contact 33.3% 33 
sph St. Paul Hospital 33.3% 9 
GP clinics General practitioner clinics 31.3% 16 
bth Baptist Hospital 25.0% 32 
sh Shatin Hospital 25.0% 4 
qeh Queen Elizabeth Hospital 24.0% 25 
uch United Christian Hospital 22.0% 41 
community General community 20.1% 174 
imported Imported 19.0% 84 
pyn Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital 10.5% 19 
cmc Caritas Medical Centre 7.7% 13 
pmh Princess Margaret Hospital 6.3% 79 
ndh North District Hospital 5.0% 20 
workplace (non-hospital) Workplace (non-hospital) 0.0% 7 
kwh Kwong Wah Hospital 0.0% 18 
metropole hotel Metropole hotel 0.0% 3 
qmh Queen Mary Hospital 0.0% 4 
sth St. Teresa's Hospital 0.0% 3 
tko Tseung Kwan O Hospital 0.0% 4 
tmh Tuen Mun Hospital 0.0% 27 
twa Tusen Wan Adventist Hospital 0.0% 2 
ych Yan Chai Hospital 0.0% 1 
uh Union Hospital 100.0% 1 
hospital total   35.2% 623 
community total   57.6% 974 
community ex. Amoy   30.8% 532 
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<0.001). However, on excluding Amoy Gardens cases, there was no significant difference in the 
proportion of cases in clusters between community (30.8%) and hospital cases (p-value=0.270). 
3.3.2 Hospital transmission 
3.3.2.1 Spatial distribution and clusters 
The spatial distribution of the hospital cases is given in Figure 3.11. Among the top five most infected 
hospitals, PWH, PMH and UCH had 57.6% to 74.1% of cases in healthcare workers, whereas AHN and 
TPH had 45.6% to 73.7% of inpatient cases.  The two coastal TPUs in Kowloon with the highest 
incidence rates were due to small population sizes of the TPUs (Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.13). Ten 
spatiotemporal clusters (p-values ranged from 0.001 to 0.003) of the hospital cases were identified 
and are displayed in Figure 3.12. The primary cluster (cluster 1) was located around AHN and TPH, 
and a group of secondary clusters (clusters 2, 3, 4, 8, 9) were located around PWH and SH. These 
TPUs were also identified as spatial clusters of all SARS cases (Figure 3.7). Cluster 6 was around the 
PMH, and cluster 7 located in the Tsing Yi Island, which had a population of 193,432 in 55,478 
households in 2001 (Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
2001), and both were related to the PMH outbreak (Figure 3.18). Cluster 10 was located between 
SPH and PYN. Similar to the all cases clusters (Figure 3.9), the majority (80.0%) of the clusters started 
within one week from day 20, and cluster 1 lasted for the longest (52 days) while cluster 5 only 
lasted for one day (Figure 3.10). The commencement dates of cluster 6 and 7 matched with the 
timing of the PMH outbreak (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 3.10  Start and end days and the duration (figure in the bar) of the spatiotemporal clusters of hospital cases 
(excluding ongoing inpatients). 
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Figure 3.11 Spatial distribution of hospital infected SARS cases in Hong Kong (TPU incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.12 Hospital spatiotemporal clusters (excluding ongoing inpatients) numbered in descending order of statistical significance (all with p-values <0.05). 
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Figure 3.13 Spatial distribution of infected healthcare workers (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.14 Spatial distribution of infected inpatients (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.15 Spatial distribution of infected hospital visitors (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.16 Spatial distribution of the PWH infected cases (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.17 Spatial distribution of the AHN infected cases (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.18 Spatial distribution of the PMH infected cases (incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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With 49.5% of the hospital infections were in healthcare workers, they were distributed in more 
TPUs (Figure 3.13), followed by inpatients (30.2%, Figure 3.14) and visitors (9.1%, Figure 3.15), but in 
terms of the ratio of number of TPUs with the infection subgroup / numbers of cases, healthcare 
workers had the lowest ratio of 0.27 (103/378), compared to 0.46 (106/233) for the inpatients and 
0.49 (34/70) for hospital visitors. However, the relationship between the number of TPUs with the 
infected subgroup and number of cases was not necessarily linear, as one would expect that as the 
number of cases increased, the number of TPU remaining uninfected would decrease. In fact, the 
number of healthcare worker infected was higher than the number of populated TPUs in Hong Kong. 
The spatial spread of the cases of individual hospitals varied between the 3 most infected hospitals. 
PWH spread widely in the territory (Figure 3.16), in contrast to AHN where the cases were relatively 
concentrated around the Tai Po and Sha Tin districts nearby the hospital (Figure 3.17). PMH cases 
were slightly more scattered than those of AHN (Figure 3.18). 
3.3.3 Community transmission 
3.3.3.1 Spatial distribution and clusters 
Figure 3.19 shows the distribution of the community cases of the SARS outbreak. The coastal TPU in 
the south-west of Sai Kung district with the highest incidence rate was due to small population size, 
and the TPU where the Amoy Gardens is located had incidence rate of 587.6 per 105 population. 
High incident rates were also found in 2 TPUs in the Tai Po and Yuen Long districts, and a TPU in the 
north of the Sai Kung district. The spatiotemporal clusters of the community cases are displayed in  
Figure 3.20, the temporal information of the clusters in Figure 3.21, and the composition of the 
source of infection in Table 3.3. The TPU where Amoy Gardens is located was the primary cluster (p-
value=0.001), dominated by Amoy Gardens cases (99.2%), and lasted for 11 days, the shortest 
duration among other community clusters. Six secondary clusters were identified (p-values ranged 
from 0.001 to 0.049), some of them were nearby the sites of major hospital and Amoy Gardens 
outbreaks. 4 out of the 7 clusters started to be a spatial cluster between day 25 to 29. Cluster 3 near 
TPH was dominated by household (34.7%) and general community (28.6%) transmission, and it 
wasthe longest cluster in duration, lasted for 44 days. Cluster 7 near PWH had considerable 
proportion of household transmission (40.9%). Cluster 6 surrounding the Amoy Gardens had 50.0% 
of the cases in the cluster infected from the Amoy Gardens outbreak, and was the shortest cluster in 
duration that lasted for 11 days. Cluster 2 and 4 in Sai Kung district and Eastern district were 
dominated by outbreaks in residential buildings (91.7% and 63.2% respectively). Cluster 5 in the 
Kowloon City district had 30.0% of general community and 20.0% of household transmission. 
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Figure 3.19 Distribution of community infected SARS cases in Hong Kong (TPU incidence rate per 100,000 population). 
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Figure 3.20 Community spatiotemporal clusters numbered in descending order of statistical significance (all with p-values <0.05). 
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Figure 3.21 Start and end days and the duration (figure in the bar) of the spatiotemporal clusters of community cases. 
 
Table 3.3 Composition (% total) of the source of infection of the community spatiotemporal clusters. Figures >25% are in bold. 
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3.3.4     Interactions between hospital and community transmission 
3.3.4.1 Comparison of spatiotemporal clusters 
Figure 3.22 shows there were two common clusters of the hospital and community cases – adjacent 
to AHN and PWH respectively, where the latter was a partial overlap (TPU 759 only). Both common 
clusters first started as hospital clusters for 5 to 7 days, before they also became community 
clusters. On comparing the timing of the hospital and community clusters (Figure 3.23), the common 
cluster near AHN ended as hospital and community clusters on the same day, whereas the partial 
common cluster ended as a hospital cluster 1 day earlier than the community cluster. Hospital 
clusters in general started earlier than the community clusters, but there was no significant 
difference in the mean duration of the hospital and community clusters (T-test p-value=0.766). 
3.3.4.2 Risk factors for the size of TPU infection 
The results of the 6 models on the community case count of the TPUs are shown in Table 3.4. The 
AIC and BIC showed that model superiority in descending order was ZINB, NB, HNB, ZIP, HP, and 
Vuong statistic suggested NB, ZINB, HNB were indifferent, and they were better than ZIP, followed 
by HP. Tests for overdispersion suggested that NB model, compared to quasi-Poisson was justified 
(p-value <0.001). The HP, HNB and ZINB models accurately predicted the number of zeroes, whereas 
the other models underestimated the zero counts. The number of cases in the nearest SARS hospital 
was significant in all the 6 models in predicting the counts and with relatively robust coefficient 
estimates. In the zero augmented models, the zero and hurdle components of the models predicted 
the probability of observing a zero count. All the 4 models indicated that increases in geographic 
distance to the nearest SARS hospital increased the chance of a TPU to be free from community 
transmission, but the predicted adjusted odds ratio in the ZINB was unreasonably high, at 10.99 
(1.40 - 86.41), and that of the HNB, HP and ZIP models were 1.59 (1.07 - 2.38), 1.91 (1.32 – 2.75), and 
4.08 (1.54 - 10.80) respectively. Taking into consideration the goodness of fit, accuracy in zero count 
prediction, and the estimated coefficients, HNB outperformed the other models. The HNB model 
showed that higher incidence of community transmission in the TPUs was related to a higher 
percentage of population aged 75+ in the TPU, a lower population density, a greater size of hospital 
outbreak in the nearest hospital with SARS patients, and earlier first case symptom onset of the TPU. 
In contrast, a higher chance of a TPU remaining uninfected by SARS was related to a higher 
percentage individuals of aged 50-74 in the TPU, lower population density, being further away from 
a hospital with SARS patients, and having less hospital infected subjects living in the TPU. Therefore 
the effects of hospital to community transmission were confirmed. 
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Figure 3.22 Comparison of hospital and community spatiotemporal clusters. Labels in red: cluster number of hospital clusters, labels in green: cluster number of community clusters. 
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Figure 3.23 Common clusters started as hospital only clusters (TPU 759 only for cluster H9C7) before they became 
common clusters. Cluster names starting with “H” are hospital clusters, and starting with “C” are community clusters, and 
the two common clusters are named as “H_C_”. 
 
  
3.3.5     Real-time cluster detection 
Figure 3.24 shows the spatial distribution, and Figure 3.25 the temporal information of the 39 TPUs 
detected as clusters using real-time application of the Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic. The 
cluster start and end days refers to the days given by the scan statistic that the TPU started or 
ceased to be a statistical significant cluster. Some TPUs were detected to be a cluster in more than 
one period of time. Table 3.6 compares the TPUs identified in the prospective and retrospective 
clusters (note that one must take into account that the scan statistic is conditional on the total 
number of cases observed when comparing these results). 12 TPUs (30.8%) were commonly 
identified in both the prospective and retrospective scans as clusters, of which 3 had the same 
cluster start dates in both scans, but the prospective scan detected later cluster end dates by 7 to 8 
days.  
Table 3.5 compares the timeline when TPU 291 - where the Amoy Gardens is located, was detected 
as a cluster. It was first detected as part of a cluster on day 28 along with other TPUs, including TPUs 
233, 246, 271, 272, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288 (only 2 of which were identified in
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Table 3.4 Comparison of the results of quasi-poisson, negative binomial, zero-inflated poisson / negative binomial, hurdle poisson / negative binomial models on the community case 
count in TPUs. The zero  and hurdle components of the zero-inflated and hurdle models predicted the probability of observing a zero count in the TPU.  
 
 
Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value Estimate SE p-value
Count model coefficients (Offset variable: ln(population size of TPU))
Intercept -9.053 0.877 <0.001 -9.038 0.433 <0.001 -8.446 0.532 <0.001 -8.400 0.703 <0.001 -7.747 0.833 <0.001 -9.363 0.719 <0.001
No. of cases in the nearest SARS hospital 0.006 0.002 <0.001 0.005 0.001 <0.001 0.006 0.001 <0.001 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.044
% of aged 50-74 in TPU -0.086 0.041 0.035 -0.083 0.022 <0.001 -0.100 0.025 <0.001 -0.069 0.032 0.033 -0.094 0.037 0.011
% of aged 75+ in TPU 0.074 0.024 <0.001 0.100 0.016 <0.001 0.132 0.018 <0.001 0.088 0.044 0.043
No. of hospital infected cases in the TPU 0.020 0.008 0.017 0.023 0.004 <0.001 0.021 0.005 <0.001
Population density of the TPU -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.002 <0.001 -0.014 0.004 <0.001
Day of first symptom onset in the TPU -0.020 0.007 <0.001 -0.036 0.018 0.044
Zero-inflated / zero hurdle model coefficients 
Intercept -12.413 4.139 0.003 -7.238 2.135 <0.001 -21.811 9.270 0.019 -5.019 2.396 0.036
ln(distance to the nearest SARS hospital) 1.406 0.496 0.005 0.646 0.187 <0.001 2.397 1.052 0.023 0.466 0.204 0.023
Population density of the TPU -0.031 0.006 <0.001 -0.023 0.006 <0.001
% of aged 50-74 in TPU 0.167 0.052 <0.001 0.161 0.061 0.009
No. of hospital infected cases in the TPU -0.488 0.104 <0.001
logLik NA -348.651 -373.590 -317.853 -315.598 -316.999
DF 5 8 11 4 6 11
AIC NA 713.302 769.181 643.706 643.197 655.998
BIC NA 741.377 807.784 657.744 664.253 694.601
Vuong's test (superior to)
Zero-inflated Poisson NA NA -2.689 0.004 1.363 0.087 1.454 0.073 1.161 0.123
Hurdle Poisson 2.689 0.004 NA NA 2.595 0.005 2.694 0.004 2.264 0.012
Negative Binomial -1.363 0.087 -2.595 0.005 NA NA 0.971 0.166 0.104 0.459
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial -1.454 0.073 -2.694 0.004 -0.971 0.166 NA NA -0.175 0.431
Hurdle Negative Binomial -1.161 0.123 -2.264 0.012 -0.104 0.459 0.175 0.431 NA NA
Expected no. of zeroes* 130 145 152 148 152 152
*  Observed number of zeroes is 152
Quasipoisson Zero-inflated Poisson Hurdle Poisson Negative Binomial
Zero-inflated Negative 
Binomial Hurdle Negative Binomial
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Table 3.5 Comparison of the timeline the Amoy TPU (291) was detected by the prospective and retrospective scan 
statistics, and the time health officials were alert to and confirmed the outbreak. 
 
the retrospective scan), with 9 of the 57 total cases (15.8%) distributed in these TPUs, and 2 in TPU 
291. Another case was recorded in TPU 291 on day 29 before the Amoy Gardens outbreak started on 
day 30. The same cluster remained significant until day 36, when TPU 291 became a primary cluster 
of its own, by then there were 20 accumulated cases in the TPU, 17 of which were Amoy cases. The 
retrospective scan detected the Amoy Gardens outbreak on day 35, when there were 11 cumulative 
Amoy cases. The health officials of Hong Kong become alert of an abnormal outbreak on day 40, 
when the cumulative cases reached 225 and the peak of the outbreak had past, and issued the 
isolation order on the Amoy Gardens Block E on day 45, when there was already 343 cases (out of 
total Amoy cases of 447). The cluster end date detected in the prospective scan was longer than that 
of the retrospective scan by 49 days.   
Other than TPU 291, prospective clusters tended to start later than the retrospective cluster by 2 to 
19 days (mean: 5.0 days, standard deviation 6.9 days). Difference of the end dates of the scans 
ranged from 14 days earlier in the real-time scan to 23 days later (mean: 3.0 days, standard 
deviation 12.0 days).  
27 TPUs (69.2%) of the prospective clusters which were not identified as clusters in the retrospective 
scan (Table 3.6), and 5 TPUs, which were part of the retrospective cluster 6 (TPUs 247, 280, 294, 
295), and part of the cluster 7 (TPU 761), were not detected in the prospective scan as clusters. 
Three of these TPUs (247, 295, 761) actually had no SARS cases, and they were included in the 
retrospective scan as part of the cluster formed by more than 1 TPU. The prospective scan seemed 
to be relatively sensitive at the early stage of the epidemic, during which the number of cases was 
small. There were 6 TPUs (220, 226, 227, 228, 229, 235) detected as a cluster (p-value=0.037) on day 
9 in the prospective scan only, during which 2 cases out of the total 6 cases were distributed in the 
cluster. In day 24, a prospective only cluster of 4 TPUs (268, 271, 272, 282) was detected (p-
value=0.07), where 3 cases out of 29 were distributed in the cluster. This was also illustrated by the 
cluster including TPU 291 before the Amoy Gardens outbreak as discussed earlier. Large clusters 
with long duration seemed to dominate the prospective scan, resulting in much longer durations of 
these clusters (e.g. TPUs 291 and 724) being identified.  
Timeline Day 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
No. of cases non-Amoy 2 1 1 1 1
in TPU 291 Amoy 1 1 0 1 1 7 6 11 80 73 44 44 28 17 13 16
Cumulative Amoy cases 1 2 2 3 4 11 17 28 108 181 225 269 297 314 327 343
Time when cluster Retrospective
detected Prospective
Health official Alert confirm
Part of a bigger cluster Standalone cluster
  
8
1
 
Figure 3.24 Prospective community TPUs detected as clusters compared to TPUs detected retrospectively.  
 82 
Figure 3.25 Start and end days and the duration (figure in the bar) of the prospective spatiotemporal clusters of community 
cases. Some of the clusters were detected to be significant in multiple periods. TPU marked with * were not detected in 
the retrospective scan. 
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Table 3.6 Comparison of the prospective and retrospective clusters. Prospective clusters with multiple significant 
periods are shaded in grey. 
 
. 
Cluster s tart Cluster end Cluster s tart Cluster end
TPU Cluster no. Location Cluster s tart Cluster end
827 25 59 2 Sai  Kung 25 52 7
231 26 27 5 Kowloon Ci ty 26 48
36 56 8
233 26 56 5 Kowloon Ci ty 26 48 8
280 28 35 6 nearby Amoy 26 48 2 -13
291 28 101 1 Amoy Gardens 35 52 -7 49
726 31 32 3 nearby AHN & TPH 29 73 2
34 34
62 76 3
759 31 35 7 nearby PWH 27 47 4 -12
720 34 34 3 nearby AHN & TPH 29 73 5
62 76 3
723 34 34 3 nearby AHN & TPH 29 73 5
62 76 3
724 34 34 3 nearby AHN & TPH 29 73 5
62 96 23
162 48 48 4 Eastern 29 73 19
51 59 -14
163 48 48 4 Eastern 38 57 10
50 74 17
220 9 9
226 9 9
227 9 9
228 9 9
229 9 9
235 9 9
268 24 24
26 27
271 24 24
26 36
272 24 24
26 36
282 24 24
26 36
821 25 30
39 39
823 25 30
39 39
222 26 27
232 37 44
26 27
234 26 27
37 44
246 26 36
263 26 27
267 26 27
281 26 36
283 26 36
284 26 36
285 26 36
286 26 36
287 28 36
288 28 35
149 31 33
722 31 32
294 6 nearby Amoy 35 46
247 6 nearby Amoy 26 46
295 6 nearby Amoy 26 46
755 7 nearby PWH 27 47
761 7 nearby PWH 27 47
Detected by prospective scan only
Detected by retrospective scan only
(day) (day)
Prospective Retrospective Difference (day)
(Prospective - Retrospective)
Match in cluster start date
Different duration
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3.4 Discussion 
The SARS outbreak in Hong Kong was characterised by large proportion of hospital infections, with 
half of the hospital cases occurring in two hospitals (PWH and AHN). Half of those infected in 
hospital were healthcare workers. The other large outbreak at Amoy Gardens accounted for one-
quarter of all cases and was caused by environmental factors in the affected building. These three 
large outbreaks certainly have implications for the spatial distribution of cases in the epidemic as a 
whole. My work has explored the impact of these outbreaks on the spatial disease clusters that are 
identified, and on the variability in incidence spatially. 
I found that the distribution of cases in the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong was spatiotemporally 
clustered, in agreement with a previous study (Lai, Wong et al. 2004). A considerable proportion of 
administrative districts remained uninfected, and the incidence rates of the infected areas varied 
substantially. Half of the total cases were contained in the spatial clusters I identified, and the 
majority of the clusters were located around major outbreak hospitals including AHN and PWH, and 
the Amoy Gardens. Before the PWH outbreak, the epidemic was sporadic and the cases were 
scattered over the territory. The PWH outbreak generated a significant increase in both incidence 
and spatial spread of SARS, and subsequently the formation of spatiotemporal clusters, the majority 
of which could be identified within a week of the start of the PWH outbreak.  
Hospital and community transmission were inter-related in the SARS outbreak - people infected in 
hospitals generated secondary cases in the community, both in households and other community 
settings, and all the infected subjects were hospitalised (sub-clinical infections being negligible in 
SARS (Leung, Lim et al. 2006)). This made hospitals treating SARS cases places with high transmission 
risk. In this study I have examined two aspects of the influence of hospitals on the epidemic - disease 
cluster formation and the size of community transmission. 
In the spatial clusters located near hospitals, 27% - 41% of cases were infected in the community. On 
comparing spatiotemporal clusters identified examining solely hospital or solely community cases 
the same clusters were identified around AHN and PWH, indicating the importance of the location of 
major outbreak hospitals on both hospital and community disease clusters. Temporally these 
common clusters first started as hospital-only clusters and then became simultaneous hospital-
transmission and community-transmission clusters, suggesting hospital outbreaks triggered 
community transmission.  
The size of the community outbreak in an area increased with the size of the outbreak in the nearest 
hospital treating SARS, and an area was more likely to have no community-infected cases if it was far 
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from hospitals treating SARS, or had less hospital-infected cases within the area. Therefore the 
distance to hospitals treating SARS patients can be considered as intrinsic factor of spatial 
heterogeneity of exposure of an area in the transmission of SARS. Population distribution of the 
elderly was related to the spatial heterogeneity of susceptibility of an area, with a higher proportion 
of individuals aged 75+ in the area increasing the size of the community outbreak, while a higher 
proportion of the age group 50-74 increasing the likelihood that an area to had no community-
infected cases. This could be related to the over-representation of the aged 75+ and under-
representation of the 50-74 age group in the SARS cases compared to the general population (Leung, 
Hedley et al. 2004). 
Given the driving role of hospital transmission in the overall spatial spread of the epidemic, I 
examined the spatial distribution of the three main types of hospital infections – healthcare workers, 
inpatients and visitors. Considerable variation was observed in the spatial distribution of the three 
main outbreak hospitals cases, and in the types of people infected in individual hospitals (i.e. 
healthcare workers, in-patients, or visitors).  The latter is likely to have been related to the 
implementation of infection control measures in the different hospitals and the number of SARS 
patients treated. For example, the TPH outbreak was sourced from the transfer of 14 patients who 
were considered as not infected with SARS from AHN for convalescence (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Expert Committee 2003), and thus seeded a high proportion of inpatients.  
The control policy implications from the study are that areas near hospitals that treat SARS patients 
are of higher risk of forming a disease cluster and inducing further community transmission, and the 
final size of the community outbreak in the area is related to the size of the nearest hospital 
outbreak. With the observation that key hospital spatial clusters lead the start of community clusters 
in a short period of time, close monitoring of the emergence of hospital clusters may provide 
opportunities to prevent further community transmission and formation of community clusters. 
Therefore, timely and localised infection control measures in these areas could help to maximize the 
benefit and cost-effectiveness of the control measures.  
Timely implementation of localized control measures partly relies on real-time detection of the 
emerging spatial disease clusters during the epidemic. My work shows that real-time application of 
the Kulldorff’s prospective scan statistic method would have been effective in identifying some real-
time clusters accurately, and would have detected the Amoy Garden cluster earlier than in reality by 
the health officials during the outbreak, and before peak transmission was reached, though the 
result was masked by a few early non-Amoy cases.   
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However, because the method is conditional on the total number of cases in the data, at the initial 
period of the epidemic when the number of total cases was small, it tended to detect clusters as a 
group of TPUs where the cases where concentrated. As more cases were records later and with the 
spatial distribution changed over time, these clusters were no longer significant. Because the total 
number of cases in the complete dataset was much greater, the retrospective scan did not pick up 
these TPUs as clusters for that time period. In the public health perspective, when these clusters are 
detected during the epidemic, it is worth putting them under observation, because it is uncertain if 
these clusters would grow further. Given that the prospective scan can be run regularly upon new 
data arrival, any existing cluster which does not grow further will be indicated as insignificant cluster 
in the later prospective scans.  
There were a few TPUs which did not have any SARS cases but detected as part of the retrospective 
clusters. This justified the much smaller maximum circle size settings applied in the prospective and 
retrospective scans than the default settings. If the default settings are applied, it is believed more 
false TPUs would have been included as part of the cluster. The retrospective and prospective scan 
results verified that using smaller maximum circle in space and time can still detect clusters of large 
size and long duration as more than one significant cluster. On the contrary, a study on the spatial 
patterns of Hong Kong H1N1 pandemic that used the default settings of 50% spatial and temporal 
window as the maximum resulted in some relatively big clusters (Lee and Wong 2010), though it is 
not directly comparable to my study. 
So far my work has focused on cluster formation and the interactions between hospital and 
community transmission. Between-areas spread and its dynamics are best studied using contact 
tracing data or methods of infection tree inference. Complete contact tracing data is scarcely 
available for any large-scale emerging outbreak, and this is the case of the SARS outbreak in Hong 
Kong in 2003. In chapter 6, I use an infection tree inference method derived by extending the 
Wallinga and Teunis method spatially to derive the between areas and within area spread of SARS in 
Hong Kong.  
 
  
 87 
Chapter 4 - Studying Human Movement Patterns Using Gravity Models 
In the previous chapter, I studied the dynamics of the spread of the SARS epidemic in and between 
the hospital and community settings, and suggested a better understanding of the mechanism of 
spread could be attained by inferring the probabilistic infection tree of the epidemic. Based on my 
findings that spatial distance from the SARS cases and hospitals treating SARS cases were risk factors 
of disease transmission, in Chapter 5 I present a modified version of the Wallinga and Teunis 
(Wallinga and Teunis 2004) method that captures the spatial risk factors in the inference of infection 
network by using  a gravity model to determine spatial connectedness. In this chapter, I derive the 
gravity model that represents the travel patterns of the Hong Kong population in relation to the 
SARS transmission. By exploring the relationship between the types of hospital infected subjects and 
their hospital flow patterns by gravity models, I also determine the extent to which the spatial 
spread of SARS is driven by spread from hospitals to the community. 
I begin the chapter with an introduction to gravity models including  a review of its application to 
studying infectious disease epidemics. This is followed by the research objectives, methods and data 
used and results.  
Throughout I use the term “outflow” of a district to refer to the number of trips made from that 
district as origin, regardless of the destination, including the within-district flow. Similarly the 
“inflow” of a district is used to describe the number of trips to that district as the destination, 
regardless of the origin (which again can be the same as the destination district). The type of flow 
was classified by the trip purpose. For example, workflow refers to trips between home and 
workplace, study flow refers to trips between home and place of study, and work-study flow refers 
to those between home and places of work or study.   
4.1 Gravity models 
4.1.1 Origin  
Gravity models are commonly used to model human spatial interaction behaviour – any movement 
in space that arises from a human process. They originate from the Newton's law of Universal 
Gravitation, which states that between two point masses there is a force of attraction with 
magnitude directly proportional to the product of the two masses, and inversely proportional to the 
square of the distance between them. It can be expressed as:  
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d
 88 
F: magnitude of the gravitational force between the two point masses 
G: gravitational constant 
m1,m2: mass of the two point masses 
d: distance between the two point masses 
 
The first conceptual application of Newton’s law to human movement was developed by Carey 
(Carey 1858), but it was almost a century later that a formal postulation was formulated (Stewart 
1941) to quantify human movement between regions to be proportional to the populations of the 
origin and destination, and inversely proportional to the squared distance between the regions. The 
squared distance relationship was later relaxed and the exponent was calibrated from observations 
(Huff 1963). In the past few decades, there has been substantial development of the theoretical 
basis and model formulation for the family of gravity models (Sen and Smith 1995). They have been 
widely applied to study different types of movement patterns, and are an essential tool in trip 
distribution modelling and transport planning (Erlander and Stewart 1990), retail planning and 
modelling different types of human and commodity flows (Haynes and Fotheringham 1984; 
Fotheringham and O'Kelly 1988).  
4.1.2 Generic model formulation 
Denote Tij as the flow from origin i to destination j, O(i) as a function of propelling or outflow 
attribute(s) of the origin i, D(j) as a function of attracting or inflow attribute(s) of the destination j, 
and f(dij) as a distance deterrence function that reflects the tendency to travel relative to distance, 
and c as the constant.  The generic form of gravity model is written as: 
( ) ( ) ( )ij ijT cO i D j f d  
Gravity models can be inflow constrained, outflow constrained, doubly constrained, or 
unconstrained (Haynes and Fotheringham 1984; Fotheringham and O'Kelly 1988). The constraint 
requires the estimated marginal flow (inflow, outflow, or both) of each study region to be equal to 
that of the observed marginal flow. Usually model fit improves with additional information in the 
constrained models compared to unconstrained models (Fotheringham and O'Kelly 1988), but the 
research question under study also determines the appropriate type of model to be applied besides 
data availability. An outflow constrained model quantifies the relative attractiveness of a region as a 
destination compared to all other possible destinations to travel from the origin. Similarly, an inflow 
constrained model quantifies the relative contribution of a region as an origin compared with other 
possible origins conditional upon the marginal inflow of the destinations. Denote Oi as the observed 
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marginal outflow for origin i, Dj as the observed marginal outflow for destination j, Ai and Bj as the 
balancing factors to ensure the constraints are met. Then these models can be written as: 
Outflow constrained model: 
 
 
 
 
Inflow constrained model: 
 
 
 
All the existing applications of gravity models in studying human infectious disease epidemics use 
the unconstrained model, and they are discussed in the following section. 
4.1.3 Application in human infectious disease epidemics 
With the spatial spread of human infectious disease ultimately driven by human movement, travel 
flows between regions modelled by gravity models have been increasingly used to establish the 
heterogeneous contact rate between individuals in the subpopulations, assuming the contact rate to 
be proportional to the flow volume. Population sizes and travel distance are the most commonly 
used attributes in the gravity models that parsimoniously capture the coupling between the patches 
and are superimposed onto metapopulation epidemic models at various geographical scales.  
On the national scale, gravity models were applied in the studies of measles (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 
2004) and seasonal influenza (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006) epidemics, and reproduced the regional 
spatiotemporal patterns which could not be achieved by using a distance function alone. A gravity 
type of spatial coupling was also used to model the spatial spread of  the 1918 influenza pandemic in 
the UK, but proved less satisfactory as a description of the US pandemic (Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 
2010). That study also found that connectivity between cities was  density dependent, that is the 
total connectivity of a city depends on the number of close neighbours. However another study of 
the epidemic patterns of measles in the coastal regions of UK (Bharti, Xia et al. 2008) using  Xia et 
al.’s model found that the gravity model underestimated the flows to close neighbours, and that 
having less neighbouring areas does not make a region less connected. A less vigorous gravity model 
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application was used in another pandemic study (Ciofi degli Atti, Merler et al. 2008)which fitted a 
gravity model to Italy’s categorical work and study trip data (within municipal, outside municipal but 
within province, outside province but within same region, outside region). However, only the 
derived spatial kernel from the model was used in the model to determine the distance dependent 
contact rates. 
At a continental scale, influenza pandemic spread in Europe was modelled with an embedded gravity 
model of the railway transportation data between countries, with the gross domestic product (GDP) 
of the countries fitting the flows better than population size (Merler and Ajelli 2010). In global 
metapopulation models, a gravity model of local commuting patterns of 29 countries integrated with 
the long-range air traffic network data underlies the multi-scaled “Global Epidemic and Mobility 
model” (GLEaM). This model was used to simulate the spread of epidemics worldwide (Balcan, 
Colizza et al. 2009), study the early stage of the influenza A/H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (Colizza, 
Vespignani et al. 2009), and investigate the strain’s potential for seasonal transmission (Balcan, Hu et 
al. 2009). 
The gravity models applied in all of these studies were of the general form: 
j k
j k
jk
N N
T k
d
 
where Tj→k denotes the flow from patch j to k, Nj and Nk are the population size of patch j and k, djk is 
the spatial distance between patches j and k, and , , and  are the scaling factors of the origin and 
destination population and the travel distance respectively, and k is a constant. In the GLEaM, an 
exponential distance function f(djk)=exp(djk/r) performed better than the power law function  
g(djk)=djk  as the kernel, and in Xia et al.’s study on measles (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004), the predicted 
number of infectives Ij in the origin patch was used instead, with the gravity model being combined 
with a time-series susceptible-infected-recovered (TSIR) model.  
Different assumptions relating the human movement described by gravity models to disease 
transmission were implicitly applied in each of these studies. The gravity model is usually embedded 
in the force of infection term of the epidemic model, with its coupling effects with each region 
summed up to give the total transmission potential from the heterogeneous level of interaction 
between the subpopulations. As the compartmental models categorizes individuals into the states of 
susceptible, infective and others, the nature of gravity model is always directional – from an origin to 
a destination -  and the flow matrices modelled are usually not symmetric. It is therefore essential to 
decide who travelled from their residing patch and to where, and possibly also where the contact 
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takes place. A few studies (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 2010) used the 
“infector driven approach”, assuming it is the infected person that travels to other patches and 
infects the susceptible person there. Thus the total force of infection experienced by a susceptible is 
proportional to the sum of the flow from other patches to the susceptible’s patch.  The opposite is 
the “susceptive driven approach”, assuming the susceptible individuals travel to other patches and 
become infected from the infectious people there (Merler and Ajelli 2010). Therefore the origin 
patch and the model structure was defined differently under these two approaches, though both of 
them assumed the movement to be unilateral in nature, with either the susceptible or the infected 
travelling, and those living in the destination remaining in their patches. However, these 
assumptions could be an oversimplified depiction of reality. 
The framework of capturing “bilateral movement” in epidemic models – that allows for the 
possibility that the susceptible travels to the infector’s patch and becomes infected there 
(susceptible driven approach), and the infector  travels to the susceptible’s patch and spreads the 
infection (infector driven approach), was proposed and developed using the spatial interaction 
theory (Thomas 1999). It defined the measure of regional attractiveness of region j as a destination 
for individuals travelling from region i as Ti→j=njexp(-rdij), where nj is the population size of j, dij the 
distance between regions i and j, and r is the distance decay parameter. Then the probability of a 
given contact by an individual in i is made in region j, denoted as pi→j = njexp(-rdij)/∑j njexp(-rdij). 
Conversely, the probability that an individual in region j travels to region i and makes contact there is 
pj→i = niexp(-rdij)/∑i ni exp(-rdij). The sum of both terms then forms the contact probability under a 
bilateral movement assumption. As an alternative to using the spatial interaction model, Keeling and 
Rohani (Keeling and Rohani 2002) used assumptions about the leaving and returning rate of 
individuals from their home patches to describe the bilateral movement in a hypothetical study of a 
population with two patches. However, this movement assumption restricted the location of 
infection to be at the home patch of either the susceptible or infective. 
Sattenspiel and Dietz (Sattenspiel and Dietz 1995) developed a more comprehensive framework that 
captures the movement of both the susceptible and infective and allows infection between them to 
occur in any regions they both travel to – referred as “multilateral movement” in this study -  using 
the rates of leaving and returning from home patches. Such information was assumed to be 
available from other sources like travel data or survey, and the method was first applied to study the 
influenza epidemic in 1918-1919 in Canada (Sattenspiel and Herring 2003). The GLEaM model was 
built upon the work of Sattenspiel and Dietz with the commuting flow derived from a gravity model. 
However, it remains uncertain how the various movement assumptions affect the results of the 
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epidemic models, or if under certain condition the much simpler unilateral assumption would be 
sufficient to describe the heterogeneous contact rate.   
Gravity coupled epidemic models can either have the parameters of the gravity model derived 
independently from the origin-destination travel data (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Balcan, Colizza 
et al. 2009; Merler and Ajelli 2010), or simultaneously estimated with the epidemic model 
parameters as an “endogenous system” (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 2010). 
Although at the expense of heightened technical challenges and computational complexity, the 
latter does not rely on the availability of the relevant travel flow data, and can serve as a means to 
validate the general assumption of gravity coupling. However, when a standard gravity relationship 
is not adequate to describe the flow dynamics, for instance, if long distance flow beyond several 
hundred kilometres exhibits different gravity behaviour than the short distance flow (Viboud, 
Bjornstad et al. 2006; Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009), gravity models fitted as a standalone statistical 
model allows model adequacy to be diagnosed on a finer level.  
The interpretation of the gravity model parameters was also different under the two methods. In an 
“endogenous” model, it is the contact rate between individuals in different subpopulations that is 
directly modelled by the gravity component, whereas the exogenous gravity model represents the 
factors driving the flow, and the flow is used as the surrogate of the heterogeneous contact rate, 
assuming they are related proportionally. It remains uncertain how valid this assumption is. Contact 
surveys (Mossong, Hens et al. 2008) have shown that the number and type of contacts made in 
different settings vary (e.g. school and work). Therefore contacts generated related to a work trip 
may be different from that of a study trip. 
Independently fitted gravity models have fairly consistent estimates of the origin and destination 
population exponents ( , ) – (0.3, 0.64) for US work flow of less than 119km (Viboud, Bjornstad et 
al. 2006), (0.28, 0.66) for work and study flows of Italy (Ciofi degli Atti, Merler et al. 2008), (0.46, 
0.64) for commuting patterns of less 300 km in 29 countries. Long distance flow generally had lower 
 and  values (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009). Endogenous estimation 
resulted in the population exponents to be insignificant for US, and at (0, 0.40) for UK (Eggo, 
Cauchemez et al. 2010). Fixing =1 resulted in =1.5 when the number of infective was directly used 
as the origin attribute (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004). This unique finding of the /  ratio greater than 1 
opposed to other studies could be partly attributed to the size of infective group (measles 
predominantly affecting children). In general, trip flows are more sensitive to the size of the 
destination population than the origin population with a higher population exponent in most cases, 
though the increment in both the propulsiveness and attractiveness of the regions decreases with 
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greater population size. Therefore small populations are disproportionally more important than 
large populations. 
The spatial kernels of the gravity model from the above studies were reproduced based on the 
kernel parameters available in the studies (Figure 4.1). All studies except Eggo et al. apparently used 
the non-normalised form of the spatial kernel but with a constant term in the gravity model 
formulation. Therefore, although model constant or the kernel normalisation factors were not 
available, reproduced kernels for the same country or those with similar geographic scale can 
provide general ideas about the shape of the kernels. Eggo et al. normalised the origin population 
and the spatial distance together for each country, therefore the US kernel before normalisation is 
not comparable to the UK kernel before normalization. The US short distance work flow kernel was 
found to be almost identical to Italy’s work and study flow kernel, while the two UK kernels for year 
1918 and 1940-60s’ were  close to each other. Balcan et al’s common short distance kernel for 29 
countries based on contemporary data was much slower decaying than the others. Spatial kernels 
implicitly capture the transportation infrastructure of the country under study during the study 
period, and are also affected by the spatial scale of the study units. The common kernel of  Balcan et 
al. was based on commuting data including small countries like Hong Kong with maximum travel 
distance less than 40 km and large countries like US (>8000 times of the physical size of Hong Kong), 
each of different geographic division – from 18 districts in Hong Kong, 3141 districts in US, to 36602 
districts in France. Therefore the derived kernel has to be applied with caution. The study also found 
that an exponential kernel fitted the data better than a power law kernel, while all other studies 
simply assumed the kernel to be distributed as a 1-parameter power law function.  
 
Figure 4.1 Spatial kernels for gravity models from previous epidemic studies reproduced, with the country and type of 
flow and the first author of the studies specified. 
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Besides being country specific, the optimal type of flow to be fitted by gravity models for studying 
epidemic spread should also be disease specific, determined by the dominant population subgroup 
for disease transmission (Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006). Existing gravity models fitted specifically to 
Hong Kong do not fit into the context of this study, neither were the spatial kernel parameters given 
(Wong, Tong et al. 1999). 
4.2 Alternative methods to capture spatial heterogeneity in contact rates 
Spatial distance kernels have also been applied to capture the spatial heterogeneity in contact rates 
(Ferguson, Cummings et al. 2005; Ciofi degli Atti, Merler et al. 2008). A variant of this is to assume 
that the average contact rates are dependent on categorised subpopulations using spatial proximity 
on a coarse resolution (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003), for example, within district, between contiguous 
districts, between non-contiguous districts. The distance only dependence assumption of contact 
rate is supported by two prominent studies that generalised human movement patterns as a power 
law distribution regardless of the geographic distribution of the population, using the banknote 
circulation (Brockmann, Hufnagel et al. 2006) and mobile phone data (Gonzalez, Hidalgo et al. 2008), 
though a single trajectory of the bank note circulation could be composed of several journeys by 
different people, whereas a displacement in the mobile phone data could be a partial or composite 
journey.  
Brockmann et al. also investigated if the circulation patterns could be attributed to spatial 
inhomogeneities, such that travel patterns varied with population size or density. They compared 
the short-time trajectories (1-4 days) after initial entry by fitting separate power law distributions to 
the short (≤10 km) and long (10km+) dispersal and by different population size categories of the 
entry city, and found that higher populated cities had a higher probability of short distance dispersal, 
but the long distance kernel exponents were comparable. However, on comparing the composition 
of the range of dispersal of the bank notes based on another snapshot of the short-time trajectory 
(<14 days) findings, I found that there were significant difference in the proportions of long range 
(>800km, chi-square test p-value=0.004) and also short range (≤10km, chi-square test p-value < 
0.0001) dispersal among the highlighted cities in the study (Long range: Jacksonville 2.9%, New York 
7.4%, Seattle 7.8%; Short range: Jacksonville 71.4%, New York 57.7%, Seattle 52.7%). The population 
size of the entry cities did not seem to explain the difference (Jacksonville 0.8 million, New York 8.4 
million, Seattle 0.6 million (United States Census Bureau 2009)). Unfortunately data were not 
available to investigate further for any potential role of the population size of the secondary 
reporting cities, i.e. the “destination” city of the circulation, and thus, the possibility of a gravity type 
of circulation patterns. However, other potential confounding effects could not be ruled out. 
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Gonzalez et al.’s mobile phone study finding that the power law distribution of human mobility was 
a convolution of the probability distribution of individual trajectories and population heterogeneity 
was an alternative perspective to dissect the underlying mechanism for the observed power law 
distribution.  
Alternatively, instead of using any functional form for the contact rates, some studies used the travel 
flow data directly to represent the contact rates (Danon, House et al. 2009). Although this avoided 
any issues related to the validity of gravity model specification and the goodness-of-fit of the model, 
it lost the additional information and insight on how the contact rates and subsequently the patterns 
of the epidemic varies with its attributing factors. Comparison with other studies is also made more 
difficult under this approach. 
Different assumptions of human movement patterns result in different patterns of epidemic spread. 
If human movement is purely distance dependent, a wave-like diffusion pattern with occasional long 
jumps will occur, and the frequency of long jump occurrence is dependent on the tail of the distance 
kernel. Under a gravity model, the diffusion pattern is expected to be a mixture of wave-like 
diffusion and population size hierarchy, as observed in different influenza epidemics (Cliff, Haggett 
et al. 1986; Smallman-Raynor, Johnson et al. 2002). The assumption of human movement driven by 
distance alone is not adequate to explain the observed patterns of the SARS outbreak. In the 
previous chapter I showed that the spatial spread of SARS in Hong Kong was a mixture of a wave-like 
diffusion and population hierarchy. In Beijing, the spread was driven by spatial contiguity and 
population density (Meng, Wang et al. 2005). Hospital-related factors also drove the spread in both 
regions.  
4.3 Study objectives 
Building on previous studies that used gravity model to capture the heterogeneous contact rates 
between subpopulations through the underlying factors for the human flow patterns, the first 
objective of this chapter is to derive gravity models to represent the contact rates relevant to SARS 
transmission in Hong Kong. These are then incorporated into a modified Wallinga and Teunis 
method for estimating the reproduction number time series of the Hong Kong SARS outbreak that 
uses both the spatial and temporal information of the epidemics in Chapter 5. In the next chapter, I 
also study the effects of trip type and the movement assumptions (susceptive driven, infection 
driven, bilateral and multilateral movement) on the Rt estimate. Therefore in this chapter I present 
the derivation for each relevant type of movement data and present parameter estimates for the 
best fitting gravity model under each model form. 
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As demonstrated in previous chapters, a high proportion of SARS transmission in Hong Kong 
occurred in hospital settings, and I found that hospital transmission could trigger community 
transmission and formation of disease cluster. Therefore my second objective is to use gravity 
models to investigate whether different types of hospital infected cases (healthcare workers, 
inpatients and hospital visitors) exhibited different patterns of flow from home to the hospital they 
were infected with SARS, which would indicate the spatial range of secondary transmission from the 
hospital to the community. The results are useful in explaining the observed epidemic spread 
patterns and have implications for disease control. 
4.4 Data 
This section describes the census, travel survey and the synthetic datasets of travel patterns of the 
Hong Kong population used to study the first research objective, and the home-to-hospital flow data 
of the hospital infected SARS cases in Hong Kong used for the second objective. This is followed by a 
brief description on the geo-demographic characteristics of Hong Kong to provide the background 
information for this study.  
4.4.1 Census travel data 
The workflow and study flow data from the 2001 Hong Kong census (Census and Statistics 
Department Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2001) were defined spatially by the District 
Council District (DCD), referred to here as “districts”. (Figure 1.1). The work and study flow data were 
composed of an 18x18 origin-destination flow matrix, with the residing district of the subjects as the 
origin. For the workflow data, the destination was the district of the workplace of the subject. For 
people with more than one job, more than one workplace, or who changed workplace regularly, 
workplace referred to that of their main employment, or with the longest hours spent during the 
census reference period. For the study flow data, the destination was the district of the school or 
educational institution the subjects attended for full-time education. As each working person 
contributed one trip to the workflow data, and each full-time student contributed one trip to the 
study flow data, the work outflow and study outflow of each district were the working population 
and full-time student population residing in that district, and the work inflow and study inflow of 
each district were the number of people working or studying in that district, regardless of where 
they lived. The sum of the work and study flow gave the work-study flow of the population. Spatial 
distance between the districts was calculated using the Euclidean distance between the centroid of 
the districts. 
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4.4.2 Travel survey data 
The travel characteristics survey 2002 in Hong Kong (Transport Department. The Government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 2002) was conducted in households in area segments 
selected by random sampling. Travel data on a particular weekday of all household members aged 
above 3 years old were collected from the 30,005 households selected (1.39% of total households in 
Hong Kong) by face-to-face interview. The average household size was 3.1 persons. The data were 
then used to project the travel patterns of the whole population of Hong Kong. The reporting 
geographic units were 25 districts. The difference of this geographical division compared to the 18 
District Council Districts used in the census was mainly in the New Territories and Islands, where the 
new towns were separated from the rural areas.  
Data on all the trips made in a particular weekday were collected, outbound and return trip 
inclusive. All trips were classified by trip purpose as: (1) home-based work (work flow):  trips from 
home to work place, or vice versa; (2) home-based study (study flow): trips from home to school 
place for attending lectures or lessons, or vice versa; (3) home-to-others: trips from home to non-
work and non-study related places, e.g. shopping places, visiting friends etc., or vice versa; (4) non-
home based: trips that did not start or end at home, nor between work places, e.g. from work place 
or school to shopping or other social places; (5) employer business: trips between work places for 
work.  I refer to the survey data that includes all the flow types above as the “survey overall” flow.  
The mean daily number of work trips per working person was 1.40, and study trips per student was 
1.13, indicating that a certain proportion of people did not return home directly after work or study, 
and/or did not start the work and study journey from home. The average daily number of home-
based-others trip was 0.57 per person, and non-home-based trip was 0.23 per person. The average 
daily trip per person is 1.82, with around 15% of the population not making any trip on an average 
weekday. The composition of the total flow by trip type was: home-based work 37.5%, home-based 
study 12.8%, home-based others 31.6%, non-home based 12.9%, and employer business 5.2%. 
The centroid of the districts was derived by an ad hoc approach for this study, because no data were 
available for re-generating the map digitally. Although the survey data is a more comprehensive 
representation of the movement of individuals in the Hong Kong population, its utility was greatly 
restricted with only the marginal inflow and outflow by district (25x2 matrix) for each trip type 
reported.  
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4.4.3 Adjusted overall census data 
Contact between individuals could be made without making a trip, for instance, in a household 
setting, which accounted for 10% of community transmission of SARS in Hong Kong (chapter 2). 
However, these contacts are likely to be under-represented if the above datasets are used as 
surrogate of contact rates between individuals, because the travel survey trip data exclude those 
who did not make any trips during the study timeframe as well as those aged below 3, and the 
census data exclude those who did not work or study. This was not an important issue in the 
previous epidemic studies that used gravity models fitted to census data, because they were used 
only as a proxy for the between-patches contact patterns. But as the modified Wallinga and Teunis 
method developed in the next chapter requires the actual within-patch contact rates, it is necessary 
to adjust the trip data. A synthetic trip dataset was therefore created based on the census data, with 
the estimated population which did not make a trip added as the within-district flow. This resulted in 
the total movements being the sum of the census work flow, census study flow, and 15% of the 
population of each district plus those aged below 3 according to the census as the within-district 
flow. Those who are retired or the unemployed elderly are included in the 15% if they did not make 
any trip. This synthetic dataset is referred as the “adjusted overall census” data. 
4.4.4 Home-to-hospital travel data 
The home-to-hospital flow matrix of the healthcare worker, inpatient and hospital visitor 
respectively captured the flow from the home district of the SARS cases to the hospitals where they 
were infected. The data were derived from the source of infection data described in chapter 2.  Nine 
hospitals with less than 10 occurrence of SARS infection were excluded in the analysis, leaving the 
dimension of the flow matrices as 18 (districts) x 12 (hospitals). The overall composition of hospital 
infected cases were  49.7% healthcare worker, 31.0% inpatient and 19.9% hospital visitors. 
4.4.5 Geo-demographic characteristics 
The districts in Hong Kong Island (HKI), Kowloon (KLN) and the New Territories (NT) have marked 
difference in their geographical and demographic characteristics (Figure 1.1), and their size varies 
from 7 km2 to 175 km2. The smallest and the most densely populated districts are in Kowloon, while 
the districts in the New Territories districts are highly heterogeneous in population density, with 
satellite cities surrounded by rural areas. The main commercial and financial areas of Hong Kong are 
located in the Central and Western, Wanchai and Yau Tsim Mong districts, which are along the 
harbour between the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. Wanchai and Yau Tsim Mong are also the most 
popular and concentrated shopping and entertainment areas. The Islands district is remote and the 
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least populated district (1.3% of total population), but has disproportionally high travel flow because 
of the international airport, and several housing estates and tourist spots there, but it is otherwise 
undeveloped. All districts in Hong Kong are coastal except Wong Tai Sin.  
The between-districts distance of Hong Kong spans from 2km to 37 km (mean=15.4km, sd=8.1km, 
Figure 4.2). The absence or low frequency of distance of between 1 and 3 km is attributed to the 
physical size of the districts. All distance of 22km and beyond is made from or to at least one of the 
New Territories districts or the Islands district.  
Figure 4.2 Distribution of between-district distance of Hong Kong based on the District Council District division. Measures 
were grouped in the hierarchy of: (1) Islands: if one of the district measured is the Islands district; (2) NT (the New 
Territories): if at least one of the district measured is located in the New Territories; (3) Others: (Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon): if the distance measured does not belong to (1) or (2). 
 
4.4.6 Data issues 
The census flow data have far better data resolution than the travel survey data but are less 
comprehensive because mainly work and study trips are covered. Home-based other trips accounted 
for around one-third of the total trips in the travel survey, and 44.4% together with non-home based 
trips. However, it is not possible to disentangle the zonal trip propulsiveness and attractiveness in 
the survey data. To illustrate this, consider Hong Kong to be divided into 3 districts. Let C be the 
matrix of the census work flow cij from district i to j, S be the matrix of the survey work flow sij 
between district i and j,  xij be the proportion of working population living in i and working at j who 
returns home directly after work. Then theoretically the matrix S can be written in relation to C as: 
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This shows that Sij does not only carry the information on the propulsion of district i and 
attractiveness of district j for work (cij), but also to some extent the propulsion of district j and 
attractiveness of district i (cji). Therefore, the estimated scaling exponents do not truly reflect the 
trip attributing factors of the districts, and the extent of offset depends on xij. Without additional 
data to disentangle the offsetting effect, the application of the survey data in this study was under 
caveat.  
Given the strengths and weaknesses of both datasets, I compared the census and survey data of the 
same trip purpose to quantify the potential effects of return flow (“returning effect”) in the survey 
data, and investigated whether the census data could be a good surrogate of the general population 
movement measured by the survey overall data To begin with, exploratory analysis on the 
characteristics of the various flow patterns was conducted to facilitate the above investigation and 
the fitting of gravity models.  
4.5 Preliminary Analysis 
Marginal flow of the same movement type of the census and survey data were compared by 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, with the different geographical division of the datasets unified as 
14 redefined spatial units. Both the outflow and inflow of the work and study trip respectively were 
very highly correlated [Work flow: outflow=0.995, inflow=0.996; study flow: outflow=0.977, 
inflow=0.907, all p-values<0.0001] (Figure 4.3), suggesting that sampling and projection of the survey 
data were satisfactory in representing the whole population, and the correlation remained strong 
despite the returning effect in the survey data.  
The outflow of all census trip data were highly correlated with the population size ( work=0.81, 
study=0.74, work-study=0.79, adjusted overall=0.78, all p-values<0.005), but for inflow the correlation with 
population size was insignificant for work ( =0.24, p-value=0.40) and work-study trips ( =0.51, p-
value=0.07), and moderately correlated for the study trip ( =0.71, p-value=0.004) and adjusted 
overall trip ( =0.64, p-value=0.01). The insignificant correlations were confounded by two different 
scaling relationships between the inflow and population size, where a few districts showed much 
higher inflow per population than the other districts (“high inflow districts”) *Figure 4.5].  
For work flow, the high inflow districts included Wanchai, Central and Western, Yau Tsim Mong and 
Islands, which are the key financial and commercial centres except Islands. For these districts the 
inflow was 1.97 to 3.45 times the working population residing in that district. Their within-district 
work flow (34.7%-49.7%) was also high compared to other districts [Figure 4.4(a)]. For study inflow, 
the high inflow districts were Kowloon City, Yau Tsim Mong, Central and Western, Wanchai and
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Figure 4.3   The scatter plots of census and survey flow of the same trip type by outflow and inflow. 
(a)  Work flow (b) Study flow 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Census outflow of different trip types by population size of the district. 
 
Sham Shui Po, which had their inflow 1.26 to 2.36 times over the student population living in the 
district, in contrast to a consistent average ratio of 0.85 (sd=0.6) for the rest of the districts [Figure 
4.5 (b)]. The majority of the districts in the New Territories had high within-district study flow 
(63.6%-86.2%), attributed to the satellite cities in the districts which were designed to be self-
sufficient in study places (Hui and Lam 2005). Study flow was generally more localised than the work 
flow (within-district flow: 59.4%-86.2% versus 13.5%-49.7%), as a substantial proportion of work 
flow was drawn to the key commercial districts in Hong Kong. 
The census work-study flow data had the ratio of work to study trips of 2.05:1 and therefore 
exhibited mixed characteristics more dominated by workflow, but with an increased proportion of 
within-district journey. The census adjusted overall data had the within-district flow further 
increased to between 46.1% and 67.9%. High inflow districts for both trip types were identified.  
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Figure 4.5 Left: Inflow by population size of the districts; Right: Inflow to outflow ratio by percentage of within-district 
flow, by census flow type: (a) work flow, (b) study flow, (c) work-study flow, and (d) adjusted overall flow. 
(a) Census work flow 
     
(b) Census study flow 
  
(c) Census work-study flow 
    
(d) Census adjusted overall flow 
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For the trip types that were studied in the travel survey only, the outflow of home-based others trips 
was strongly correlated with the population ( =0.83, p-value=0.0002), but not the inflow ( =0.14, p-
value=0.62). Inflow relative to the population size was high in Yau Tsim Mong, Wanchai and Islands, 
where the first two districts are also the most popular areas for leisure activities and shopping 
[Figure 4.6 (a-b)]. Non-home based outflow and inflow was not correlated with the population size 
at all ( outflow=0.12, p-value=0.69; inflow=0.03, p-value=0.92). Its peak trip making time was between 
12pm to 2pm and 5pm to 7pm (Transport Department. The Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 2002), and high outflow numbers were observed in Yau Tsim Mong, Central 
and Western, Wanchai, Kowloon City and Islands, which were also the areas of high work or study 
inflow [Figure 4.6(c)]. These suggested that a substantial proportion of non-home based trips were 
made during lunch break or after work or study. The most popular destinations were Yau Tsim Mong 
and Wanchai [Figure 4.6(d)]. 
The overall flow in survey data was highly correlated with the population size in its outflow ( =0.81, 
p-value=0.0005), but not correlated in the inflow ( =0.24, p-value=0.42). It also had the same 
districts of high inflow as in the census work and work-study trips [(e-f)]. Its high correlation with the 
census work flow [ outflow=0.99, inflow=0.91, all p-values < 0.0001] supports the use of the census 
work data as a surrogate for the overall movement patterns, and so was the work-study flow data 
[ outflow=0.98, inflow=0.87, all p-values <0.0001]. The census adjusted overall trip was slightly less but 
nevertheless still highly correlated with the survey data [ outflow=0.98, p-value <0.0001; inflow=0.74, 
p-value=0.002]. 
The markedly different characteristics of the high inflow districts compared to other districts implied 
a dichotomous scaling relationship might be required for the gravity model fitting that used 
population size as the regional attribute. Alternatively, the marginal flow (inflow or outflow) can be 
used directly as the regional attributes for that specific flow type, as it captures the features that 
attract or propel journeys which may not be strongly correlated with population size, for instance, 
office space. 
4.6 Methodology  
4.6.1 Model formulation - Hong Kong travel patterns 
Outflow constrained, inflow constrained and unconstrained gravity models were fitted to the 
different flow data. To capture the dichotomous effect of the attribution factors on the flow by 
districts with high inflow, I used an adjustment scaling effect for modelling both the high within- 
district and between-district flows of these districts. Denote T as the total observed number of trips,  
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Figure 4.6 The outflow (left) and inflow (right) by population size of the home-based others, non-home based and overall 
trips in the survey data. The straight lines represent the least square regression of flow=constant x population size. 
(a) Home-based others outflow  (b) Home-based others inflow 
  
(c) Non-home based outflow   (d) Non-home based inflow 
  
(e) Survey overall outflow   (f) Survey overall inflow 
 
Figure 4.7 (Left) Survey overall outflow by census work outflow; (Right) Survey overall inflow by census work inflow. 
The straight lines represent the least square regression of the survey overall flow=constant x census flow. 
(a) Outflow     (b) Inflow 
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Tij,,as the flow from origin i to destination j, Oi as the observed outflow from region i, Dj as the 
observed inflow from region j, Ni and Nj as the attributing factor of region i and j respectively, with 
their effect scaled by non-negative exponent 1 and 1, and the scaling adjustment factors 2 and 2 
respectively, and f(dij) as the distance deterrence function.  The gravity model formulations are then 
written as: 
(a) Outflow constrained model 
1 2
1 2
2
          
'   for districts with high inflow / outflow ratio ( )
      
0 otherwise( )
for all i
i j ij
ij
j ij
j
ij i
j
O N f d
T
f d
T
N
O
 
(b) Inflow constrained model 
1 2
1 2
2
          
'   for districts with high inflow / outflow ratio ( )
      
0 otherwise( )
for all i
i
j i ij
ij
ij
i
ij j
i
D N f d
T
f d
T
N
D
 
(c) Unconstrained model 
1 2 1 2
2
2
'   for districts with high inflow / outflow ratio
 ( )      
0 otherwise
'   for districts with high inflow
                                                     
0
u u u u u
ij i j ij u
u
u
T cN N f d
,
 / outflow ratio
otherwise
ij
i j
T T
 
Two measures of Nj were considered: (1) the population size, and (2) inflow (for the outflow 
constrained model); outflow (for the inflow constrained model); marginal flow (ie. inflow and 
outflow, for the unconstrained model). The distance deterrence function f(dij) is the normalised 
function of k(dij) with maximum distance of 50 km, decided based on the physical dimension of Hong 
Kong. Power-law and exponential functions are the most commonly used functional form of k(dij) in 
gravity models for human travel (Fotheringham and O'Kelly 1988; Sen and Smith 1995), and with 
proven success in studying infectious disease transmission of human (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; 
Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Bharti, Xia et al. 2008; Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009). In this study, I used 
a more generic form of the power law function with two parameters, and the exponential function 
as k(dij), as show below. The better kernel form was decided by comparing the goodness-of-fit 
statistics of the models. 
(4.1) 
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2-parameter power-law function   
 ( ) (1 )ij bij
d
k d
a
  
Exponential function     
 ( ) ( )ij ijk d exp ad   
For work flow, work-study flow, adjusted census overall and survey overall flow models, the high 
inflow to outflow ratio districts included Wanchai, Central & Western, Yau Tsim Mong, Islands. For 
study flow models, they were Wanchai, Central & Western, Yau Tsim Mong, Kowloon City and Sham 
Shui Po. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the variants of the specification of the gravity models fitted. For the survey 
overall flow data, only the population size was used as the attraction factor, because the dependent 
variable was the marginal flow. For clarity, I denoted the gravity model specification in the format of 
[gravity model structure]–[flow data fitted]–[attraction factor], with the abbreviation of the 
specification given in Table 4.1 (e.g. U-WS-P stands for unconstrained gravity model on the census 
work-study flow using population as the attributing factor). 
Table 4.1  Summary of the gravity models fitted to the census and survey data. 
Nature Variant 
Census data 
Gravity Model structure 
1. Outflow constrained (O)  
2. Inflow constrained (I) 
3. Unconstrained (U) 
Flow data Tij   
 
1. Work flow (W) 
2. Study flow (S) 
3. Work-study flow (WS) 
4. Adjusted census overall (AC) 
Attributing factor Nj 
 
1. Inflow (I) / Outflow (O) / Marginal flow (M) 
2. Population size (P) 
3. Population size with high inflow district adjustment (P2) 
Spatial kernel functional form 
k(dij) 
 
1. Power law 
2. Exponential 
Travel survey data (TS) 
Gravity Model structure 
1. Outflow constrained (O)  
2. Inflow constrained (I) 
3. Unconstrained (U) 
Flow data Tij   
 
Overall flow (TS) 
Attributing factor Nj 1. Population size (P) 
2. Population size with high inflow district adjustment (P2) 
Spatial kernel functional form 
k(dij) 
 
1. Power law 
2. Exponential 
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4.6.2 Model formulation- Home-to-hospital patterns 
Because the spatial distribution of the SARS hospital infected subjects was largely driven by the 
epidemiological characteristics of the epidemic, I used the outflow constrained gravity model so that 
conditional on the number (i.e. outflow) of SARS hospital infected cases in each district, I study how 
the flow patterns were related to travel distance and hospital related factors for each type of 
hospital infected subjects (healthcare workers, inpatients and hospital visitors) and the overall flow.  
The gravity model formulation was similar to that of the outflow model in the previous section. 
Denoting Tij as the home-to-hospital flow, Hj as the attribution factor of hospital j, the formulation 
can be written as: 
 
  ( )
1
( ) 
       for all i
ij i i j ij
i
j ij
j
ij i
j
T A O H f d
A
H f d
T O
 
The power law and exponential spatial kernel defined previously were applied. Two inflow 
attribution factors were considered: (1) the hospital size, using the number of hospital beds as the 
proxy; and (2) the “inflow” of the type of SARS hospital infected subject under study, which 
essentially captured the hospital and epidemic specific factors for the flow. The derived spatial 
kernel and the scaling factors for different hospital subject types were compared. Table 4.2 below 
summarises the specification of the 16 gravity models fitted to study the hospital flow. 
Table 4.2 Gravity models fitted to the hospital flow data. 
Nature Variant 
Gravity model structure Outflow constrained 
Flow data Tij   
 
1. Healthcare worker flow 
2. Inpatient flow 
3. Visitor flow 
4. Overall flow 
Attraction factor Hj 
 
1. Hospital size 
2. Inflow 
Spatial kernel functional form 
k(dij) 
 
1. Power law 
2. Exponential 
 
4.6.3 Model fitting 
Because the 2-parameter power law function kernel was used in this study, the gravity model 
parameters have to be estimated numerically. Assuming the flow is distributed as independent 
(4.2) 
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Poisson or multinomial, maximum likelihood method can be applied for parameter estimation 
(Fotheringham and O'Kelly 1988; Sen and Smith 1995). Weaker assumptions are made under the 
multinomial distribution compared to the independent Poisson distribution, though both 
distributions result in the same maximum likelihood estimates of the gravity model parameters (Sen 
and Smith 1995). Simulation studies showed that the maximum likelihood estimates of the gravity 
model parameters remained reliable and robust in small sample size or slight deviation to the 
independent Poisson assumption (Sen and Matuszewski 1991).  
Consider T, the I x J matrix of the flows Tij to be distributed as multinomial (T, p), where T is the total 
number of the observed flows, and p is the matrix of pij, the probability of flows from i to j. Denote T+j 
as the marginal inflow, Ti+ as the marginal outflow, and their vectors as Tj and Ti respectively. An 
outflow constrained gravity model implies that Ti = (T1+, T2+, …., TI+) is given, and with T being 
multinomial distributed implies conditional multinomial distribution of Tj ~ multinomial (Ti, pj/i) for 
all j, where pj/i is the vector of probability of pij given pi+, pi+ = Ti+/T and / 1j ij p  for all i. The I x J 
matrix of flows is considered as a marginal multinomial for the outflow totals and i conditional 
multinomials for the i outflows, with the likelihood function written as: 
 /
! !
! !
ij i
T Ti
j i i
i j iij i
j i
T T
L p p
T T
 
It can be shown that  
 /ln lnij j i
i j
L T p   
From the gravity models defined in equation 4.1,  
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
 
/
 
 ( )
 ( )
( )
( )
ij ij i i j ij
j i
i i i i j ij
j
j ij
j ij
j
p T T A O T f d
p
p T T A O T f d
f d
f d
T
T
  
Inserting equation 4.4 into equation 4.3 gives 
 
1 2
1 2
ln l
)
n
(
( )
j ij
ji j i
j
ij
j
T
L T
T
f d
f d
  
Similarly, it can be derived for the inflow constrained model that: 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
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For the unconstrained model,  
,
,
!
!
ijT
ij
i jij
i j
T
L p
T
 
and it can be implied that 
,
ln lnij ij
i j
L T p
 
and 
1 1
,
2 2)ln  ( )lnln [( ln ( )]u u i uij u i
j
j
i
jN N fT dL
 For the home-to-hospital gravity models, the same method of model fitting was used, and Tj in 
equation 4.5 was replaced by Hj. The adjusted models had one more parameter  to be estimated 
through the likelihood: 
 l n
)
( )
n
(
l j ij
j ij
j
ij
i j
T
L T
T
f d
f d
  
The model parameters were estimated numerically using the Generalized Reduced Gradient 
nonlinear optimization algorithm (Fylstra, Lasdon et al. 1998). 
4.6.4 Goodness-of-fit evaluation and model comparison 
Evaluation of the goodness-of-fit of the models was performed both on the global and individual 
observation levels. Models fitted to the same observed flow were compared by deviance and 
standardized root mean square error statistic (SRMSE, equation 4.6), the latter having been 
identified as the best measure for spatial interaction model comparison compared to chi-square, R-
square, and other less commonly used statistics (Knudsen and Fotheringham 1986). The observed 
and predicted probability distribution of the journey distance was compared graphically, and 
deviance residual plots were generated on the district and individual observation levels, categorized 
into within-district flow and between-district flow residuals.  
 
2ˆ( )ij ij ij
i j i j
T T T
SRMSE
I J I J
  (4.6) 
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In situations where the difference in deviance was not adequately informative to distinguish 
between the performance of nested models, Akaike's information criterion (AIC) which penalizes for 
the number of parameters was used. 
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Hong Kong travel patterns 
In all gravity models fitted to the movement patterns of the Hong Kong population and regardless of 
the gravity model type, the 2-parameter power law kernel outperformed the exponential kernel in 
the goodness-of-fit statistics. The latter tended to greatly underestimate the within-district flows 
(i.e. zero journey distance), compared to the good fit of power law kernel models to the probability 
distribution of the journey distance, as shown in Figure 4.8 as examples of illustration. In spite of 
this, the estimates of the scaling exponents 1, 2, 1 and 2 were fairly consistent between the 
power law and exponential kernel models, showing the robustness of the estimates. The following 
discussion focuses on the power law spatial kernel models only. 
Figure 4.8 Comparison of the gravity models using power-law or exponential kernel in estimating the probability 
distribution of journey distance. Outflow constrained gravity models using district-adjusted population size as the 
attributing factor were fitted to the census workflow and study flow respective (Models O-W-P2 and O-S-P2). 
(a) Census workflow     (b) Census study flow 
  
 
4.7.1.1 Outflow constrained gravity models 
Table 4.3 summarises the parameter estimates and the goodness-of-fit statistics of the outflow 
constrained gravity models fitted to the five movement datasets. The deviance and SRMSE statistics 
indicate that the district-adjusted population size model is better than the inflow model for the 
census study flow. The reverse is suggested for the census work flow and census work-study flow. 
The adjusted census overall flow was inconclusive, but the residual plots of these three flow types  
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Table 4.3 Outflow constrained gravity model parameter estimates and the goodness-of-fit statistics. 
Census work flow (W) 
Attraction factor Work inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. O-W-I O-W-P O-W-P2 
1 0.965 0.000 0.601 
- - 0.106 
a 3.855 7.635 4.881 
b 1.463 1.983 1.627 
Log likelihood -14,465,988  -14,785,300  -14,525,413  
Deviance 289,883  928,507  408,732  
SRMSE 0.388 0.624 0.507 
Census study flow (S) 
Attraction factor Study inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. O-S-I O-S-P O-S-P2 
1 0.718 0.034 0.619 
- - 0.075 
a 2.208 2.287 1.847 
b 2.156 2.198 2.082 
Log likelihood -5,501,432  -5,519,967  -5,476,049  
Deviance 225,944  263,015  175,179  
SRMSE 0.436 0.492 0.415 
Census work & study flow (WS) 
Attraction factor Work + study inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. O-WS-I O-WS-P O-WS-P2 
1 0.998 0.000 0.536 
- - 0.092 
a 2.180 3.013 2.339 
b 1.432 1.600 1.485 
Log likelihood -20,439,354  -20,695,179  -20,459,024  
Deviance 485,000  996,649  524,340  
SRMSE 0.410 0.600 0.459 
Adjusted census overall flow (AC) 
Attraction factor overall inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. O-AC-I O-AC-P O-AC-P2 
1 0.969 0.000 0.498 
- - 0.087 
a 0.816 0.973 0.752 
b 1.177 1.235 1.169 
Log likelihood -25,472,150  -25,667,403  -25,436,898  
Deviance 666,374  1,056,879  595,869  
SRMSE 0.418 0.502 0.423 
Survey overall flow (TS) 
Attraction factor overall inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no.   O-TS-P O-TS-P2 
1 n/a 0.062 0.844 
  - 0.106 
a   1060779.314 6.477 
b   229270.104 1.398 
Log likelihood   -30,153  -29,050  
Deviance   3,011  806  
SRMSE   0.562 0.249 
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indicates that the inflow models had poor fit. All of the fitted models greatly underestimate the flow 
of high inflow districts, shown as the few positive deviance residuals by district, and the rest as 
negative residuals of smaller magnitude [Figure 4.9 (a,left) as an example]. On the other hand, the 
within-district flow of highly populated districts is overestimated, displayed as the downward trend 
in these residuals [Figure 4.9 (a,right)].  These were not observed for the district-adjusted population 
models [Figure 4.9 (b)]. Taking this into account, the district-adjusted population models were 
preferred for all five types of flow. 
Figure 4.9  Deviance residual plots of the outflow constrained gravity models by district (left) and of individual 
observations (right) of the inflow and district-adjusted population models on census work-study flow. 
(a) Inflow effect model (Model O-WS-I)  
 
(b) District-adjusted population size model (Model O-WS-P2) 
  
 
For each census flow type, the normalised spatial kernels derived from the inflow and district-
adjusted population gravity models were highly consistent to the extent that they were almost 
visually indistinguishable [Figure 4.10 (a-b)]. The study flow kernel was the most localised kernel, 
followed by survey overall, adjusted census overall and census work-study, and the work kernels, 
and the non-study kernels were close to each other [Figure 4.10(b)]. Distance impendence differed 
by study trip compared to other trip types as indicated by the kernels. Half of the study trip distance 
is estimated to be within 2km, i.e. they were all within-district flow (Figure 4.2), consistent with the 
high within-district study flow observed which captured other trip making factors besides journey 
distance. For work trips, half of the journeys were estimated to be within 7km – a distance including 
journeys to non-contiguous districts. For work-study flow and adjusted census overall flow, half of 
trips were within 5km, and for the survey overall trip, within 4km.  
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Figure 4.10 The normalised power law spatial kernel (in log-log scale) of the inflow and district-adjusted population 
gravity models on the 5 flow types respectively. 
(a) Census work, study and work-study flow kernel (b) Adjusted census overall and survey overall kernel 
 (compared to census work and work-study kernel) 
  
Because of the robustness of the spatial kernel derived between the inflow and population models 
for each flow type, the difference in the goodness-of-fit between the models fitted to the same flow 
can be attributed to the attraction factor used and the estimates of the scaling exponents. Inflow as 
the regional attributing factor generally showed a directly proportional relationship with the flow 
( 1 1) as expected, except for the study flow, but a single scaling relationship was not adequate to 
capture the dichotomous mechanism in the flow patterns as discussed. The lower than expected 
inflow exponent ( 1=0.7) and the steep spatial kernel of the study flow suggested distance 
impendence effect was relatively strong in driving the trip patterns compared to other flows. Using 
population size as the regional attributing factors required a scaling adjustment ( 2) for the high 
work inflow districts, otherwise the model could not capture any population size effect (Models O-
W-P, O-WS-P and O-AC-P), and this was not improved by excluding the remote and lowly-populated 
Islands district in the analysis. With district adjustment, the common population scaling effect 1 was 
estimated at around 0.5-0.6 for all census flow type, around 0.8 for the survey overall flow, and the 
adjustment effect 2 was all around 0.08-0.1. On the other hand, census flow of increasingly localised 
nature tended to have lower 1 and 2 estimates [work:(0.60,0.11); work-study: (0.54, 0.09); census 
adjusted overall: (0.50,0.09)], along with slightly more localised spatial kernel [Figure 4.10(b)]. 
Adjustment of all four high work inflow districts gave the best model fit for the census work, work-
study flow, adjusted census overall flow and survey overall flow, while for study flow the best model 
had all the five high study inflow districts adjusted. 
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The potential effects of the return trip in the survey data on the gravity models could be higher 
scaling exponents, induced from the model comparison of the survey and census work and study 
flow ( 1 – work: 0.64 vs 0.60, study: 0.75 vs 0.62; 2 – work: 0.26 vs 0.11, study: 0.14 vs 0.08, Table 
4.3 and Table 4.4) and less localised spatial kernels (Figure 4.11). My attempt to fit a gravity model 
on the survey overall flow that excluded the work and study trips was not successful, possibly 
because of different underlying dynamics driving the various types of flow in the data, and the low 
data resolution that only allowed the model fitting on the marginal inflow. However, it could at least 
be concluded that the high 1 of 0.84 in the survey overall flow model (with 2=0.106, same as 
census work model, Table 4.3) was partly due to the returning effect, though the effects of non-
work, non-study and non-home based trips could not be quantified. The same analysis was not 
conducted as the inflow constrained model, because the outflow of the survey data was more 
subject to the projection used to generate the data. Nor was it fitted as an unconstrained model 
since only the marginal flow data were available for model fitting. In general, although high 
correlation was observed between the census work and work-study flow with the survey overall trip 
patterns, evidence was lacking to either support or reject that their scaling factors with population 
size were comparable, and therefore could be a good proxy for the survey overall flow. 
Table 4.4 Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics of the outflow constrained district-adjusted population 
gravity models fitted to the survey work and study flow data. 
Data Survey work trip Survey study trip 
Parameter estimates 
 
  
0.639 0.750 
0.257 0.143 
a 0.751  52.814  
b 0.687  12.167  
Goodness-of-fit 
 
  
Log likelihood -13,244  -4,589  
Deviance 692  79  
SRMSE 0.331 0.196 
 
Figure 4.11 Spatial kernels derived from the survey work flow and study flow gravity model compared to that of the 
census work flow and study flow model. 
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4.7.1.2 Inflow constrained gravity models 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of the inflow constrained gravity models fitted to the various 
movement patterns. Consistent with the high correlation observed between outflow and population 
size (Figure 4.4), the scaling effect 1 of the population size without district adjustment was around 1 
except in the survey overall flow model, probably because journeys not started from home were also 
included in the survey data. However, adjusting the high inflow districts gave the best model 
goodness-of-fit in all flow types, and generally more random patterns in the deviance residual plots. 
Estimates of 1 varied, from 0.38 for census study flow, to 0.76 for census work flow, and the mixed 
flow types ranged at 0.6-0.7 and again with the more localised the nature of the flow type having 
lower scaling exponent. Estimates of 2 were -0.08 for study flow, and between -0.04 and -0.06 
otherwise, suggesting that the high inflow districts were less “competitive” as the trip donor 
compared per capita, though more competitive as trip attractor based on the results of the outflow 
constrained models. 2 was insignificant in the survey overall flow, probably because high inflow 
districts were also important donors of non-home based trips. Study flow remained more driven by 
travel distance than the zonal attributes. The same districts were adjusted as in the outflow 
constrained models, except for the work flow and work-study flow which was better fitted without 
adjusting for the Islands district. 
The spatial kernels derived were also very robust and were also visually indistinguishable from those 
fitted with outflow as the factor. The rank of descending localisation of the kernels was the almost 
identical to that of the outflow constrained models, except the survey overall flow was the least 
localised rather than being the second in the previous ranking by outflow constrained kernels (Figure 
4.12). In general, the kernel ranking confirmed the extent of localisation of the census flow fitted in 
both gravity model settings. 
Figure 4.12 Spatial kernels derived from the inflow constrained, district-adjusted population size gravity models of 
different flow types.  
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Table 4.5  Inflow constrained gravity model parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics. 
Census work flow 
Attraction factor Work outflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. I-W-O I-W-P I-W-P2 
1 0.991 1.010 0.759 
- - -0.043 
a 1.081 1.069 1.162 
b 0.801 0.802 0.851 
Log likelihood -14,568,824  -14,562,810  -14,534,722  
Deviance 495,554  483,526  427,351  
SRMSE 0.508 0.505 0.481 
Census study flow 
Attraction factor Study outflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. I-S-O I-S-P I-S-P2 
1 1.096 1.034 0.388 
- - -0.081 
a 1.402 1.369 1.328 
b 1.803 1.777 1.808 
Log likelihood -5,519,289  -5,539,079  -5,492,797  
Deviance 261,658  301,238  208,674  
SRMSE 0.456 0.510 0.368 
Census work & study flow 
Attraction factor Work + study outflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. I-WS-O I-WS-P I-WS-P2 
1 1.073 1.049 0.725 
- - -0.055 
a 0.876 0.803 0.809 
b 0.993 0.961 0.984 
Log likelihood -20,563,983  -20,593,038  -20,530,146  
Deviance 734,257  792,367  666,583  
SRMSE 0.542 0.568 0.500 
Adjusted census overall flow 
Attraction factor overall outflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. I-AC-O I-AC-P I-AC-P2 
1 1.095 1.054 0.592 
- - -0.062 
a 0.386 0.366 0.349 
b 0.940 0.926 0.931 
Log likelihood -25,549,138  -25,566,167  -25,483,651  
Deviance 820,350  854,408  689,376  
SRMSE 0.508 0.518 0.554 
Survey overall flow 
Attraction factor overall outflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no.   I-TS-P I-TS-P2 
1 n/a 0.728 0.647 
  - -0.055 
a   0.000 0.001 
b   0.219 0.287 
Log likelihood   -36,709  -36,697  
Deviance   277  253  
SRMSE   0.145 0.140 
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4.7.1.3 Unconstrained gravity models 
Results of the unconstrained gravity model fitting are summarized in Table 4.6. The district-adjusted 
population models were the best model for all flow types, though for the census work flow this was 
justified by the randomly distributed deviance residuals [Figure 4.13(b)], as the model with marginal 
flow attribute gave lower model deviance but with trends in the deviance residual plots [Figure 
4.13(a)]. Estimates of all scaling exponent u1, u2, u1 and u2 were generally comparable to those 
estimated in the outflow constrained and inflow constrained settings, though to a lesser extent for 
the overall survey model, where robustness of the model could have been affected by its low data 
resolution. With the exception of the study flow district-adjusted population model, all marginal flow 
and district-adjusted population models had u1 > u1. For high inflow districts, ( u1+ u2)<( u1+ u2) 
for work and study flow, and only marginally so for adjusted census overall and survey overall flow, 
and the opposite was observed for census work-study flow (Table 4.7). On comparing the 
multiplicative flow component (= populationscaling exponent x model normalisation constant 0.5) of each 
attribute (origin / destination, adjusted district / other district), where the origin flow component x 
destination flow component x spatial kernel = flow from the origin to destination, the key population 
Figure 4.13 Deviance residual plots of the unconstrained gravity models by district (left) and of individual observations 
(right) of the marginal flow and district-adjusted population models on census workflow. 
(a) Marginal flow model (Model U-W-M)  
  
(b) District-adjusted population size model (Model U-W-P2) 
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Table 4.6 Unconstrained gravity model parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics. 
Census work flow 
Attraction factor Work outflow & inflows Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. U-W-M U-W-P U-W-P2 
u1 0.922 0.960 0.706 
u2 - - -0.041 
u1 0.839 0.000 0.606 
u2 - - 0.104 
a 0.656 2.408 1.241 
b 0.660 1.100 0.869 
Log likelihood -14,601,623  -14,861,794  -14,611,753  
Deviance 561,153  1,081,495  581,412  
SRMSE 0.574 0.712 0.533 
Census study flow 
Attraction factor Study outflow & inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. U-S-M U-S-P U-S-P2 
u1 0.920 1.003 0.397 
u2 - - -0.084 
u1 0.306 0.032 0.548 
u2 - - 0.067 
a 1.373 10.514 1.145 
b 1.770 5.611 1.720 
Log likelihood -5,532,508  -5,638,188  -5,511,367  
Deviance 288,097  499,456  245,815  
SRMSE 0.524 0.922 0.734 
Census work & study flow 
Attraction factor Work-study outflow & 
inflow 
Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. U-WS-M U-WS-P U-WS-P2 
u1 0.918 0.973 0.742 
u2 - - -0.052 
u1 0.708 0.010 0.512 
u2 - - 0.086 
a 0.647 2.282 0.790 
b 0.876 1.464 0.974 
Log likelihood -20,632,926  -20,832,279  -20,589,365  
Deviance 872,144  1,270,851  785,022  
SRMSE 0.633 0.609 0.532 
Adjusted census overall flow 
Attraction factor overall outflow & inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no. U-AC-M U-AC-P U-AC-P2 
u1 0.823 0.944 0.608 
u2 - - -0.060 
u1 0.560 0.000 0.469 
u2 - 
 
- 0.083 
a 0.346 0.511 0.329 
b 0.895 1.007 0.916 
Log likelihood -25,637,585  -25,747,980  -25,528,309  
Deviance 997,244  1,218,033  778,691  
SRMSE 0.512 0.464 0.414 
Survey overall flow 
Attraction factor overall outflow & inflow Population Population (adjusted) 
Model no.   U-TS-P U-TS-P2 
u1 n/a 0.482 0.727 
u2   - - 
u1   0.000 0.509 
u2   - 0.223 
a   1444.469 0.295 
b   587.536 0.536 
Log likelihood   -90,801  -89,481  
Deviance   4,746  2,106  
SRMSE   0.629 0.353 
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attributes that drove each type of flow (compared on the basis of identical population size) can be 
determined, assuming constant spatial kernel effect between the regions (Table 4.7,Figure 4.14). The 
more localised flow types – census work-study and adjusted census overall flow were most driven by 
other (i.e. non-high inflow district) origin population. Both the work and survey overall flow were 
most driven by high inflow district destination population and other district origin population. All 
non-study flow was least sensitive to the population size of the other destination. Study flow was 
strongly driven by adjusted destination population, but all origins had little impact. 
 
Table 4.7  Categorisation of each flow type by the comparison of scaling exponent estimates. In parenthesis: key 
driving attributes of the flow in descending order. “Adjusted origin/destination” refers to high inflow district as 
origin/destination, and “other origin/destination” refers to other districts as origin/destination. 
 u1+ u2< u1+ u2 u1+ u2 u1+ u2 u1+ u2> u1+ u2 
u1 > u1 Census work-study 
(other origin >  
 adjusted origin > 
 adjusted destination > 
 other destination) 
Adjusted census overall 
(other origin >  
 adjusted destination >  
 adjusted origin > 
 other destination) 
Survey overall 
(adjusted Destination >   
 any origin [ u2=0] > 
 other destination) 
Census work 
(adjusted destination >   
other origin > 
adjusted origin > 
other destination) 
u1 < u1   Census study 
(adjusted destination >  
 other destination > 
other origin > 
adjusted destination) 
 
Figure 4.14 Comparison of the effects of scaling exponents of the high inflow and ordinary districts on the multiplicative 
flow component (=population
scaling exponent
 x normalisation constant
0.5
), based on the unconstrained gravity models on 
census work flow and adjusted census overall flow, assuming the distance effect=1.   
(a) Census work flow  (b) Adjusted census overall flow  
( u1 > u and u1+ u2< u1+ u2) ( u1 > u and u1+ u2 u1+ u2) 
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(c) Census work-study flow  (d) Census study flow  
( u1 > u and u1+ u2> u1+ u2) ( u1 < u and u1+ u2< u1+ u2) 
  
(e) Survey overall flow    
( u1 > u and u1+ u2 u1+ u2) 
 
Unconstrained gravity models had slightly less robust spatial kernels for the work and work-study 
flow on comparing the marginal flow model to the district-adjusted population models [Figure 
4.15(a)]. Study flow and adjusted census overall kernels remained visually inseparable under the 
same comparison. The order of descending localisation of the kernels was identical to that of the 
inflow constrained models [Figure 4.15(b)]. 
Comparing the kernels from the three types of gravity model under each flow type (Figure 4.16), 
kernels from unconstrained models were visually inseparable to those of the inflow constrained 
models for work, work-study and adjusted census overall flow, and only slightly different for the 
study and survey overall flow. Kernels from the outflow constrained models were always more 
localised than the others, and were fairly close to the unconstrained / inflow kernel under the study 
and adjusted census overall flow, but there was a gap between the survey kernels. Comparing the 
fitted journey distance distribution (Figure 4.17), unconstrained models for work and work-study 
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Figure 4.15 The normalised power law spatial kernel of marginal flow and district-adjusted population gravity models 
on the five flow types respectively. 
(a) Census work and work-study flow kernel (b) Kernel of all 5 flow type 
(marginal flow and population with adjustment model)  (population with adjustment model) 
  
Figure 4.16 Comparison of the spatial kernel of each flow type derived by inflow constrained, outflow constrained and 
unconstrained models. 
(a) Work flow (b) Study flow 
  
(c) Work-study flow (d) Adjusted census overall flow 
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(e) Survey overall flow 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Comparison of the estimated journal distance distribution under the inflow constrained, outflow constrained 
and unconstrained models for each flow type. 
(a) Work flow 
 
(b) Study flow 
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(c) Work-study flow 
 
(d) Adjusted census overall flow 
 
flow were inferior to the constrained models, while in general all three types of gravity model fitted 
equally well for the study and adjusted census overall flow. In general, the performance of the 
unconstrained gravity models in this study was satisfactory with the robustness of the results not as 
strong as the constrained models only on some occasions. 
4.7.2 Hospital flow patterns 
Table 4.8 shows that the home-to hospital flow of inpatient, visitor and the overall flow were not 
affected by hospital size (models H3-H8), and the increment of healthcare worker’s flow diminished 
with increase in hospital size ( =0.30, models H1-H2). However, using hospital size as the attribution 
factor was not adequate as the flows to PWH and AHN were highly underestimated from the 
residual plots. This suggested that the flow of inpatients and visitors were more driven by the 
epidemic related factors, and using inflow as the attribution factor greatly improved the gravity 
model fit for all flows (models H9-H16). The scaling component was consistently estimated at 0.9, 
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regardless of the flow type and the spatial kernel functional form. The power law models had 
marginally higher SRMSE in the overall, inpatient and visitor inflow, but were otherwise the better 
model than the exponential kernel model in other goodness-of-fit statistics and the estimation of 
journey distance, especially in the within-district flow distribution (Figure 4.18). 
Table 4.8 Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics of the gravity models on the healthcare worker, inpatient, 
visitor and overall flows, using hospital size or number of hospital infection as the attribution factor, and the power-law or 
exponential distribution as the spatial kernel. (SRMSE: standardized root mean square error). 
  Healthcare worker Inpatient Visitor Overall 
Spatial distance kernel Power law Exp Power law Exp Power law Exp Power law Exp 
Total observed flows 367 229 147 739 
Attribution factor Hospital size 
Model H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 
Parameter estimates     
  
        
0.303 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a 26.882 0.144 5.435 0.210 1.288 0.156 7.241 0.166 
b 5.092 - 2.434 - 0.998 - 2.351 - 
Goodness-of-fit     
  
        
Log likelihood -1721 -1722 -912 -921 -631 -637 -3288 -3300 
Deviance 470 472 288 306 270 281 684 708 
AIC 3448 3448 1830 1846 1268 1277 6583 6604 
SRMSE 2.627 2.735 2.841 2.973 3.234 3.694 2.358 2.615 
Attribution factor Inflow 
Model H9 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 
Parameter estimates     
  
        
0.916 0.912 0.912 0.942 0.894 0.895 0.897 0.896 
a 39.860 0.141 9.607 0.202 6.644 0.142 17.224 0.160 
b 6.753 - 3.323 - 1.894 - 3.956 - 
Goodness-of-fit                 
Log likelihood -1578 -1579 -878 -884 -566 -568 -3092 -3098 
Deviance 184 185 220 232 139 143 292 303 
AIC 3162 3162 1763 1773 1138 1140 6191 6200 
SRMSE 1.027 1.055 2.012 1.926 1.918 1.832 1.186 1.185 
 
Figure 4.18 Comparison of the observed and estimated probability distribution of journey distance by gravity models 
using the power law or exponential spatial kernel for the: (a) healthcare worker flow, (b) inpatient flow, (c) visitor flow, and 
(d) overall flow, using hospital size as the attraction factor.  
(a) Healthcare worker (b) Inpatient 
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(c) Visitor (d) Overall 
   
From the derived normalised power law spatial kernels, inpatients were the most localised 
compared to healthcare workers, and the latter resided closer to their workplace than the general 
Hong Kong working population (Figure 4.19). Visitors were the furthest away from the hospital, but 
their kernel distribution was very close to that of the census work or work-study flow kernels. Half of 
the inpatients tended to travel within 4km from the hospital they were infected with SARS, and half 
of the visitors and healthcare workers within 5km.  
Figure 4.19 Power law spatial kernels derived from the healthcare worker, inpatient, visitor and overall hospital flow 
gravity models, compared to the census work and work-study spatial kernels from outflow constrained gravity models. 
 
4.8 Discussion 
In this chapter, I studied the characteristics of various trip patterns of the Hong Kong population, and 
derived gravity models to describe their attributing factors with proven robustness of the parameter 
estimates and adequacy of the models. Several districts which are the key commercial and leisure 
areas of Hong Kong demonstrated a different flow dynamics that need a custom-structured gravity 
model beyond a simple proportional relationship with the marginal flow or the population. It is 
unlikely that this phenomenon only exists in Hong Kong, but the small physical and population size 
and the spatial unit of the study could have made these effects more prominent in the gravity model 
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fitting. Allowing these districts to have a different scaling relationship with the population size better 
predicted the flow patterns than using marginal flow which directly captures the flow related 
characteristics of the region.  
The scaling effect of population size to work and mixed flow from the census was 0.6-0.7 for 
destination populations (both normal and high inflow districts), and around 0.5-0.6 for the normal 
origin population and 0.6-0.7 for high inflow districts origin. The destination scaling effects of the 
previous studies (mostly 0.6-0.7) are comparable to this study, but they had lower origin scaling 
effects (0.3-0.5), and the ratio of these two exponents indicated that destination population effect is 
stronger than the origin population effect in driving the trip patterns. The same was observed only in 
the study flow of this study. Such difference between the studies could be due to the general factors 
that Hong Kong is more like a city of other countries in terms of its physical and population size, also 
with its own demo-geographic settings.  
To further understand these differences, I looked into each flow type for its key driving attributes. 
The study flow was markedly different from other flows in that journey distance is a strong trip 
driver. This conformed to the observation in human geography that public facilities or governmental 
service establishment (e.g. public schools) are more densely distributed and closer to their users 
than commercial facilities or non-governmental establishments (e.g. bank, retail stores) (Stephan 
1988; Um, Son et al. 2009), which are also locations of retail employment. The key financial and 
commercial centres in Hong Kong further reduce the distance effect on the commuting patterns, 
therefore a least localised spatial kernel compared to other flow, but highly driven by high inflow 
destination population and normal district origin population. The integrated patterns of work and 
study flow adjusted with those who did not travel were strongly driven by normal district origin 
population and had a more localised spatial kernel than commuting flow. Thus this model is most 
appropriate for the heterogeneous contact rate for the modified Wallinga and Teunis method. 
The spatial kernels derived in this study are much more localised than the other studies due to the 
small geographical size of Hong Kong. The work and study trip kernels indicated that if considering 
the distance impendence effect, half of the travel distance was within 5km – a journey distance of 
either within-district or between contiguous districts all over Hong Kong, or between non-contiguous 
districts in Hong Kong Island or Kowloon. Though not directly comparable, a metapopulation 
epidemic model of the Hong Kong SARS outbreak (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003) estimated the relative 
contact rates between contiguous district relative to within-district to be 0.57 (95% CI: 0.42, 1), and 
between non contiguous districts at 0.02 (95% CI: 0, 0.1), suggesting a steep decay of contact rates 
over distance. 
AHN 
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There are a few limitations to applying the derived gravity model into the spatial Wallinga and 
Teunis method. Although I derived gravity models using the travel survey data which also captured 
the non-routine trips, which were found by others to affect the timescale and patterns of epidemic 
spread (Danon, House et al. 2009), the effect of return trips included in the trip data could not be 
disentangled. Also the spatial resolution of the gravity model restricts the spatial resolution of the 
division of the SARS cases used in the extended method. Furthermore the distance between the 
centroid of the districts rather than the actual journey distance was used in the gravity model. For 
this reason, household transmission is not distinguishable from within-district transmission of non-
household settings, and individuals in the same district are therefore assumed to make contacts 
homogenously. Any potential effect of population density was also not taken into account.  
On comparing the distribution of the home-to-hospital flow by types of hospital infected SARS case,  
I found similar results as in the PWH ward 8A cases (Lai, Wong et al. 2004). Inpatients were the 
closest, given the geographically localised catchment area of hospitals, and the policies adopted to 
allocate SARS patients to hospitals during the epidemic. Healthcare workers were closer to their 
employing hospitals than visitors to those hospitals, and the general population to their workplace. 
This could be due to the demand of on shift work of the healthcare workers, but there was also a 
small proportion of more random patterns because of staff deployment from other hospitals during 
the epidemic (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). Visitors were furthest, 
though their patterns were expected to be a mixture of that similar to that of the inpatient, 
contributed by the family and housemaid of the inpatients, and more random in distribution and 
remote to the hospitals, contributed by relatives and friends. The flow patterns implied that hospital 
visitors had the longest potential spatial range of secondary infection from hospital to community, 
whereas the healthcare worker were the key sources for the local transmission and cluster 
formation in areas with hospitals treating SARS patients. Such findings could provide further insights 
on the spread patterns and control measures of the epidemics, and the interplay between the 
hospital and community transmission. 
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Chapter 5 - The Spatial Wallinga and Teunis Method 
In this chapter, I derive a spatially extended version of the Wallinga and Teunis method (referred as 
“the modified method”) that incorporates gravity model based spatial coupling (as described in the 
previous chapter) to estimate the reproduction number of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong. I begin 
with a review of the original Wallinga and Teunis method. 
5.1 The Wallinga and Teunis method 
5.1.1 Formulation 
The Wallinga and Tenuis method (Wallinga and Teunis 2004) considers an epidemic as a branching 
process connecting infected individuals in a population. It considers all the possible infection trees 
which might generate an observed set of incident disease cases and estimates the probability of 
transmission between each potential pair of infected to derive estimates for the individual and daily 
reproduction numbers. The method makes two basic assumptions: (1) for each non-imported case j, 
there is exactly one infector i, who is from the n reported cases; and (2) the transmission events 
from case i to case j, and from case i to any other cases k are independent. Given these, the 
probability that i infected j is estimated from the serial interval density w(s ), where  is the vector 
of the distribution parameters. Serial interval is the time interval between any specific event in the 
time course of infection of the primary case and the corresponding event of the secondary case 
(Svensson 2007), and most often the event is chosen as the onset of clinical symptoms. Denoting the 
cases by i=1,…n, and the infection tree by the vector v, where v(i) is the infector of case i, and q as 
the number of imported cases, the probability of case i infected case j conditional on the observed 
set of cases is written as: 
 
1,
(  )
(   
;
; )
i jI
i j m n
m j
m m j
w t t
p
w t t
  
Hence the probability of infection from case i to case j is given by the strength of their 
epidemiological link as estimated from their relative time of symptom onset, normalised by the  sum 
of that of all potential infectors of case j.  
The use of serial interval density to estimate the probability of infection between cases implicitly 
assumes that people are only infectious after developing symptoms, and this is a valid assumption 
for SARS. It also assumes that all people infectious at time t could have infected someone infected at 
that time.  
(5.1) 
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Given the assumptions above, the individual effective reproductive number for case i, R(i), is 
distributed as: 
1
)( ) ~ (
k n q
I
i k
k
R i Bernoulli p
 
The expected value of R(i) is therefore written as: 
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R(t), the reproductive number on day t, is the average of R(i) of all the nt cases with symptom onset 
on date t: 
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This method was evaluated on simulated data and its performance was in general satisfactory, 
though the estimated R(t) had a slight tendency to be lower than the actual value by less than 5% 
(Wallinga and Teunis 2004).  
Using partial likelihood for statistical inference has much reduced the computational intensity of the 
Wallinga and Teunis method. Building on this advantage and extending the method to account for 
censored cases due to reporting delay, it can evaluate in real-time the transmissibility of the 
epidemic and the effectiveness of the implemented control measures (Cauchemez, Boelle et al. 
2006; Cowling, Lau et al. 2010). When  knowledge of the serial interval distribution is not available, 
the reproduction number and serial interval distribution may be able to be estimated simultaneously 
(Garske, Clarke et al. 2007), though this can often lead to model over-parameterisation (Griffin, 
Garske et al. 2010). In general, an epidemic curve only gives information about the real-time growth 
rate of an epidemic, so that the reproduction number and generation interval estimates are 
intrinsically correlated (Wallinga and Lipsitch 2007). 
In a study of the H1N1 influenza pandemic in UK (Ghani, Baguelin et al. 2009), the Wallinga and 
Teunis method with censoring was further modified in two ways – incorporation of contact tracing 
information, and using the convolution of incubation period and infectivity densities instead of the 
serial interval distribution for the probability of infection. The use of the convoluted density was 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
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supported by the availability of good data on incubation period, and allowed individuals to be 
infectious before the symptom onset, which is the characteristic of influenza. Lower reproduction 
number estimates and shorter confidence interval were attained compared with that from a full 
epidemic model, and this is consistent with the findings from the Wallinga and Teunis’s original 
results with simulated data (Wallinga and Teunis 2004). 
5.1.2 Alternative approaches 
It is possible to derive the same effective reproduction number formulation [equation 5.3] using a 
renewal equation method (Fraser 2007). Based on Kermack and McKendrick’s time-since-infection 
transmission model (Kermack and McKendrick 1927), and assuming secondary infections are 
generated by each infected individual as a Poisson process with rate (t, ) (where t is calendar time 
and  is time since infection), (t, ) was related to the incidence rate I(t), and the individual 
reproduction number of cases who had symptom onset on day t, denoted as Rc(t), as follows : 
0
0
( ) ( , ) ( )        and
R (t)= ( , )c
I t t I t d
t d
 
It was shown that (t, ) can be decomposed into w( ), the generation time distribution where 
0
( ) 1w d , and RI(t), the instantaneous reproductive number – the average number of secondary 
cases that could be generated by a case infected at time t should the conditions remain unchanged, 
which is a property related to the epidemic at time t rather than to individuals infected at time t as 
in the Rc(t).  Assuming w( ) is independent of t, the decomposition is written as: 
0
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By substitution, 
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Discretising the incidence and generation time distribution by time intervals ti and ti+1 into Ii and wi, 
where 
0
1
n
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The Rc(t) formulation is equivalent to equation 5.2, though Wallinga and Teunis used the serial 
interval density for the probability of transmission. Fraser’s method was also extended to capture 
underreporting during the epidemic (Fraser, Donnelly et al. 2009). There are common assumptions 
in both approaches: (1) the serial interval and generation interval distribution were assumed 
unchanged during the epidemic, though Fraser suggested different density functions can be used at 
different phases of the epidemic; (2). individuals were homogeneous in their mixing, and in their 
infectivity profile or serial interval distribution; (3) A case was identified as a potential infector of the 
other cases if the generation or serial interval of the potential infection pairs was within the defined 
range of the interval. Wallinga and Teunis’s approach is more individual based, while Fraser’s 
formulation is calibrated on the daily incidence, though they are technically identical. However, the 
individual based approach is more suitable to be extended spatially when the spatial location of the 
potential infection pairs is incorporated. 
White and Pagano (White and Pagano 2008) proposed a likelihood-based method based on the 
branching process concept that used the serial interval distribution to estimate the onset of the 
secondary cases probabilistically, and by fitting the derived daily incidence to the observed data the 
daily reproductive number was estimated. The method was also modified to enable the estimation 
of the serial interval distribution and reproductive number simultaneously, and adjust for censored 
cases and impute for cases with missing onset dates (White and Pagano 2008; White, Wallinga et al. 
2009). It shares the similarities of the Wallinga and Teunis and Fraser’s approach above, but is more 
difficult to be decomposed to allow additional spatial information of the individuals, nor could the 
infection tree be derived explicitly.  
5.1.3 Capturing individual heterogeneity 
In the original Wallinga and Teunis method, the only characteristic that differs between cases is the 
symptom onset date. Cases with the same onset date have exactly the same probability of having 
infected a specific secondary case regardless of their physical proximity to the infectee, and have the 
same individual reproductive number. This partly contributes to the R(t) estimates from the Wallinga 
and Teunis method being smoothed, even during the periods of super-spreading events.  
(5.4) 
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Incorporating contact tracing data into the method can improve the accuracy of the reproduction 
number estimates by incorporating prior data on who infected who. However, in reality, contact 
tracing data are seldom obtainable from all cases, and in large scale outbreaks, resources required 
for contact tracing of cases become unaffordable as the epidemic grows (Ghani, Baguelin et al. 
2009). On the other hand, only contact with people who are known by the case can be collected in 
contact tracing, and it is also subject to recall bias. In the Hong Kong SARS outbreak, a high 
proportion of cases had data on possible epidemiological source of transmission collected, and some 
of them had specific contacts traced (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). 
However, still around one-tenth of the cases could not identify any place or person from which 
infection might have been acquired (source of infection data described in chapter 2). 
Spatial information for cases, for instance residential location, is more likely to remain available for 
identified cases even at the later stages of the epidemic. The prerequisite for infectious disease 
transmission is that infected and susceptible individuals are in the same place at the same time. 
Capturing this spatial condition allows more accurate and realistic reconstruction of the infection 
tree.  A study on the UK Foot and Mouth disease epidemic in 2001 (Ferguson, Donnelly et al. 2001) 
had used a kernel of spatial distance from the infected farm as a multiplicative factor to the farm-
specific susceptibility and infectiousness to estimate the relative risk of transmission.  
Human movements are less traceable and more complicated that than livestock animals, but gravity 
models had proved successful in modelling human travel patterns and thus representing the spatial 
heterogeneity in the probability of contact between individuals based on their spatial location in 
epidemics. 
Past work has explored both infector driven (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Eggo, Cauchemez et al. 2010) 
and susceptible driven (Merler and Ajelli 2010) assumptions in linking gravity models to the 
probability of contact in epidemic models, but the effects of these assumptions were not compared. 
The essence of the Wallinga and Teunis method is to identify the potential infectors of cases, and 
then assign the relative likelihood of infection to all the potential infection pairs. Spatial context has 
a role to play in both processes. The original method identifies a case as potential infector regardless 
whether the potential infection pairs would have been in the same location or not. The use of spatial 
data can refine the list of potential infectors to those who were present at the infection location at 
the date of infection. The probability of infection between cases can be considered to be composed 
of two components – probability of contact based on the spatial location of the cases, and the 
probability of transmission given the timeline of infection. This chapter uses these principles to 
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derive an extended Wallinga and Teunis method incorporating both spatial and temporal 
components. 
5.2 Study objectives 
I consider two levels of spatial extension of the Wallinga and Teunis method. On a coarser spatial 
resolution, spatial data were used only to estimate the probability of contact between cases, 
referred as the “partially extended method”. On a more refined spatial level that used the source of 
infection (e.g. hospital or community) and hospitalisation data of the cases, eligible potential 
infectors were those present at the infection location at the date of infection. The method with this 
additional spatial extension is referred as the “fully extended method”.  
Because the occurrence of disease transmission is not observable, the date of infection was inferred 
from the probability distribution of the incubation period and the symptom onset date to identify 
potential infectors who fulfilled the spatial criteria. Accordingly the temporal component of the 
probability of infection were estimated by a convoluted incubation and infectious (or infectivity) 
distribution instead of the serial interval density. Therefore, the first objective of this chapter is to 
derive such a deconvoluted distribution for the serial interval density of the SARS outbreak to be 
applied in both the partially and fully extended methods. 
The second objective is to derive the partially extended method and evaluate different spatial mixing 
assumptions under which gravity models are used to derive the probability of contact. Gravity 
models predict the flows from a home location to the destination, and therefore give the probability 
of travel from home to a destination for certain trip purpose. This unilateral direction of movement, 
regardless of whether one considers the susceptible or infector to be travelling, risks oversimplifying 
the infection risks associated with travel. Therefore I also considered bilateral (both susceptible and 
infector could travel to each other’s home location) and multilateral (susceptible and infector could 
travel to any location and meet there) movement, and under different trip types (work, work-study, 
adjusted overall) and trip data (census and survey), to find the most appropriate proxy for the 
probability of contact leading to the observed spatiotemporal spread of the SARS epidemic in Hong 
Kong.  
Building on the result of this chapter, the fully extended method is derived in the next chapter to 
study the hospital and community transmission and their dynamics in the SARS outbreak in Hong 
Kong. The following section describes the method and discusses the results of deconvoluting the 
serial interval distribution – the first objective of this chapter.  
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5.3 Fitting serial interval data 
5.3.1 Method 
Figure 5.1 Timeline of transmission between infector i and infectee j. Si and sj are the time of symptom onset, ti and tj 
are the time of infection, gij is the generation interval and sij is the serial interval of the transmission between cases i and j. 
 
 
Deconvolution of the serial interval density with the incubation period distribution to derive the 
infectiousness density (generation time distribution) was applied in the SARS and H1N1 pandemic 
(Kuk and Ma 2005; Ghani, Baguelin et al. 2009). Using the observed serial interval data, the unknown 
density of either the infectiousness or the incubation can be derived based on the decomposition of 
the timeline of infection illustrated in Figure 5.1. Consider infector i and infectee j with symptom 
onset dates si and sj, and time of infections ti and tj respectively. Let w(s) be the serial interval 
density, q(c) be the incubation period density, and u(t) be the infectiousness density. I assume the 
serial interval distribution to have zero density at negative times given SARS cases started to be 
infectious only with the onset of symptoms, and that the distribution of incubation period and 
infectiousness to be independent, the serial interval density can expressed (in discrete time, given 
the daily interval of SARS case reporting) as:  
( ) ( ) ( )
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Without loss of generality, let si=0 and sij=sj-si, giving: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
j
j
s
ij j j j
t
w s u t q s t   
With the probability distribution of the incubation period and the empirical data of the serial interval 
reported in previous studies, I derived the infectiousness density u(t) using equation 5.5. In the fully 
and partially extended Wallinga and Teunis methods, given the symptom onset date of case j and 
the incubation period density, I inferred the date of infection of case j and the temporal component 
(5.5) 
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of the probability of infection by the potential infector case i from the infectiousness density, given 
the symptom onset date of case i.  
Assuming the count of the serial interval data by day to be Poisson distributed, I used the maximum 
likelihood method to fit the convoluted serial interval distribution with a time step of 0.5 days to 
empirical serial interval data. These data was derived from the Singapore SARS outbreak (n=180) by 
digitising the histogram of Lipsitch et al.’s study (Lipsitch, Cohen et al. 2003). The data have mean 8.4 
days (SD 3.8 days) and maximum observation at 20 days. Naïvely fitting a Weibull distribution 
directly to the data (truncating the distribution at 20 days) gave the scale parameter of 9.39 and 
shape parameter of 2.21. 
The goodness-of-fit of the different convoluted serial interval models were compared by their 
deviance. The following describes the probability distributions explored in modelling the serial 
interval data: 
1. Incubation period distribution  
i) Weibull distribution 
Cowling et al. (Cowling, Muller et al. 2007) compared the goodness of fit of lognormal, Weibull 
and Gamma distribution to the incubation period distribution of Hong Kong (n=168) and Toronto 
(n=149) SARS cases, and concluded the lognormal function fitted best. However, the difference 
in the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was only marginal for the Hong Kong data (395 vs 396) 
comparing lognormal and Weibull distributions, while the former had a thicker right tail, with 
the 99th percentile at 22.3 days (longer than the observed maximum serial interval), compared 
with 15.9 and 15.0 days for the Weibull and gamma distributions. The gamma distribution used 
for other Hong Kong SARS studies (Donnelly, Ghani et al. 2003; Leung, Hedley et al. 2004) fitted 
worst, reinforcing the findings by Farewell et al. (Farewell, Herzberg et al. 2005) that various 
probability distributions should be considered and compared in estimating the incubation period 
density. 
In this study, I used the Weibull distribution (scale and shape parameters at 4.60 and 1.23) to 
describe the incubation distribution [Figure 5.2(b)]. The mean was assumed to be 4.3 days (SD 
3.5 days), and the distribution was truncated at 14 days (i.e. the 98th percentile of the Weibull 
incubation period distribution). This maximum period is longer than the 10 days quarantine for 
suspected cases adopted during the outbreak.  
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ii) Constant  
The use of Weibull incubation period distribution in inferring the date of infection gives a 
probability distribution of the date of infection and the list of potential infectors. A simplified 
assumption of constant incubation period gives a specific date of infection. With the mean and 
the mode of the incubation period were 4.3 and 2 days, I explored and assessed the effects of 
using constant incubation periods of 2, 3 or 4 days respectively on deriving the infectiousness 
density.  
Assuming a constant incubation assumption, the infectiousness distribution could not simply be 
considered as an offset of the serial interval distribution, because if  
1,     
( )   
0,      
c k
q c
c k
 
then tj=sij-k, giving w(sij)=u(sij-k), which contradicts the assumption that infectiousness starts with 
the onset of symptoms for sij<k. Therefore a proper deconvolution of the serial interval was 
required even under constant incubation assumption. 
2. Infectiousness distribution  
Both Weibull and gamma distributions were explored to describe the temporal development of 
infectiousness. Based on the maximum observed serial interval data of 20 days, I assumed the 
maximum duration of infectiousness to be 18 days when the incubation period was assumed a 
constant 2 days, 17 days when incubation was 3 days, 16 days when the incubation period was 4 
days, and 14 days when using a Weibull incubation distribution assumption truncated at 14 days. 
In the modified method, this was considered as the maximum duration of infectiousness, and 
the infectious period was allowed to vary based on the hospitalisation data. 
5.3.2 Results 
Table 5.1 shows that assuming a constant incubation period of 2 days with Weibull distributed 
infectiousness gave the best fitting convoluted serial interval model (deviance=20.99), and was 
comparable to fitting a Weibull serial interval distribution directly to the observed serial interval data 
(deviance=20.95). A Weibull infectiousness distribution was also preferred when the incubation 
period was assumed to be Weibull distributed (deviance=25.10), but a gamma function for 
infectiousness fitted best when a constant incubation period of 3 or 4 days was assumed.  
For the rest of this study, the convoluted density of fixed 2-day incubation period and Weibull 
distributed infectiousness is referred as the “2-day convolution”, and the corresponding 
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infectiousness density as “2-day infectiousness” respectively, and that of the 3 and 4-day incubation 
with gamma infectiousness distribution are referred as “3-day convolution”, “3-day infectiousness”  
and “4-day convolution”, “4-day infectiousness” respectively, and that of the Weibull distributed 
incubation and infectiousness are referred as “Weibull convolution” and “Weibull infectiousness”.  
Table 5.1 Parameter estimates of the infectiousness distribution and the goodness-of-fit of the convoluted serial 
interval under different incubation period assumptions. 
Incubation period distribution Weibull Constant (4 days) Constant (3 days) Constant (2 days) 
                  
Infectiousness distribution Weibull Gamma Weibull Gamma Weibull Gamma Weibull Gamma 
Maximum duration (days) 14 14 16 16 17 17 18 18 
                  
Parameter estimates                 
a (scale parameter) 4.32 1.53 5.38 3.79 6.20 4.57 6.90 3.04 
b (shape parameter) 1.59 2.84 1.08 1.46 1.06 1.38 1.56 2.29 
                  
Mean 3.87 4.31 4.65 5.06 5.44 5.57 6.06 6.57 
Standard deviation 2.49 2.51 3.79 3.70 4.11 4.08 3.82 3.94 
                  
Convoluted serial interval                 
Log likelihood 263 261 225 233 248 255 265 264 
Deviance 25.10 28.68 99.47 85.06 55.18 40.96 20.99 22.46 
                  
Mean 8.45 7.91 9.10 9.11 8.62 8.62 8.53 8.56 
Standard deviation 3.96 4.00 3.73 3.65 4.10 4.02 3.79 3.92 
                  
 
The 2-day infectiousness had higher mean and mode (4 days) than the Weibull infectiousness [mode 
3 days], and was less sharply peaked with a fatter tail [Figure 5.2 (b)]. Although the 4-day 
infectiousness was closest to the Weibull infectiousness in shape and with the mode a day later, the 
4-day convolution gave zero serial interval density for days 1-3 due to the incubation period 
assumption, and that contributed to a higher and earlier peak of the 4-day convolution than the 
Weibull convolution [Figure 5.2 (c)]. Besides, being least able to catch the peak of the observed serial 
interval at day 3 and 4, but peaked at the trough of the observed data at day 5 and 6 had made it the 
least fitting model to the observed serial interval data. 
Because of the bimodal shape of the observed serial interval distribution, even the Weibull 
distribution fitted directly to the data underestimated the two peak probabilities while 
overestimated the probabilities between the peaks, with a left shift of the single peak to day 7 and 8. 
The Weibull convolution had a further left shift of the peak to day 6 and 7, and the 2-day 
convolution to day 6. 
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Figure 5.2 (a) The convoluted serial interval density using Weibull incubation and infectiousness distribution, 
compared to the observed and Weibull fitted serial interval distribution. Comparison of: (b) the derived infectiousness 
density, and (c) the convoluted serial interval density, using Weibull distributed or constant incubation of 2, 3 or 4 days 
respectively. (d) The number of potential infectors by symptom onset date based on different assumptions to identify 
potential infectors. 
 (a) Weibull distributed incubation and infectiousness 
  
(b) Comparison of infectiousness density
 
(c) Comparison of convoluted serial interval density 
 
(d) No. of potential infectors 
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Besides how well the convoluted serial interval fitted to the data, it also matters in estimating R how 
many of the cases are identified as potential infectors through time. The 2-day convolution model 
implied that potential infectors were those with symptom onset between 2 and 20 days before the 
symptom onset of the infectee. By comparison, the Weibull convolution implies potential infectors 
have symptom onset 1 to 28 days earlier before that of the infectee. During the first 3 weeks of the 
epidemic where the number of cumulative cases was small, the difference in the number of 
potential infectors for cases with symptom onset during this period is minimal [Figure 5.2 (d)]. 
However, at the peak of the epidemic, each case had 962 potential infectors under the Weibull 
convolution. The 2-day convolution gave 80 (SD 48) or 15.7% fewer potential infectors per infectee, 
and the 4-day convolution had 196 (SD 110) or 37.1% fewer. A broader coverage of potential 
infectors might reduce the chance of missing out the real infector with long serial interval, but at the 
cost that the infection might be incorrectly attributed to more cases who were not the true index 
case. This latter issue means that estimates of R(t) and individual reproduction numbers tended to 
be further smoothed out and less able to reflect the real fluctuations along the epidemic. 
Taking into consideration the above results, I used the 2-day convolution model for my baseline 
analysis in this and later chapters, and (given data suggesting a mean 4 day incubation period) 
investigated the impact of assuming the 4-day convolution model in sensitivity analyses. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
Estimation of the profile of infectiousness over time in an infected individual is not straightforward 
because disease transmission is not observable. Viral load is considered a proxy of infectiousness 
with the most common assumption being that they are proportional to each other (Anderson, Fraser 
et al. 2004). For SARS, viral load peaked between 6 to 10 days after symptom onset based on a study 
of 14 patients (Peiris, Chu et al. 2003). A Bayesian analysis found that a gamma function was the best 
fitting distributional form (compared with a uniform or triangular distribution), with a peak 9 days 
after symptom onset (McBryde, Gibson et al. 2006). An unpublished study reported in the WHO 
meeting during the SARS outbreak suggested peak infectiousness was 7 to 8 days after symptom 
onset, based on the generation of secondary cases in the Singapore outbreak (Anderson, Fraser et al. 
2004). Generally, analyses of viral load data have therefore been consistent with epidemiological 
data  and my analysis presented above. 
Another study used the contact tracing data of the Hong Kong SARS outbreak to estimate the daily 
transmission probability and incubation period simultaneously using a Bayesian discrete-time 
likelihood model by Markov chain Monte Carlo method. It was estimated that in the household 
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setting, the probability of transmission was bimodal, peaked at day 2 and 10 after symptom onset 
(Pitzer, Leung et al. 2007). The authors suggested any discrepancy to the viral shedding findings with 
their study were due to the infectiousness of index cases and the susceptibility of the contacts. The 
early peak could be due to infection by highly infectious people or to highly susceptible people, or to 
caregivers whose exposure was relatively high, or it could also be due to higher compliance with 
control measures later on (leading to right-censoring of the serial interval distribution), or co-
primary infection from outside the household.  
However, because the serial interval observed in household outbreaks tends to be shorter than that 
of community outbreaks (Fine 2003), peak infectiousness estimated from household data could also 
be earlier than in the non-household settings due to close proximity and more intense exposure. 
Also contacts identified in contact tracing were likely to be restricted to those whose name was 
known and could be recalled. Therefore exposure outside household and workplace might have had 
a lower chance to be included. Pitzer et al.’s work excluded non-household contacts which may 
mean the resulting infectiousness function is biased for use outside the household. On the other 
hand, the second peak at day 10 was the higher peak, but the number of infectious individual not 
admitted to hospital 10 days after symptom onset was extremely small (2.5%), and in Pitzer et al.’s 
data only 25% of the household exposure last for more than 5 days.  
The idea that there might be a second peak in infectiousness 10 days after symptom onset was 
further challenged by another study which suggested mean duration of infectiousness was 9.3 days 
(95% CI 8.6-9.9 days) using a stochastic compartmental model using MCMC methods for parameter 
estimation (Cori, Boelle et al. 2009). If the second peak of infectiousness at day 10 were ignored, and 
the peak of 2 day after symptom onset were considered as biased for the general settings, then the 
true peak infectiousness would be between 3 to at most 9 days after symptom onset. This is 
consistent with the findings of this study under different assumptions of the incubation period.  
Although the Singapore serial interval data used above showed slight evidence of bimodality, the 
second peak in that data occurred at day 9, which is inconsistent with infectiousness peaking at day 
10. Serial interval data collected from contact tracing could be subject to the false assignment of 
tertiary cases to the index case of the household or disease cluster, resulted in a pseudo-bimodal 
distribution, and this is a feasible explanation of the observed serial interval data with the time delay 
between the first and second peak being comparable to the time of the first peak.  
Some of the assumptions I make in modelling the serial interval distribution above could be 
oversimplified, though they are also commonly used in other epidemic studies. The serial interval 
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and infectiousness distributions were assumed not to change over time, though it was shown that 
mean serial interval in reality reduced as the epidemic progressed (Lipsitch, Cohen et al. 2003), 
perhaps due to saturation of infection hazards in exposed individuals (Svensson 2007; Kenah, 
Lipsitch et al. 2008), but more likely due the effects of more effective control measures such 
isolation and quarantine. In using serial interval data from the Singapore outbreak and incubation 
period data from Hong Kong, I implicitly assume distributions did not vary between countries. 
Without the availability of additional data, it is difficult to resolve these issues.  
Lastly, my assumption of a constant incubation period dramatically simplifies the application of 
Wallinga and Teunis type analyses, but of course is an approximation and is somewhat unrealistic. 
The impact of incubation period assumptions is assessed in sensitivity analyses.  
5.4 Partial extension of Wallinga and Tenuis’s method 
5.4.1 Method 
The second objective of this chapter is to extend the Wallinga and Teunis method to include spatial 
heterogeneity using the gravity models derived in the previous chapter. The original method was 
modified in the following ways: 
(1) I explicitly modelled the time of infection rather than just model the times of onset of 
disease. Hence the criterion applied for case i to be a potential infector of case j was that 
case i had to be infectious at the date of infection of cases j.  
(2) Instead of just using the serial interval density to estimate the relative likelihood of infection 
of case i to case j, I used the product of the probability of contact given the spatial location 
of the cases i and j, denoted as pc(xi,xj; ) [with xi being the spatial location of case i] and the 
convolution of the infectivity density u(tj-si; ) and incubation period density q(sj-tj; ) [where 
si is the symptom onset date of case i, ti the time of infection, and , ,  are the vectors of 
parameters of the respective function].  
Let 
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This modifies the relative probability of case i infected case j as:
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The individual and effective reproduction numbers were then estimated as in the original Wallinga 
and Teunis method as: 
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It was noted that the R(i) and R(t) estimates are invariant for any constant multiplicative scaling of 
g(). The formulation of pc(xi,xj; ) was derived from the gravity models and varied under different 
spatial mixing assumptions. These are given in the following section.    
5.4.2 Spatial mixing assumptions 
Previous epidemic models incorporating gravity model to represent the relative probability of 
contact between patches have assumed either susceptible-driven or infector-driven spatial 
movement of infection. In this study, I investigated these two ‘unilateral’ assumptions together with 
bilateral and multilateral spatial mixing, deriving expressions for pc(xi,xj; ) for each.   
5.4.2.1 Unilateral movement 
Let T be the origin-destination trip matrix with components Ti’j’ being the number of trips from 
district i’ to j’. Denote pTi->j’ as the probability of a specific individual in i travelling to district j’, and 
pCi->j as the probability of a specific individual in i travelling to district j’ and making contact with a 
(5.6) 
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specific individual in j’. Let Ni’ and Nj’ be the population sizes of i’ and j’ respectively. Under unilateral 
mixing, depending on who moves, the probability of travel and probability of contact between 
individuals i (from patch i’) and j (from patch j’) can be written as: 
' ' ' '
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' ' '
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To better illustrate how the gravity model was incorporated into the Wallinga and Teunis method 
assuming unilateral mixing, I considered without loss of generality a population being divided into 4 
districts, and with 4 cases i, j, k, m living in district i’, j’, k’ and m’ respectively. The Wallinga and 
Teunis formulation for the probability that i infected j conditional upon j being infected on the 
observed day of infection is the relative probability (up to an unknown multiplicative scaling 
constant) that i infected j divided by the sum of the relative probability of infection from all possible 
infectors on that day, i.e. the denominator is the sum of the likelihood of j being infected by k, m and 
i, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 (a). The unilateral mixing assumption implies either susceptible j moved 
to district i’ and got infected by i , or infector i went to district j’ and infected j.  Infector driven 
mixing assumed infectors i, k, m moved to j’ *Figure 5.3 (b)], and the corresponding trip matrix 
components were Ti’j’, Tk’j’, Tm’j’ [Figure 5.3 (d)]. Susceptible driven mixing assumes susceptible j 
moved to district i’, m’ or k’ *Figure 5.3 (c)], with the trip matrix components Tj’i, Tj’k’, Tj’m’ [Figure 5.3 
(d)].  
In the previous chapter, I derived gravity models for Ti’j’ using population sizes Ni’ and Nj’ and spatial 
distance between patches. It is necessary to use constrained gravity models when extending the 
Wallinga and Teunis method. In an outflow constrained model one conditions on the total number 
of journeys from a patch and partitions these journeys between possible destinations according to 
their relative attractiveness (as quantified by the gravity model) . This formulation is appropriate for 
use in a susceptible driven unilateral movement model. An inflow constrained model conditions on 
the marginal inflow of a district partitions this flow between possible origins according to the relative 
attractiveness of the destination to those origin patches. This was the appropriate formulation for 
use with the infector driven model which assumes all possible infectors have to travel to the patch of 
the susceptible [Figure 5.3 (b,d)]. This simple example excluded the scenario where j is infected 
within its own district just for the purpose of illustration, though of course this possibility is allowed 
in the model. 
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Figure 5.3 Schematic presentation of the relationship between potential infectors i, m, k to infectee j under: (a) 
Wallinga and Teunis method; (2) Infection driven movement; (c) susceptible driven movement; (d) trip matrix, with Oi’ and 
Di’ denote the outflow and inflow of district i’. 
 
5.4.2.1.1 Susceptible driven movement  
To generalise, let the SARS cases be m=1,….,n, and the Hong Kong population be partitioned by their 
residential location into s = 1,…., S districts, and let the population of district s be denoted Ns. Denote 
the residing district of case m as m’. The outflow constrained models derived in the previous 
chapter, where Os is the marginal outflow of district s, are of the form: 
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And pT j→i’, the probability of an individual residing in j’ to travel to i’ is: 
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The probability of contact pCj→i between cases i and j (using the residential location instead of the 
centroid of i’ and j’ as it allows higher spatial resolution) is:  
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Hence the probability that i  infects j under the susceptible driven assumption, ps
I
i→j , is: 
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The ratio Oj’/Nj’ cancels from numerator and denominator. The resulting probability of contact 
component within this probability of infection is the product of the scaled population size of the 
district and the spatial kernel function.  
5.4.2.1.2 Infector driven movement  
Now consider an inflow constrained gravity model of the form below, with Di’ being the marginal 
inflow to district i’, and 1, 2 the power parameters of the gravity model on origin district 
population size:  
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 The probability of travel pT i→j’  of an individual in i’ to j’ is: 
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And the probability of contact pCi→j through i travel to j’ and contact j is:  
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This gives: 
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This is similar to the comparable expression for the susceptible driven model, with the only 
difference being that the gravity model power parameters represent the attractiveness of origin 
patches in one model and that of destination patches in the other. Under the gravity model with 
1=1 and 2=0 (or the susceptible driven model when 1=1 and 2=0), dependence on patch 
population size is lost and the spatial component only contains the spatial kernel (referred to as the 
“distance only” model later). Susceptible-driven and Infector-driven models are equivalent in this 
special case.  
5.4.2.1.3 Observed trip patterns 
Besides using gravity models, I also used the observed trip matrix directly to derive the probability of 
contact and incorporate it into the extended Wallinga and Teunis method. The mathematical 
formulations for the resulted probability of infection estimation are given below, and the probability 
of infection from case i to case j using the observed trip patterns is denoted as pO
I
i→j. However, 
spatial resolution on the individuals’ location within the district was lost in the partially modified 
method using the observed trip patterns directly, because the data only give total flows between 
districts. Therefore the observed trip modified method was used to check the general consistency 
rather than evaluating the modified methods that used the gravity models. 
Under susceptible driven movement we obtain: 
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Under infector driven movement the expression is: 
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5.4.2.2 Bilateral movement 
Figure 5.4 Schematic presentation of the (a) Wallinga and Teunis method and (b) bilateral movement assumption, 
with i as the infector and j as the infectee and in the same settings described in Chapter 5.4.2.1. (c) Relevant components in 
the trip matrix under the bilateral movement assumption. The colour marks the corresponding potential infector. 
 
 
Unilateral mixing is a simplified model of human movement. Bilateral mixing [Figure 5.4 (a-c)] allows 
susceptible to travel to infectors or vice versa with equal weight.  I used an unconstrained gravity 
model in this case written as: 
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The probability of contact between infector i and infectee j in i’ is the probability of travel of i within 
i’ and j to i’, divided by the traveller (i.e. worker or school student) population of i’. In the census 
data where each person contributed one trip to the data, the traveller population of a patch is just 
the marginal daily inflow into that patch, denoted as Di’. Therefore the probability of contact 
between i and j under bilateral movement is: 
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Incorporated into Wallinga and Teunis method, I get: 
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This formulation has both the attractiveness and propulsiveness of the home patch of the potential 
infectors affecting the probability of infection. Using observed trip patterns instead of the gravity 
model, the formulation is: 
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5.4.2.3 Multilateral movement 
The multilateral movement assumption allows individuals i and j to meet in any patch. Therefore 
their probability of contact is the sum across all patches of the product of their probability of 
travelling to the same patch and making contact there [Figure 5.5 (a-c)]. The bilateral model is a 
subset of the multilateral scenario with the meeting patches being either i’ or j’. 
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Figure 5.5 Schematic presentation of the (a) Wallinga and Teunis method and (b) multilateral movement assumption, 
with i as the infector and j as the infectee and in the same settings described in Chapter 5.4.2.1. (c) Relevant components in 
the trip matrix under the multilateral movement assumption. The colour marks the corresponding potential infector. 
 
 
The formulation of the probability of contact under multilateral movement based on the 
unconstrained gravity model described earlier is: 
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Hence the probability that i infects j is: 
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Using the observed trip data, the equivalent expression is: 
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5.4.3 Time course of infection assumptions 
5.4.3.1 Variable infectious period 
The extended Wallinga and Teunis model I derived assumes all individuals have equal duration of 
infectiousness. However, hospital discharge dates sometimes allow us to set a more realistic upper 
bound on the duration of infectiousness. Hence in assigning the end date of infectiousness to a case, 
I used the earlier of the imputed end of infectiousness (from the convolution model) and the 
observed hospital discharge date. Although the patients were likely have ceased being 
infectiousness a few days before discharge, there is a lack of reliable data on this to further improve 
the estimation of individual’s infectious period.  
5.4.3.2 Incubation period and infectiousness 
The date of infection of the cases was inferred from the incubation period distribution. The 2-day 
incubation period and Weibull distributed infectiousness with 18 days infectious period (2-day 
convolution) were applied in this study as the baseline scenario. Infectiousness was assumed to 
commence on the date of symptom onset. Sensitivity analysis using a 4 days incubation period and 
gamma infectiousness density with 16 days infectious period (4 day convolution), and the Weibuall 
serial interval density were conducted. 
5.4.4 Analysis plan 
I first evaluated the effects of using the decovoluted serial interval and the variable infectious period 
respectively without incorporating any spatial component (referred as “non-spatial models”), and 
compared them to the original method. Then the spatially extended method was applied with 
different spatial mixing assumptions, and travel patterns represented by gravity models (Table 5.2), 
using the adjusted census overall trip data as the baseline because of its comprehensive coverage. 
The distance-only model was also fitted to examine the effect of population size dependence in the 
gravity model. In addition, because spatial data with high resolution may not be available in reality 
during the epidemic, I also tested the model using the centroid of the residing district of the cases 
rather than their residential location. 
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Table 5.2 Variants of the partially extended Wallinga and Teunis method studied. 
Spatial mixing assumption Trip patterns fitted to the 
gravity model 
Probability of transmission based on temporal 
information 
1. Infector driven 
2. Susceptible driven  
3. Bilateral 
4. Multilateral 
5. Distance only 
1. Adjusted census 
overall 
2. Census work 
3. Census work-study 
4. Survey overall 
5. Observed trip patterns 
 
1. Baseline: 2-day incubation, 
Weibull infectiousness and  
variable infectious period of 
maximum infectious period of 18 days  
2. Sensitivity analysis: 4-day incubation,  
gamma infectiousness and  
variable infectious period of  
maximum 16 days  
 
3. Sensitivity analysis: Serial interval density of 
20 days  
 
The key outputs of the partially modified method are the daily reproduction numbers R(t), the 
reproduction number of individual cases R(i), and the percentage of within-district transmission in 
the estimated reproduction numbers. Evaluation of the method is not straightforward. Use of 
simulated data can test inference ability of models, but of course does not test whether a model 
really incorporates the mechanisms underlying the observed spatiotemporal spread of an epidemic. 
Therefore I compared model results to epidemiological linkage data for the Hong Kong SARS 
epidemic, and in particular focus on the PWH and Amoy Gardens outbreaks, whose transmission 
dynamics were more widely studied. These events served as a good test of the ability of the method 
to capture the full extent of spatial heterogeneity and within-district transmission. 
5.4.5 Results 
5.4.5.1 Deconvolution model 
The non-spatial models using convoluted densities had higher, sharper and later peak of R(t) at 
around the time of the PWH and Amoy Gardens super-spreading events, but otherwise were similar 
to the results from the original Wallinga and Teunis method (Figure 5.6). The difference observed 
can be attributed to the characteristics of the convoluted densities compared with that of the 
original serial interval density [Figure 5.2 (c)]. The earlier peak of the convoluted densities translated 
into a later peak R(t) for these clusters compared with the original method (PWH peak: day 17, i.e. 4 
days later; Amoy peak: day 33, i.e. 2 days later). Because t in R(t) corresponds to the symptom onset 
date of cases rather than the time the secondary transmission occurs, R(t) peaks earlier than the 
peak case incidence of the observed clusters, at day 23 and 38. This time gap was more realistic in 
the non-spatial method (5-6 days) than the original method (8-9 days).  
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 Figure 5.6 Estimated reproduction number R(t) using the non-spatial method with the deconvolution of serial interval 
density of: (i) 2 days incubation and Weibull infectiousness of 18 days, (ii) 4 days incubation and gamma infectiousness of 
16 days, compared to the original Wallinga and Teunis method. 
 
 
The differences in R(t) compared with the original method were larger for the PWH outbreak due to 
the small and sporadic number of cases (e.g. absence of cases with onset from day 14 to 16) in the 
initial period of the outbreak, and the number of potential infectors was further reduced under the 
4-day incubation period assumption, because individuals with symptom onset 1 to 3 days before the 
case’s onset were not eligible to be infectors. It remained difficult to identify the index cases of the 
super-spreading events (whose actual onset was day 10 for PWH and day 28 for Amoy) from 
estimated individual reproduction numbers  using only the temporal data in the non-spatial method, 
because individuals eligible to be infectors on a particular day had the same reproduction number 
for that date.  
5.4.5.2 Variable infectious period 
Using the observed hospital discharge date as the upper bound of duration of infectiousness 
resulted in cases with shorter infectious period to have  lower individual R(i) (Figure 5.7), but other 
eligible potential infectors of the same secondary case would correspondingly be attributed a higher 
individual reproduction number. The overall impact on R(t) was more significant at the beginning 
and the end of the epidemic when the case incidence was small, and fluctuated in terms of direction 
(e.g. higher R(t) on day 10 to 13, and lower in day 1, 4 and 7). The difference in R(i) and R(t) 
compared to the original method were mostly of minimal magnitude (25th and 75th percentile, and 
the maximum: R(i)=(0.03,0.06,-1.8), R(t)=(-0.02,0.05,-0.8)). The variable infectious period estimated 
some R(i) to be close to 0, reflecting the reality that some cases to have low chance of generating 
any secondary transmission. The number of potential infectors per onset day reduced on average by 
25.4 (SD 20.3, range 0-86) compared to the original method. 
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Figure 5.7 (a) Comparison of R(i) and R(t) estimates under the fixed and variable infectious period assumption, using 
the Wallinga and Teunis method with the serial interval distribution.  
 
5.4.5.3 Spatial mixing  
Figure 5.8 depicts R(t) and R(i) estimated under different movement assumptions using the spatially 
extended Wallinga and Teunis method with gravity models fitted to the adjusted census travel data, 
all with 2-day convolution and variable infectious period. Results are compared with those from the 
non-spatial model. Defining high R(i) as those >5 up to day 20, and >3 afterwards, the susceptible 
driven model [Figure 5.8(a)] had more cases with high R(i) (2.8%) than the infector driven (2.1%), 
bilateral (1.7%), multilateral (0.5%) and distance only (2.1%) models. 
Notably, 48.0% of high R(i) cases in the susceptible model resided in the high inflow districts, and 
none in all other models.  This illustrated a tendency of susceptible-driven models to over-represent 
cases from high inflow districts as having high R(i). In reality only 4.4% of all SARS cases resided in 
high inflow districts, while the model estimated that 92.3% of such cases had high R(i). Similar results 
were found for the models using the observed trip patterns instead of a gravity model, ruling out the 
Figure 5.8 The estimated daily and individual reproduction numbers R(t) and R(i) under different movement 
assumptions, using the partially extended method with 2-day convolution and variable infectious period and on the 
adjusted census overall trip patterns. High R(i) values are highlighted in green, and the R(i) of the index case of the PWH 
and Amoy Gardens outbreak are identified.  
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(b) Infector driven model  
 
(c) Bilateral model 
 
(d) Distance only model (based on the spatial kernel derived from inflow constrained gravity model with 1=1 and 2=0) 
 
(e) Multilateral model 
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(f)  Non-spatial model (with 2-day convolution and variable infectious period) 
 
 
effect being due to poor fitting of the gravity model. This bias tended to prevent the model from 
identifying the real index cases of the PWH and Amoy outbreaks (e.g. R(i)=11.7 for a case onset at 
day 5, and those high R(i) cases on day 22-27), making the model not desirable.  
The infector driven, bilateral and distance only models gave similar results to each other [Figure 
5.8(b-d)], and all estimated the true index case of the PWH outbreak to have a higher R(i) [5.4, 5.0 
and 5.7 respectively], compared with the 4.1 obtained from the non-spatial model [Figure 5.8(f)]. 
Peak R(i) for the PWH outbreak was 10.4 (infector driven), 8.8 (bilateral), 9.4 (distance only) and 7.9 
(non-spatial) at day 17. All three spatial models better identified the Amoy index case, estimating its 
R(i) as 3.9 (infector driven and distance only) and 3.4 (bilateral), while for the non-spatial model the 
Amoy index only had an R(i) of 1.6 - indistinguishable from many other cases. Peak Amoy R(i) 
reached 5.5 in the infector driven model and 5.6 in the distance only model at day 33, but in the 
bilateral model the peak R(i) of 6.1 at day 44 was from a non-Amoy infected case who lived in the 
district where the Amoy Gardens is located. From day 41 onwards, the infector driven model 
estimated a slighter wider range of R(i) (including values close to 0) than the bilateral and distance 
only models, suggesting the infector driven model was able to reproduce more heterogeneity than 
the other two models. The distance only model gave the least heterogeneity, as expected. All three 
models estimated two cases at day 91 and 97 to have R(i) around or higher than 1 – in reality these 
were related to the hospital outbreak in NDH. In general, the infector driven model slightly 
outperformed the bilateral and distance only model, though all of them generated satisfactory and 
sensible results.  
The multilateral model [Figure 5.8 (e)] by allowing the cases to meet in all districts reduced the level 
of spatial heterogeneity overall, and thus reduced the variation of R(i) - most notably during the 
Amoy outbreak where the maximum R(i) was only 3.0. I therefore considered it as inferior to the 
infector driven, bilateral and distance only models. 
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The differences in R(t) estimates between the infector driven model results and those from other 
spatial mixing models (Figure 5.9) were greatest at the initial period (day 1-20) when the cumulative 
number of cases was small (24 cases) and at the beginning of the PWH outbreak. From day 41 
onwards when the epidemic size was above 700, the difference was small. The maximum magnitude 
of R(t) difference was 2.9 with the original method, 1.7 with the non-spatial model, 2.0 with the 
distance only model, 4.5 with the susceptible driven model, and 0.72 with the bilateral model, 
though the surge in R(t) for the peak of Amoy outbreak at day 35 was less remarkable in the bilateral 
model than the infector driven model [Figure 5.8 (b,c)]. 
Figure 5.9 Box-plots on the difference of R(t) [model of other spatial mixing assumptions - infector driven model] by 3 
stages of the epidemic. The dots represent the median, the top and bottom of the boxes are the 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentile, 
and the upper and lower cap are the 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentile  1.5 interquartile range, and beyond those are outliers and 
displayed as circle. 
 
Greater fluctuations in R(t) towards the end of the epidemic were predicted in all spatial models, 
attributed to small case incidence and some local outbreaks [Figure 5.8 (a-e)]. Figure 5.10 shows a 
clearer comparison of R(t) over time. The general shape of the R(t) time-series estimates were very 
similar among the inflow constrained, bilateral and distance only model [Figure 5.10(a)], and the 
original method and non-spatial model were over-smoothed [Figure 5.10(b)], especially when 
compared to the daily incidence of the epidemic [Figure 5.10(c)]. 
Investigating further the difference between the unilateral movement models, the adjustment 
exponent of the high inflow districts in the gravity model 2=0.09 in the susceptible driven model
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Figure 5.10 The R(t) time series of the inflow constrained model (a) compared to that of the bilateral and distance only 
model; (b) compared to that of the non-spatial model and the original Wallinga and Teunis method; (c) plotted along the 
case incidence of the outbreak by source of infection. 
(a)
 
(b)
 
(c)
 
was found to have boosted the probability of contact with a specific individual in these districts 
(Figure 5.11), while the negative exponent 2=-0.06 in the infector-driven model correspondingly 
reduced the probability of contact with a specific individual from these districts, because the inflow 
constrained gravity model showed that these districts were weak donors of between-district 
journeys. These districts accounted for 12% of the Hong Kong population, but only for 4.4% of the 
total SARS cases. Therefore inflow constrained models are more appropriate for representing SARS 
transmission dynamics. 
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Figure 5.11 The probability of contact with a specific individual by the district population under the susceptible and 
infector driven model, with those of the high inflow districts were labelled. 
 
The infector driven model was gave very similar results to the distance-only model in capturing the 
proportion of within district transmission, though with the population effect in the spatial 
component (Figure 5.12). The overall proportion of within district transmission was 38.6% under the 
infector driven model, 38.2% in the distance only model and 35.9% in the bilateral model, all of 
which were more than double that estimated using the non-spatial model (15.2%), which – as 
expected - only estimated roughly the same proportion of the number of potential secondary cases 
in the same district as the index case (15.5%) identified by the incubation period assumption and 
given the observed set of incident case data. For cases which were associated with the Amoy 
outbreak the average proportion estimated to have been infected within their residential district 
was 56.1% for the infector driven model, 53.6% for the bilateral model, and 56.9% for distance only 
model. However, these figures included hospital transmission by the Amoy cases. We would expect 
more realistic results the fully extended method in which the hospital transmission was accounted 
for explicitly (see the next chapter). 
Figure 5.12 Percentage of within district transmission in the R(t) of the inflow constrained, bilateral and non-spatial 
model, and in the number of potential secondary cases estimated by the modified method. 
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On studying the reproduction number by district (Figure 5.13), the weekly average reproduction 
number R(w) of the high inflow districts were generally higher for the bilateral model than the inflow 
constrained model, at the expense of lower R(w) in a few districts such as Kowloon City and Kwun 
Tong (where Amoy Gardens located) at week 2 to 5. This could be attributed to the spatial 
Figure 5.13 Difference in estimated district-specific weekly average reproduction number R(w) [infector-driven model - 
bilateral models]. Blue box: high inflow districts; red box: districts with highest positive R(w) difference. Amoy Gardens is 
located in Kwun Tong district 
 
component in the bilateral model which equally weighted the susceptive driven and infector driven 
type of movement.  
Taking the above findings into consideration, I considered the infector driven model to be slightly 
better than the bilateral model, and thus adopted it as the baseline model. The bilateral model was 
used for sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results.  
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5.4.5.4 Sensitivity to travel data used 
Use of the adjusted census overall trip data enabled the partially modified method to better capture 
the localised super-spreading events, with higher R(t) [Figure 5.14] and R(i) estimated for those 
events. Using the infector driven model, R(i) of the index of the PWH and Amoy outbreak under the 
work-study data based gravity model (see previous chapter) was 0.3 and 0.7 lower than that 
obtained using the adjusted census overall model. For the work trip data based model these 
Figure 5.14 The daily reproduction number of inflow constrained model based on gravity models of different travel trip 
patterns. 
 
Figure 5.15 Percentage of within district transmission in R(t) and in the number of potential secondary cases under 
different trip patterns used in the gravity model for the inflow constrained method. 
 
 
estimates were 0.8 and 1.0 lower, and for the gravity model based on the overall survey data, the 
estimates were 1.4 and 1.6 lower. The same descending order of performance was found in the 
percentage of within district transmission estimated [Figure 5.15]. Therefore I chose to use the 
gravity models fitted to the adjusted census trip data for subsequent analyses. 
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5.4.5.5 Spatiotemporal reproduction number and within district transmission 
Based on the infector driven mixing and the adjusted census overall gravity model in the partially 
modified method, the weekly average reproduction number R(w) increased from 2.3 in week 1 to 
5.7 in week 3, capturing the effect of the PWH outbreak well (Figure 5.16). The second peak in R(w) 
of 1.7 at week 5 captured the impact of the Amoy Gardens outbreak. From week 6 onwards R(w) 
was below 1. Excluding the 447 and 123 cases from the Amoy and PWH clusters, the initial R(w) was 
estimated as 2.08, and R(w) fell below 1 from week 4.  
Figure 5.16 The estimated weekly average reproduction number by the partially modified model, and the weekly 
incidence by source of infection. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 (a-c) shows by district the overall incidence rates, average R(i) of cases residing in the 
district, and the overall proportion of within-district transmission by cases living in that district. 
Figure 5.18 shows district-specific R(w) estimates, and Figure 5.19 the weekly percentage of within-
district transmission. The four high inflow districts (Wan Chai, Central and Western, Islands and Tsim 
Sha Tsui) had relatively low R(i), within district transmission and incidence rate. Districts with high 
R(i) (Kowloon City, Wong Tai Sin, Kwun Tong) were those infected in the first week of the epidemic 
(Figure 5.18) and had high R(i) in the next 2 weeks, though the high R(w) in Kwun Tong was due to 
the Amoy outbreak. Districts with high within-district transmission included Sha Tin (where PWH 
located), Kwun Tong, and Tai Po Figure 5.17 (c), all identified as important spatiotemporal clusters by 
the Kulldorff’s scan statistic in chapter 3.  
The first three weeks showed a rapid spread of the epidemic to other districts resulting with 
moderately high R(w) estimates (Figure 5.18) and great variation in the proportion of within-district 
transmission (Figure 5.19), but in the Sha Tin district the within-district transmission remained high 
because of the PWH outbreak. At week 4 and 5, all districts were infected but R(w) estimates were 
mostly lower than the previous weeks, with the Kwun Tong district having the highest R(w) and 
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proportion of within district transmission, as early cases of the Amoy cluster had symptom onset 
during this period and the peak incidence was reached at week 6. The Tai Po district then became 
the key area of within district transmission till week 9, and from this time onwards till the end of the 
epidemic the R(w) of all districts were <1, during which the North district was alone in sustaining any 
significant local transmission. 
Figure 5.17 The spatial decomposition of (a) The overall case incidence rate, (b) average R(i), and (c) percentage of within 
district transmission by reproduction number by district council district. 
(a)
  
(b) (c) 
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Figure 5.18 The spatiotemporal weekly reproduction number R(w) by district, and the weekly incidence of the hospital and Amoy 
outbreaks (from the source of infection data). 
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Figure 5.19 The spatiotemporal within district transmission percentage in R(w) by district, and the weekly incidence of the hospital 
and Amoy outbreaks (from the source of infection data). 
 
 
 
 
North 
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5.4.5.6 Sensitivity analysis 
The 2-day convolution serial interval model generally gave the highest proportion of within-district 
transmission compared to the 4-day convolution and Weibull serial interval assumptions (Figure 
5.20). This could be due to the tendency of household transmission to have shorter serial intervals 
(Fine 2003), while the 4-day convolution excluded the potential infectors whose onset was less than 
3 day before the index cases.  
Figure 5.20 Comparison of the percentage of within district transmission in the reproduction number under the 
assumptions of 2-day, 4-day and Weibull convolution. 
 
As noted previously [Figure 5.2(c)], the non-spatial 4-day convolution showed a shift of the peak R(t) 
compared to the 2-day convolution model (Figure 5.6). A similar effect was seen for the spatially 
extended method [Figure 5.21(a)]. Also the higher peak of the 4-day convolution distribution 
resulted in higher R(i) than the 2-day incubation model for the PWH and Amoy index case, by 
magnitude of 2.9 and 1 respectively. The difference in R(t) and R(i) between the 2-day convolution 
and the Weibull serial interval distribution models [Figure 5.21 (b)] were smaller but similar in nature 
to those beween the 2-day and 4-day convolution models. In general, the R(i) and R(t) estimates 
were fairly robust from day 40 onwards under all assumptions on the timeline of the course of 
infection (Figure 5.22). 
Using the residing district centroid rather the residential location of the cases as the spatial 
reference, the model performance was satisfactory in capturing the effects of spatial heterogeneity, 
though the Amoy index cases was less easily distinguished by the R(i) because there were some 
cases with increasing R(i) from day 24 to 27 [Figure 5.22(a)]. The R(i) of the PWH and Amoy index 
cases were 5.7 and 3.3 respectively. A higher percentage (2.4%) of the cases had high R(i) estimates, 
but none from the high inflow districts. A higher proportion of within district transmission also 
resulted from the centroid model. This is because for the model which used residential locations,
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Figure 5.21 The difference in daily and individual reproduction nubmers R(t) and R(i) using the 2-day convolution as 
baseline compared to: (a) the 4-day convolution model; (b) the Weibull serial interval distribution model. 
(a)
 
(b)  
Figure 5.22 Results of the partially modified method using the centroid of the residing district of the cases: (a) the daily 
and individual reproduction number estimates, (b) proportion of within district transmission. 
(a)
 
(b)  
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zero distance only occurred for cases in the same household or building, while when centroid 
locations were used, all cases residing in the same district had zero spatial separation. 
5.4.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I derived a spatially extended Wallinga and Teunis method that used a constant 
incubation period to infer the date of infection and identify the potential infectors, a Weibull 
distributed profile of infectiousness over time (fitted to serial interval data), and a spatially-
dependent probability of contact derived from gravity models with different spatial mixing 
assumptions and underlying travel data. I found each of these modifications improved the ability of 
the model to capture the spatiotemporal heterogeneity of the epidemic, leading to more realistic 
estimates of the reproduction number at the daily and individual levels.  
The modified method identified the index cases of the PWH and Amoy outbreak with a rapid 
increase in individual reproduction numbers, and more accurately estimated the true extent of these 
super-spreading events compared with the original method. However, methods of probabilistic 
infection network inference generally identify the super-spreading events – where cases tended to 
be close in symptom onset and spatial locations, as high individual reproduction numbers for a small 
fraction of cases – especially in the early generation of the cluster, rather than as a very high 
reproduction number of a single case. This also applies to transmission through environmental 
factors, for instance in the Amoy outbreak.  
Using the average reproduction number of the first week of the epidemic to approximate the basic 
reproduction number, R0 was estimated at 2.1 with the PWH and Amoy clusters excluded. This is 
slightly lower than estimates of 2.7 [95% CI: (2.2, 3.7)] estimated by a spatially explicit 
metapopulation model of the Hong Kong epidemic (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003). This difference may 
partly be attributed to 100 cases which were only linked to the Amoy cluster after the Riley’s study, 
but in addition Riley’s study defined the stage of the epidemic coarsely, and the basic reproduction 
number estimate corresponded to the first 33 days of the epidemic.  
Previous epidemic models (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 2004; Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Merler and Ajelli 
2010) only used the gravity model to reflect the relative contact rate between patches, and the 
weightings of the within-patch and between-patch contact rates were estimated from the 
spatiotemporal incidence data through the model. In the modified method derived in this study, 
gravity models were used for both within and between patches coupling. Travel data that were 
adjusted to include those who did not travel as remaining in their home patch proved crucial to 
better capture the movement and contact between individuals in the same district or household, 
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though closer and longer contact made in the household setting specifically was not explicitly 
accounted for. 
Because trip patterns described by the gravity models are directional, the use of a gravity model to 
represent contacts in epidemic models requires assumptions on who travels and where individuals 
meet. Comparing the different assumptions I explored, the infector driven model that assumed the 
infector travels to the susceptible’s patch best reproduced the spatiotemporal spread of the SARS 
outbreak in Hong Kong. This was largely attributed to the inflow-constrained gravity model it used 
better capturing the relationship between travel patterns and infectious contact, in particular the 
correct weighting of distance effect, the population size effect and high inflow districts effect, and 
how all these were subsequently transformed into within-district and between district contact rates. 
Key commercial and leisure districts in Hong Kong attract high numbers of visitors from other 
districts, but the incidence rates in these districts were mostly low. Districts with high incidence rate 
were those with local outbreaks occurred. This suggested that distance was a stronger driver than 
the population size and the high inflow districts in the disease spread. The susceptible driven model 
that used the outflow constrained gravity model had contact rates strongly driven by the high inflow 
districts, and therefore underestimate the probability of within district transmission. Conversely, 
infector driven model that used the inflow constrained gravity model with a negative scaling 
exponent on the high inflow districts discounted the probability of contact with these districts, 
matching the observed spatial distribution of cases. The bilateral model as a balance of both 
approaches produced similar results to the infector driven model.  
Compared with other models assuming bilateral movements (Thomas 1999), the method developed 
here allowed the contact probabilities to be scaled with the population size, and scaling effects were 
allowed to varied for districts with a higher flow as they were the key areas of commercial and 
leisure activities. Compared with epidemic models that use observed leaving and return rates from 
and to the patches to capture heterogeneous contact rates (Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009), my 
approach is somewhat more parsimonious, yet produced substantial spatial and individual-level 
heterogeneity. As the epidemic grows, the effects of super-spreading events or local outbreaks are 
averaged out in estimates of the overall population reproduction number, making such events less 
detectable. Spatially-stratified and individual reproduction number estimates allow such 
heterogeneity to be revealed. 
The spatially extended Wallinga and Teunis method presented here was shown to give satisfactory 
results even when only spatial data of coarse resolution were available, which is often the case 
during epidemics. However, the findings on the most appropriate spatial mixing were unique to the 
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current model structure and the characteristics of the Hong Kong population, therefore maybe not 
be directly applicable to other studies that incorporate gravity model into metapopulation epidemic 
models. 
  
 170 
Chapter 6 - Quantifying Hospital and Community Transmissions 
In this chapter, I study the dynamics of hospital and community transmission of the SARS outbreak in 
Hong Kong by further modifying the Wallinga and Teunis method to incorporate finer spatial details 
and to utilise the hospitalisation and source of infection data. A review on the current findings on 
the role of hospital and community transmission in the SARS outbreak is given below. 
6.1 Current findings 
Nosocomial transmission of SARS occurred in many countries (World Health Organisation (WHO) 
2004). Therefore it is important to capture the transmission dynamics within and between the 
hospital and the community in epidemic models to give credible results. Nosocomial transmission 
was considered in one modelling study of SARS transmission in Hong Kong (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003), 
and two other studies have attempted to quantify the degree of transmission that occurred in the 
hospital and community settings (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003; Cori, Boelle et al. 2009).  
Cori et al. (Cori, Boelle et al. 2009) fitted a discrete time stochastic SEIHR model, using the 
hospitalisation data, to the Hong Kong SARS outbreak. Individuals were categorised as inpatients 
(those infected whilst hospitalised for other health conditions), healthcare workers and the general 
population. The date of infection was inferred assuming constant infectiousness between 1 day 
before to 4 days after symptom onset and a latent period of 5 days. The infectious period was 
estimated to be 9.3 days. Super-spreading events in the Amoy Gardens and PWH were captured as 
an additional contribution to the force of infection in the general population and hospitalised 
patients/health care workers respectively.  The start and end dates of these super-spreading events 
and their size were estimated.  
Cori et al. found that the estimated effective contact rate over time was a few times higher in the 
community than in the hospital, and that since late March (roughly day 40 of the epidemic) the 
hospital effective contact rate had been very close to 0. The average reproduction number 
(referenced by infection time) of the community infected cases was generally higher than that of the 
healthcare workers, and inpatients apparently had average reproduction number lower than 0.25 
throughout. Under the model, the PWH outbreak corresponded to high reproduction numbers from 
healthcare worker to community, and community to community, whereas the reproduction 
numbers for transmission among and between healthcare workers and inpatients did not change 
much during this period compared to the rest of the epidemic. This is in contrast to another study on 
the PWH outbreak which found an important contribution of healthcare workers in this super-
spreading event (Kwok, Leung et al. 2007).  
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Lloyd-Smith et al. (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003) studied the effect of various infection control 
measures in reducing transmission within and between the community and hospitals and the scale 
of the epidemic. They used a discrete time stochastic compartmental model and applied the 
baseline transmission rate that yielded the basic reproductive number estimates of SARS from 
previous findings on a hypothetical community with a hospital. Within-hospital transmission was 
identified as the most important transmission setting in which control measures, especially those 
targeting healthcare workers, are most effective. Transmission between hospital and community 
was also found to be important as it had the potential to trigger further transmission within the 
community. Reduction of contact between off-duty healthcare workers and the community was 
recommended especially when hospital control measures are not adequate to curtail the outbreak. 
A key plausible explanation for the low contribution of healthcare workers in hospital infection in 
Cori et al.’s study compared to the other study is the implicit assumption that infectious healthcare 
workers, prior to hospital admission for treating SARS, could only infect other healthcare workers in 
the community and not in the hospital. Therefore the hospital effective contact rate was likely to be 
underestimated, and hence also the reproduction numbers among and between healthcare workers 
and inpatients. Lloyd-Smith et al.’s study allowed transmission among healthcare workers in the 
hospital before admission, but ignored transmission between hospital patients and hospital visitors. 
Hospitals with SARS outbreaks were considered as a single physical unit in both studies. Twenty-one 
hospitals in Hong Kong experienced the SARS outbreak, and hospitalised patients had little 
opportunity to contact patients and healthcare workers from other hospitals. Studies with more 
realistic assumptions about the possible transmission pathways (e.g. healthcare workers could infect 
other healthcare workers in the hospitals) and the hospital infection settings are therefore needed 
to better quantify the transmission between and within hospitals and the community. 
6.2 Study objectives 
I showed in chapter 3 that the spatial distribution of the community infected SARS cases in Hong 
Kong is related to the hospital outbreaks. Here I quantify disease transmission within and between 
the hospital and community settings, including their spatiotemporal trends, by capturing the 
following key elements in the fully extended spatial Wallinga and Teunis method: 
(1) All transmission pathways in the Hong Kong outbreak are accounted for; 
(2) Each hospital is treated as a separate spatial unit; 
(3) Addition of spatial criterion in identifying potential infectors; 
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6.3 Method 
The fully extended method captures the transmission in the individual hospitals and community 
explicitly. To do so a potential infector must have been present in the location of infection as well as 
being infectious on the date of infection of the secondary case. The date of infection and time of 
infectiousness of the cases were inferred by the incubation period density as in the partially 
extended method presented in the previous chapter. The infection location of the cases (individual 
hospital and community) and the infection subgroup (healthcare worker, inpatient, inpatient 
(released), hospital visitor, community infected) were derived from the source of infection data 
described in chapter 2. The location of the infectious cases by time (individual hospital and 
community) was derived using the validated hospitalisation data described in chapter 2. Subject to 
the transmission pathways defined in the following section, all these together identify the potential 
infectors of the cases. 
6.3.1 Transmission pathways 
Figure 6.1 Places of exposure of infectious cases by their source of infection and time course of infection. 
 
From the data validation described in chapter 2, it was possible to define the possible transmission 
pathways between the subgroups of SARS cases in the Hong Kong outbreak using all available 
data,including the SARSID integrated database, contact tracing data, the official report on the SARS 
outbreak which contained more detailed information on the epidemiological linkage of some cases 
and  hence to derive the source of infection of the cases. However, there are cases whose infection 
source is not definite, because transmission cannot be observed, and information obtainable from 
the data is sometimes limited. Therefore I allowed healthcare workers, hospital visitors and 
inpatients (released) to have certain probabilities that they were infected from the community. 
Working hospital* 
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Admitted hospital* 
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Since infectious healthcare workers also spend time in the community before their admission for 
SARS, they could also generate secondary transmission in the community, along with infectious 
community infected cases, hospital visitors and inpatients (released) in the community, before being 
hospitalised for SARS treatment. Therefore healthcare workers could infect other healthcare 
workers, hospital visitors and inpatients (released) in both the hospital and the community. The 
possible locations of secondary transmission generated by an infectious individuals based on their 
source of infection is summarised as follows and depicted in Figure 6.1.  
 (a). Healthcare worker 
Before hospital admission for SARS, infectious healthcare workers could infect the healthcare 
workers, inpatients, inpatients released during incubation period and hospital visitors in their 
working hospital, and those in the community including healthcare workers, inpatients (released) 
and hospital visitors. After hospitalisation for SARS treatment, infectious healthcare workers could 
infect the healthcare workers, inpatients (ongoing or later released) and visitors in their admitted 
hospital until the end of their infectious period. 
(b). Community infected subject, hospital visitor and inpatient (released)  
Infectious community-acquired cases, hospital visitors and inpatients (released) could infect those in 
the community (including healthcare workers, inpatients (released) and hospital visitors) until they 
were admitted to hospital for SARS treatment, where they could infect the healthcare workers, 
inpatients (ongoing or later released) and hospital visitors of the hospital they stayed in until their 
infectious period ended. 
It is assumed that inpatients (released) were not infectious when first discharged from hospital for 
treating non-SARS condition i.e. the hospitalisation episode when they became infected. Also it was 
assumed that hospital visitors did not re-visit the hospital that they were infected from their start of 
infectiousness until their hospital admission (to the same or a different hospital) for SARS treatment. 
(c). Inpatient 
Inpatients stayed in the hospital continuously until end of infectiousness and could therefore only 
infect healthcare workers, inpatients (ongoing or later released) and visitors in the hospital(s) they 
stayed in. 
6.3.2 Mathematical formulation  
Based on the source of infection data described in chapter 2, let the place of infection of case j be 
Z(j)={1, 2,….hn, hn+1}, where hn is the number of hospital with SARS outbreak, 1 to hn are the index of 
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the hn hospitals in Hong Kong with SARS transmission, and hn+1 is the index for the community. Let 
R(j)={hcw, ip_r, ip, vis, com} represent the infection subgroup for case j defined as one of healthcare 
worker (hcw), inpatient released during incubation (ip_r), inpatient with ongoing hospitalisation (ip), 
hospital visitor (vis) and community infected subjects (com). Using the hospitalisation and SARSID 
integrated dataset, the hospital and community location of case j at time t is denoted as L(j,t, ), 
where =1 denotes the hospital location and =2 the community location. L(j,t,1)={0, 1,….. hn}, with 
0 denoting that case j was not in any hospital at time t, and 1 to hn are the hospital indices as defined 
in Z(j). L(j,t,2)={hn+1,0}, where hn+1 is the community index and indicates case j was in the 
community at time t, and otherwise 0. Therefore L(j,t, ) can capture the dual location of the 
healthcare workers before their hospital admission. 
Using a constant incubation period k implies that the date of infection of case j, denoted as 
( )j jt s k , where sj is the time of onset of symptoms for case j, and sij is the serial interval 
between cases i and j. The probability density function of the serial interval can be obtained as the 
convolution of the probability density functions of the infectiousness profile (u) and incubation 
period (q) as:  
( ) ( )
(
)
)
(
( )
j
j i
s
j i j j
t s
ij
j i
j i
u t s q s t
u s s k
u t s
w s
 
Therefore for each case j there is a set of potential infectors.  
Denoting the cases by i=1,…n, and the infection tree by the vector v, where v(i) is the infector of case 
i, and q as the number of imported cases. Therefore the infectivity of v(j) at the time j was infected, 
jt , is given by ( )( )j v ju t s . Denote ( ( ), , )L jI v j j t  as an indicator function of whether v(j) was in the 
same location as j at time jt , the likelihood of a network v that underlies the observed epidemic 
curve t can be written as:  
( ) _ ( ) _
1
( ; ) ( ( ), , )[ ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ( )) ( ( ), ) ( , ; ) ( ( ))( , , ; ) ]c cj v j L j h h hcw w c c v j j hcw c
j n q
j
u t s I v j j t I v j j p v j j I v j I v j j p x x I v jL v t
The indicator function of the index and infectee being in the same location is defined as: 
1    if ( ( ), , ) ( )  or ( ( ), , | 2) +1                      
( ( ), , )
0    otherwise
j j n
L j
L v j t Z j L v j t h
I v j j t  
The function captures v(j) who satisfies at least one of the 3 conditions: 
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Scenario 1: v(j) was at the specific hospital where case j was infected at jt  
Scenario 2: v(j) was in the community at jt , and j was community infected 
Scenario 3: v(j) was in the community at jt , and j was hospital infected 
The indicator function for hospital transmission 
    if ( ( ), , | 1) ( )                
( ( ), )
0    otherwise
j
h
L v j t Z j
I v j j  
applies the weighting of hospital acquired infection  on v(j) under scenario 1, because hospital 
infected cases are considered to have the probability of (1- ) to be community infected. It was 
assumed =99% in the base case model (Table 6.1), and other values of  were tested in the 
sensitivity analysis.  
The working healthcare worker indicator function in the hospital setting is 
_
    if R(v(j))=hcw and ( ( ))               
( ( ))
1    otherwise
j adm
hcw w
t d v j
I v j  
where dadm(v(j)) is the date of hospital admission of case v(j). This function applies the proportion of 
time  a healthcare worker spent in the working hospital before being hospitalised. The time spent 
in the community is therefore (1- ).  is assumed to be 80% in the base case scenario (Table 6.1), 
and the impact of this assumption was assessed in the sensitivity analysis. 
The indicator function for community transmission 
1            if ( ) +1    
( ( ), ) 1      if ( ) +1 and ( ( ), , | 2) +1              
0            if ( ( ), , | 2) 0     
n
c n j n
j
Z j h
I v j j Z j h L v j t h
L v j t
 
is used to assign the full probability of infection in community to those under scenario 2, and (1- ) to 
those under scenario 3 to account for the uncertainty that case j could be community infected even 
though the source of infection data suggested hospital-acquired infection. 
The working healthcare worker indicator function in the community  
_
1     if R(v(j))=hcw and ( ( ))               
( ( ))
1    otherwise
j adm
hcw c
t d v j
I v j  
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captures the proportion of time a healthcare worker spent in the community before hospitalised. 
The function ( ( ), )chp v j j denotes the probability of contact between v(j) and j in the hospital where 
infection occurred. It is defined as: 
1
( ( ), )
( ( ))
c
h
pop
p v j j
H Z j
 
where Hpop(Z(j)) gives the population size of the hospital where Z(j) was infected. The hospital 
population is composed of healthcare workers, hospitalised patients and hospital visitors. The 
number of staff, hospital beds and bed occupancy rate in each public hospital were available in the 
Statistical Report of the Hospital Authority (Hospital Authority 2003), and they were taken as the 
population size of healthcare worker and patient (number of beds x occupancy rate) of the hospitals. 
The ratio of number of hospital visitors per occupied bed (per day)  was assumed to be 0.8 (Table 
6.1), in view of the no visitor policy implemented during part of the outbreak. Different assumptions 
were tested in the sensitivity analysis. For the 6 private hospitals with SARS transmission, only the 
number of hospital beds was available from the report. Bed occupancy rate and staff to bed ratio 
was derived as the average of the comparable hospitals in terms of size and type (e.g. acute or 
convalescent), because it was observed that large hospitals with more than 1000 beds tend to have 
higher staff to bed ratios. The number of hospital visitors was derived in the same way as previously 
described for the public hospitals.  
Table 6.1 Parameter assumptions applied in the fully extended spatial method. 
 
 
The function pc
c(xv(j),xj; ) denotes the probability of contact between v(j) and j in the community. 
This is derived from the gravity model as in the partial extended method, but normalised by j’ such 
that the probability of travel within district j’ is scaled to 1, therefore comparable to the hospital 
infection setting. Under the infector driven mixing model, as described in chapter 5, the 
normalisation factor j’ and pc
c(xv(j),xj; ) are derived as: 
Parameters Symbol Baseline assumption
Weighting of hospital-acquired infection for hospital infected cases 0.99
hospital visitor per bed ratio 0.8
Working healthcare worker proportion of time in hospital 0.8
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Similar to the derivation in the partially extended method on ( ) ( )( ; , , ), , ,v j j v j jg s s x x  in equation 
5.6, the relative probability that case i infected case j, can then be written as: 
_ _
_
1,
' , , ,
' , , ,
( ; ) ( , , )[ ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ; ) ( )]
( ; ) ( , , )[ ( , ) ( , ) ( ) (
( ; , )
( ;
, ) ( , ;
, ) 
i j i j
i j i j
c c
j i L j h h hcw w c c i j hcw c
c c
j m L j h h hcw w c c
I
i j m n
m j
m m j
p
g s s x x
g s s x x
u t s I i j t I i j p i j I i I i j p x x I i
u t s I m j t I m j p m j I m I m j p x x
1,
_  ) ( )]
m n
m m j
hcw cI m
 
The probabilities that i infected j in hospital and in the community respectively are given as: 
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Therefore the individual reproduction number R(i) can be decomposed into the hospital 
reproduction number RH(i), the community reproduction number RC(i). The decomposition also 
applies in the daily reproduction number R(t) to the hospital and community reproduction number 
RH(t) and RC(t). They are formulated as: 
(6.1) 
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I quantified the transmission between and within hospital and community by the reproduction 
numbers Rxy, where x denotes the infection place of the case, and y denotes the secondary infection 
generated by the case in location y. Therefore Rhh measures the infection from hospital to hospital, 
Rhc from hospital to community, Rcc from community to community, and Rhc from hospital to 
community, both at the individual and daily level. Because I allowed the hospital infected cases to 
have a probability of acquiring infection in the community, the probabilities that case j is hospital or 
community infected, denoted as SH(j) and SC(j) and SH(j)+ SC(j)=1, are derived as:  
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I further validated the results by identifying cases with high Rxy (>3), and considered whether the 
potential secondary transmission clusters and their index cases estimated here corresponded to the 
high Rxy based on epidemiological linkage retrieved from the SARSID integrated dataset and the 
official Hong Kong SARS report (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). This 
shows how the fully extended method captures the transmission dynamics of the important disease 
clusters, and serves as an evaluation of its performance in identifying the index cases of these 
clusters correctly. A second evaluation is based upon the index case of disease transmission clusters 
of size >1 that are identifiable from the SARSID integrated dataset and the official Hong Kong SARS 
report. Their reported cluster sizes were compared to the estimated Rxy, under the caveat that the 
later generation cases of the clusters had also contributed to further transmission in the cluster and 
thus the final cluster size. 
The extent of local transmission by different settings is assessed by the proportion of within-district 
transmission in hospital transmission (of all cases), community transmission excluding Amoy cases, 
and community transmission by Amoy cases. The interpretation of within district transmission in 
hospital is that the residing district of the index and secondary case in the hospital transmission is 
the same. 
All districts were infected with SARS cases in 4 weeks. To study the spatial patterns of the initial 
spread, I identified the first case in each district and traced their source of infection. If they were 
infected from the community, their most probable index case was derived from the fully extended 
method. Maps of the transmission routes were then generated. 
Different assumptions for the hospital visitor to bed ratio , the proportion of time working 
healthcare workers spent in hospitals , and the probability of hospital infection  were tested in the 
sensitivity analysis. I also studied the impact of using the bilateral movement mixing assumptions.  
6.4 Results 
Figure 6.2 shows the daily hospital and community reproduction numbers RH(t) and RC(t) estimated 
by the fully extended method under the infector driven spatial mixing assumption. The super-
spreading events were well captured. The method accurately captured the onset of the PWH 
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outbreak at day 10 with a sharp peak RH(t)=6.49, and a high RH(t)=5.12 at day 20 as the cluster grew. 
At day 28, the day of the Amoy index symptom onset, there was a slight increase in Rc(t), and it 
gradually reached the peak at day 35 with RC(t)=2.55. The relatively high RC(t)=1.09 at day 85 was 
from a small outbreak in PWH that further spread to the community, with the small number of 
incident cases at this time making its effect on the daily estimate of RC(t) more noticeable. The high 
estimates of RH(t) of 1.39 and 3.67 on days 88 and 92 respectively, as well as the high RC(t) of 3.46 on 
the same day, were related to an outbreak in NDH with 14 cases that generated further infection in 
the community. After the PWH outbreak and from day 23 onwards, RH(t) was below 1 except on the 
few days mentioned previously. Community transmission was also mostly below 1 from day 38 
onwards, after the Amoy outbreak. 
Compared to the partially extended method from the previous chapter, the fully extended method 
has substantially improved the over-smoothing problem in the R(t) time-series (Figure 6.3). It 
performed better than the partially extended model in capturing peak R(t) of the PWH outbreak at 
Figure 6.2 Estimates of the daily hospital and community reproduction numbers of the fully extended method. 
 
Figure 6.3 Comparison of the overall reproduction number between the fully extended and partially extended method. 
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its index’s symptom onset at day 10 rather than at day 17, estimated higher R(t) at the onset day of 
Amoy’s index at day 28, and also detected smaller outbreaks at the late stage of the epidemic with 
higher R(t). In general, the full model was more sensitive to fluctuations in R(t) throughout the 
epidemic.  
Hospital-to-hospital and community-to-community transmission were identified as the main driving 
forces of the transmission, partly because of the super-spreading events (Figure 6.4). With the Amoy 
outbreak, the within-community transmission was estimated to account for 42.8% of the total 
transmission measured by the reproduction number, and with the PWH outbreak the within-hospital 
transmission was estimated to account for 32.4%. Excluding these two super-spreading events, 
disease spread between hospital and community (Rch+Rhc) was estimated to have increased from 
24.9% to 33.4%, and was estimated to be more important than the within-community transmission 
(27.6%) when the Amoy outbreak was excluded. Within hospital transmission was estimated to be 
the most important setting where infection occurred. On average, R(i)=0.95, Rhh=0.31, Rhc=0.12, 
Rch=0.12, Rcc=0.41. 
Figure 6.4 Composition of the reproduction number of the epidemic of: (a) all cases; (b) all cases excluding the PWH 
and Amoy clusters. 
(a) (b)  
  
Figure 6.5(a) shows the weekly reproduction number by transmission setting. As the outbreak 
started from an imported case, disease spread in the first week was initially estimated to be mainly 
within the community (Rcc=0.62). As the infected cases became hospitalised, week 2 estimates 
showed a strong community-to-hospital transmission [Rch=2.10], eventually leading to the PWH 
outbreak at week 3 and 4 (Rhh=2.62 and 0.64 respectively). In the meantime transmission from 
hospital back to the community was estimated to have increased (Rhc=0.36 and 0.28 respectively in 
weeks 3 and 4). At week 5, infection control policies were implemented in PWH, and hospital 
transmission appears to have subsided, but the Amoy outbreak started and drove the within-
community transmission during these two weeks (Rcc=0.85 and 0.71 respectively in weeks 5 and 6). 
From week 6 the overall estimated R(t) was lower than 1, and more control measures were in place 
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at week 7. From that point onwards within-hospital transmission was estimated to be the main 
driver of the epidemic, accounting for around half of the transmission [Figure 6.5(b)]. R(t) was 
estimated to have returned to 1 at week 14 driven by transmission from hospital to both hospital 
and community related to the NDH outbreak, but quickly subsided the week after. 
Figure 6.5 (a) Weekly reproduction number estimates by transmission settings, and the key infection control 
measures implemented; (b) composition of weekly reproduction number by transmission setting. 
(a)
 
(b)
  
Around a quarter of hospital infection was estimated to be from cases whose primary infection was 
in the community [Figure 6.6(a)]. This was mainly driven by its domination at the first 2 weeks of the 
epidemic, and after that it accounted for no more than 10% of the hospital infection [Figure 6.6(c)]. 
More than half of the hospital infections were estimated to be from healthcare workers, and they 
were the key infector for most of the epidemic. Exceptions were during weeks 8 and 9 when hospital 
infections were driven by inpatients (ongoing and released) largely due to the characteristics of the 
AHN outbreak that occurred around the time, and in week 13, during which the NDH outbreak 
occurred, when infection was dominated by visitors.  
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Figure 6.6 The overall composition of: (a) hospital transmission and (b) community transmission, by the source of 
infection of the infector. (c) and (d): same as (a) and (b) but on a weekly basis.  
(a) (b) 
  
(c)  
(d)
  
Around a quarter of the community infection was estimated to have been generated by hospital 
infected cases [Figure 6.6(b)], whilst 44.0% were from Amoy cases. No one type of primary infection 
source dominated transmission in the community throughout the epidemic. Cases infected from the 
other community, which included general practitioner clinics, elderly homes, travelling abroad, the 
Metropole Hotel, and unknown location were estimated to have caused around a quarter of further 
infections in the community, and they were the estimated to be the key primary infection source 
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during the first and last 2 weeks of the epidemic [Figure 6.6(d)]. Case infected from an outbreak in 
residential buildings were estimated to have caused around 40% of the community transmission at 
week 3 and 11, and household infected cases estimated to have caused over 40% and 60% of the 
community transmission at week 10 and 12. Cases infected as the close contact of other SARS cases 
were estimated to have caused over 80% of the further transmission at week 13.  
Healthcare workers were estimated to have had the highest overall reproduction number of 1.35 
(excluding SSE 1.04), and highest hospital reproduction number RH=1.06 (excluding SSE 0.79) [Figure 
6.7]. Amoy cases on average were estimated to have generated 0.91 secondary cases in the 
community, and 1.08 secondary cases if including those in the hospital. A typical community case 
was estimated to have generated 0.77 secondary infection, of which 0.55 were in the community. 
Hospital visitors were estimated to have generated a very similar level of overall secondary infection 
(R=0.78, or 0.66 excluding SSE), and had estimated higher transmission potential in the community 
(RC=0.46 or 0.37 excluding SSE) than in the hospital (RH=0.32, or 0.29 excluding SSE). The same is 
observed in the released inpatients (R=0.65, RC=0.37, RH=0.28; excluding SSE R=0.59, RC=0.32, 
RH=0.27). RH of inpatients was half of the healthcare workers (0.53, or 0.52 excluding SSE).  
Figure 6.7 The average reproduction number of hospital and community transmission by the subgroup of infected cases. 
 
 
Throughout the epidemic, healthcare workers were estimated to have had an overall reproduction 
number higher than 1 most of the time (except weeks 8, 9, 11 and 15), and there were a few weeks 
that the estimated hospital reproduction number was higher than 1 (week 3, 4, 7, 14) [Figure 6.8(a)]. 
At the peak of PWH outbreak RH of healthcare worker reached 6.14. Hospital visitors, inpatients 
(released and ongoing) had estimated reproduction numbers above 1 in a week or two throughout 
the epidemic [Figure 6.8(b-d)]. Their highest reproduction number was 1.32 for hospital visitors 
(week 13), 1.92 for released inpatients (week 3), and 1.19 for inpatients (week 8). Community 
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Figure 6.8 Weekly reproduction number of hospital and community transmission by infection subgroup. 
(a) Healthcare worker 
 
(b) Hospital visitor 
 
(c) Inpatient (released) 
 
(d) Inpatient  
 
(e) Community infected (excluding Amoy cases) 
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3.48 at week 2 but was strongly driven by secondary transmission in hospital [Figure 6.8(e)]. Week 3 
was the only week their community reproduction number was estimated to be higher than 1 (1.03).  
From week 5 onwards the overall reproduction number was estimated to be lower than 1 and it 
gradually decreased for the rest of the epidemic. 
Figure 6.9 (a-d) shows the box plots of the estimated individual reproduction numbers by 
transmission settings by week, and Figure 6.9(e) shows the scatter plot of the overall individual 
reproduction numbers. Cases with high reproduction number by transmission settings (Rxy>3) are 
marked with the probable secondary transmission cluster identified from epidemiological linkage 
data and a cases number. Details of the secondary cluster are listed in Table 6.2 under the case 
number. Table 6.3 lists the index case of identifiable disease clusters of size > 1 based on the 
epidemiological linkage data, and the reproduction number estimates by transmission settings.  
It was known from contact tracing that the index case of the PWH outbreak was infected from the 
Metropole hotel – where the first occurrence of SARS transmission took place, and the Amoy Garden 
outbreak was sourced from PWH where the index case had stayed before staying in the Amoy 
Gardens. The fully extended method identified the index case of the PWH outbreak (case 3) to have 
a high Rch=12.3, and estimated the first case onset of the cluster who was a healthcare worker (case 
4) to have high Rhh=22.9, and 7 other healthcare workers to have high Rhh between 3.2 and 7.3 (case 
5-11). For the Amoy cluster, the method apparently attributed the index to be sourced from 
community rather than hospital transmission. The real index case had Rhc=1.9 (case 76, Table 6.3), 
but the “pseudo” index case with the same onset day and who lived in the Amoy district had Rcc=9.3. 
Another 25 Amoy district residents also had high Rcc between 3.2 and 9.7 (case 15-41).  
For the AHN outbreak [Figure 6.9(a)], information from contact tracing was not specific enough to 
identify the index case (Table 6.2), and there was only low incidence at the beginning before a more 
established outbreak occurred at day 45. The method estimated that within-hospital and cross-
settings transmission were involved, and estimated high Rhh from 3.4 to 15.5 for 12 cases including 
healthcare workers and an inpatient (case 49-53, 55-59, 61-62), high Rhc of 3.8 and 4.9 for two cases 
where the secondary cluster in the community could not be identified, and a high Rch of 3 (case 60).  
The method also identified some smaller disease clusters in other hospitals (BTH, QEH, NDH) [Figure 
6.9(a)] and an elderly home [Figure 6.9(d)]. However, there were 6 cases identified with high Rcc 
(case 1, 2, 43-45, 48) [Figure 6.9(d)] and 4 cases with high Rhc (case 47, 63, 69) [Figure 6.9(b)] where 
the probable secondary cluster(s) were not identifiable from the epidemiological linkage data (Table 
6.2). This could be due to community transmissions that were less traceable. Furthermore the 
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Figure 6.9 (a)-(d): Box plots of individual reproduction number by transmission settings and week of symptom onset. 
Any case with Rxy>3 was marked with a case number (in blanket), and the corresponding probable cluster of secondary 
infection listed in Table 6.2 (indexed by the case number). Black cross: mean; red horizontal line in box: median; top and 
bottom of the box: 75
th
 and 25
th
 percentile; upper and lower cap: maximum and minimum observation below 1.5 
interquartile range above the 75
th
 percentile and below and 25
th
 percentile; circles: outliners. (e). Scatter plot of individual 
overall reproduction number R(i) by onset day. 
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(e) R(i) 
 
secondary infection might not have occurred as a cluster but individually to several people. In the 
source of infection data, over 20% of the cases were known to be community infected but without 
any information about the location of the infection or their potential infector. Comparing the Rxy of 
the index cases of the 38 identifiable clusters to their reported cluster size (Table 6.3), 3 were close 
to the cluster size (case 76, 82, 83), and others generally had lower corresponding Rxy values, which 
could partly be caused by the infection being assigned to the later generations of the cluster by the 
epidemic tree reconstruction method. 
The scatter plot of the overall individual reproduction number of the fully extended method [Figure 
6.9(e)] compared to that of the partial method (Figure 6.16) showed a more random and natural 
pattern. It also estimated higher R(i) for the PWH index (12.3 vs 10.4), and for the “pseudo” Amoy 
index compared to the correctly identified real index in the partial method (9.3 vs 3.9). The fully 
extended method also showed sporadic cases with high R(i) throughout the epidemic and reflected 
other disease clusters underway, the wider range of R(i) more realistically reflecting the likely 
variation of R(i).  
Overall I estimated that there was 40.7% of the transmission that was within-district over the 
epidemic. In the community transmission of the Amoy cases it was estimated to be 80.3%, in the 
community transmission excluding Amoy cases it was estimated to be 33.9%, and in the hospital 
transmission it was estimated to be 23.8%. The temporal trend of the within-district transmission 
(Figure 6.10) showed that at the first week of the Amoy outbreak, 87.7% of community transmission 
of the Amoy cases were estimated to be in the same district, and this decreases gradually, as the 
Amoy outbreak triggered other outbreaks in nearby housing estates residential buildings, and the 
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 Table 6.2 Summary of the high Rxy cases (>3) identified, and details of the matching probable secondary clusters 
based on the epidemiological linkage data. (#: only Rxy>0.01 were displayed; *: from source of infection dataset; **: 
matched by the epidemiological linkage data. ip: inpatient, hcw: healthcare worker). 
Case 
no Rhh Rhc Rcc Rch Ri
onset day 
(week)
source of 
infection* Secondory cluster**
Real 
index?
Link to cluster (if not the 
real index)
Real index 
source of 
infection*
Cluster 1st 
onset day
Cluster 
size
1 3.3 3.3 9 (2) Metropole not identi fied NA
2 3.3 3.3 18 (3) Community not identi fied NA
3 1.1 12.3 13.4 10 (2) Metropole PWH (8A) Yes 10 123
4 22.9 0.5 0.0 23.5 20 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No cluster 1st onset & hcw
5 5.0 0.1 5.1 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
6 6.0 0.2 6.2 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
7 6.0 0.3 0.0 6.3 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
8 6.0 0.1 0.0 6.1 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
9 6.2 0.5 0.0 6.7 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
10 7.3 0.2 7.5 21 (3) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
11 3.2 0.8 3.9 22 (4) PWH (8A) PWH (8A) No hcw
12 4.5 0.6 5.1 18 (3) PYN (A5) PYN (A5) No cluster 1st onset imported 18 9
13 3.3 1.4 4.7 24 (4) QEH (March) QEH (March) No cluster 1st onset & hcw imported 24 15
14 5.3 1.0 0.0 6.3 28 (4) BTH (March) BTH (March) No cluster 1st onset & hcw close contact 28 20
15 9.3 0.0 9.3 28 (4) Community Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident PWH ip 28 447
16 8.8 8.8 30 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
17 9.5 9.5 31 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
18 5.1 0.1 5.2 31 (5) Imported Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
19 9.7 0.0 9.7 33 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
20 7.7 0.1 7.8 34 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
21 6.2 0.2 6.3 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
22 6.2 0.2 6.3 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
23 7.0 0.1 7.1 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
24 7.0 0.1 7.1 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
25 7.4 0.0 7.5 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
26 7.6 0.0 7.6 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
27 7.6 0.1 7.7 35 (5) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
28 5.4 0.2 5.6 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
29 5.9 0.2 6.1 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
30 6.2 0.2 6.4 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
31 6.2 0.2 6.4 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
32 6.7 0.1 6.7 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
33 6.7 0.1 6.7 36 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
34 3.2 0.1 3.3 37 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
35 3.2 0.2 3.4 37 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
36 3.4 0.1 3.5 37 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
37 3.4 0.1 3.5 37 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
38 3.8 0.1 3.9 37 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
39 3.4 0.0 3.5 38 (6) Amoy Amoy No Amoy dis trict res ident
40 3.2 0.2 3.4 37 (6) Amoy Amoy,fami ly cluster No Amoy dis trict res ident
41 3.2 0.2 3.3 37 (6) Amoy Amoy,fami ly cluster No Amoy dis trict res ident
42 5.5 5.5 32 (5) UCH Household Yes UCH vis i tor 32 2
43 3.3 0.1 3.3 33 (5) Close contact not identi fied NA
44 3.4 0.1 3.6 34 (5) Community not identi fied NA
45 3.7 0.1 3.9 35 (5) Imported not identi fied NA
46 0.5 3.1 3.5 36 (6) PWH PWH NA hcw uncerta in uncerta in uncerta in
47 0.2 3.0 3.2 36 (6) UCH not identi fied NA
48 3.2 0.0 3.2 36 (6) Community not identi fied NA
49 5.9 0.5 6.4 38 (6) AHN AHN No hcw community 37 136
50 9.0 1.1 10.0 41 (6) AHN AHN No hcw
51 5.1 0.3 5.4 44 (7) AHN AHN No hcw
52 7.6 0.8 8.4 44 (7) AHN AHN No hcw
53 9.1 0.9 10.0 46 (7) AHN AHN No hcw
54 0.0 3.8 3.9 47 (7) AHN not identi fied NA
55 7.4 0.5 7.9 48 (7) AHN AHN No hcw
56 15.5 1.0 16.5 49 (7) AHN AHN No hcw
57 3.9 3.9 51 (8) AHN AHN No ip
58 8.2 0.3 8.5 51 (8) AHN AHN No hcw
59 5.5 0.7 6.2 54 (8) AHN AHN No hcw
60 3.0 3.0 54 (8) Community AHN No admitted to AHN
61 3.4 0.5 3.9 55 (8) AHN AHN No hcw
62 4.9 0.8 5.7 55 (8) AHN AHN No hcw
63 0.0 4.9 5.0 57 (9) AHN not identi fied NA
64 1.1 4.0 5.2 42 (6) SH SH Uncerta in SH hcw uncerta in uncerta in 8 max.
65 3.0 0.1 3.1 49 (7) Elderly home Elderly home Probable 1st onset 49 3
66 3.4 3.4 49 (7) Imported CMC No admitted to CMC CMC hcw 61 26
67 3.2 0.2 3.4 71 (11) BTH BTH (Apri l ) No cluster 1st onset & hcw BTH ip 71 8
68 3.8 3.8 88 (13) NDH NDH No ip NDH ip uncerta in 29 max.
69 3.7 3.5 7.1 92 (14) NDH NDH No hcw NDH ip uncerta in 29 max.
69 3.7 3.5 7.1 92 (14) NDH not identi fied NA
The secondary clustercases identified with high R
#
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Table 6.3 Index cases of disease clusters with size >1 identifiable from the epidemiological linkage data, and their R 
estimates by transmission settings from the fully extended method. *: from source of infection dataset. 
 
  
Transmission 
settings Case no
Secondary disease 
cluster*
Cluster index 
infection source*
index onset day 
(week)
Cluster 
size* Rhh Rhc Rcc Rch Ri
Hospital to 70 household PWH hcw 22 (4) 2 0.6 0.6
community 71 household PWH hcw 23 (4) 3 2.5 0.7 3.2
72 household PWH ip 23 (4) 2 0.4 0.4
73 close contact PWH ip_released 23 (4) 2 0.3 0.2 0.5
74 household PWH visitor 24 (4) 2 0.1 1.0 1.2
75 household PYN hcw 24 (4) 2 0.2 0.4 0.6
76 Amoy PWH ip_released 28 (4) 447 0.1 1.9 2.0
76 household PWH ip_released 28 (4) 2 0.1 1.9 2.0
77 household PWH hcw 29 (5) 2 0.8 0.5 1.3
78 close contact BTH ip_released 33 (5) 3 0.3 0.4 0.7
79 household PWH 35 (5) 2 0.2 1.4 1.5
80 household AHN 40 (6) 2 0.2 0.3 0.4
81 household PMH 47 (7) 2 0.4 0.6 1.0
82 household AHN 48 (7) 2 0.1 1.8 1.9
83 household AHN ip_released 57 (9) 3 1.7 1.7
83 close contact AHN ip_released 57 (9) 2 1.7 1.7
84 close contact UCH ip_released 59 (9) 3 1.2 0.6 1.8
85 household AHN 61 (9) 2 0.9 0.2 1.2
86 household BTH 64 (10) 2 1.1 0.5 1.6
87 household AHN ip_released 65 (10) 2 0.2 0.2
Community to 88 PYN (A5) imported 7 (1) 9 1.8 1.1 2.9
hospital 3 PWH (8A) metropole 10 (2) 123 1.1 12.3 13.4
89 SPH metropole 13 (2) 9 1.0 1.0
90 QEH imported 17 (3) 15 1.2 1.3 2.5
91 BTH (March) close contact 24 (4) 20 0.3 0.3 0.7
Community 88 Metropole imported 1 (1) 3 1.0 1.0
to community 3 close contact metro 10 (2) 4 1.1 12.3 13.4
92 close contact imported 27 (4) 2 0.4 0.1 0.5
93 household community 35 (5) 2 2.7 0.1 2.9
94 household community 36 (6) 3 0.6 0.1 0.7
95 household community 37 (6) 2 1.4 0.1 1.5
96 Elderly home Amoy resident 38 (6) 2 0.8 0.2 1.0
97 household community 39 (6) 2 0.7 0.1 0.7
98 household community 49 (7) 2 0.7 0.1 0.8
99 household community 57 (9) 2 0.2 0.2
100 household community 58 (9) 2 0.7 0.2 0.9
101 household elderly home 60 (9) 2 0.3 0.3 0.6
102 close contact household 69 (10) 4 1.8 0.0 1.8
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Figure 6.10 Percentage of within district transmission in all hospital transmission, community transmission excluding 
Amoy cases, and community transmission of the Amoy cases. 
 
Amoy cases were also considered as the infector of other community transmission outside the Amoy 
cluster. Therefore these figures are expected to be lower than the percentage of the Amoy cases 
lived in the Kwun Tong district, i.e. 94.2%.  
Figure 6.11 shows the percentage of within-district transmission by transmission settings. Within 
community, 59.8% of the transmission was estimated to be in the same district. Excluding the Amoy 
cases, hospital-to-community transmission was more spatially localised than the community-to-
community transmission (estimated within-district transmission 35.8% vs 32.6%), probably because 
the former was mainly composed of secondary household transmission of the hospital infected 
cases, while within-community transmission also consisted of less localised infection, e.g. between 
close contacts, in health clinics etc. Community-to-hospital and hospital-to-hospital transmission 
were comparable in the estimated within-district distribution (22.5% vs 24.2%). By the type of 
infected subjects, the key drivers for within-district transmission from hospital to community were 
inpatients released during the incubation period (43.6%), and hospital visitors (39.9%) [Figure 6.12]. 
Healthcare workers had the strongest tendency to infect someone from another districts. 
Figure 6.11 Percentage of within-district transmission in the reproduction number by transmission settings. 
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Figure 6.12 Comparison of the within-district transmission by type of infected subjects. 
 
The estimated percentage of within-district transmission by district is shown in Figure 6.13. Kwun 
Tong district, because of the Amoy outbreak, had high estimated within district transmission of 
68.1%, followed by Tai Po district, where AHN is located, at 42.2%, and Sha Tin, where PWH is 
located, at 32.8%. These are the same locations as those where the key spatial clusters were 
identified in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.6). 
The fully extended method estimated lower within-district transmission during much of the 
epidemic than the partially extended method (Figure 6.14). This is because the latter does not 
differentiate the infection location, and therefore captures more cases as within-district than the 
additional spatial criteria applied in the full method. At the peak of the two super-spreading events, 
the full method estimated higher within-district transmission.  
Figure 6.13 Overall percentage of within-district transmission by district.  
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
hcw visitor inpatient 
released
inpatient community 
infected
w
it
h
in
 d
is
tr
ic
t 
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
 (
%
)
Rhh
Rhc
Rcc
Rch
11: Central & Western   
12: Wan Chai   
13: Eastern   
14: Southern   
23: Sham Shui Po   
24: Kowloon City   
25: Wong Tai Sin 
26: Kwun Tong 
27: Yau Tsim Mong 
31: Kwai Tsing 
32: Tsuen Wan 
33: Tuen Mun 
34: Yuen Long 
35: North 
36: Tai Po 
37: Sha Tin 
38: Sai Kung 
39: Islands 
 194 
Figure 6.14 Comparison of the proportion of within-district transmission over time between the full and partially 
extended method. 
 
Using the infection source and most probable index case of the first case in each district, the map of 
estimated disease spread patterns is given in Figure 6.15, and the sequence of infection and 
population size of the districts are shown in Figure 6.16. The sequence of district infection was 
negatively correlated with population size (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient=-0.62, p-
value=0.06) and to a lesser extent with population density (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient=-
0.54, p-value=0.02). The first 5 districts (27.8%) were estimated to have been infected by imported 
cases at week 1 and 2, two of which have high population size. Further spread through hospital 
transmission (KWH) and community transmission from Metropole hotel at week 2 were estimated to 
be to moderate and low population sized districts which are not adjacent to the infected districts. 
PWH was estimated to be the main source of infection for week 3 and 4 when the PWH outbreak 
peaked. In general, and the pattern of spatial spread was driven by PWH as the focal point and also 
exhibited a mixture of diffusion and population size hierarchy.   
Figure 6.17 shows the overall reproduction number by district. Four districts with reproduction 
number higher than 1 included Kowloon City (1.17), Tai Po (1.12), Kwun Tong (1.07), and Wan Chai 
(1.02). The variation of Rhc and Rch among districts was very small (<0.25), therefore it was mainly the 
within-hospital and within-community transmission that determine the transmissibility of the 
districts (Figure 6.18). However, the estimate of the reproduction number by district is affected by 
the number of cases in the district, and districts like Wan Chai, which only had 16 cases (0.9%) but 
with cases onset in the early epidemics, therefore tended to have higher reproduction number 
before the effects of infection control was shown (week 3 Rhh=3.40, Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21). 
Similarly, Kowloon city was estimated to have accounted for 4.0% of the cases, and had high 
estimated Rcc at week 2 (3.28) and only had moderate to low estimated reproduction numbers 
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Figure 6.15 Disease spread patterns shown as the transmission route of the first case of each district. Broken black 
arrow: imported; red arrow: transmitted from hospital infection; green arrow: transmitted from community infection. Blue 
gradient colour: weekly incidence of the district.   
 
 
Figure 6.16 Population size of the district (blue gradient colour) and the sequence of district being infected (size of red 
circle, smaller size earlier infection). Some districts were estimated to have been infected on the same day. 
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Figure 6.17 Overall reproduction number by district. 
 
afterwards (Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.23). On the other hand, districts with a high number of cases 
may have individuals with high reproduction numbers but overall a relatively low average, as is the 
case in Sha Tin (R=0.95). Tai Po and Kwun Tong, which also had high within-district transmission, 
were identified as potentially sustaining transmission as indicated by the high estimated average 
reproduction number. 
Figure 6.19 shows that in most districts hospital-to-hospital transmission was estimated to be the 
most important driver of transmission. Kwun Tong, and the adjacent districts Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon 
City and Sai King were however estimated to have been dominated by within-community 
transmission. This is consistent with the findings from the spatial cluster detection in Chapter 3. 
The spatiotemporal display of the reproduction number by district (Figure 6.20) showed that at week 
2, the reproduction number in Sha Tin was as high as 13.39, mainly fuelled by Rch (12.27, Figure 6.24) 
because of the PWH index case. At week 3 as infection spread from PWH to Yuen Long and Tsuen 
Wan (Figure 6.15), these districts soon became highly transmissible (R=7.50 and 5.06 respectively), 
mainly from the hospital-to-hospital infection (Figure 6.21). From week 4 onwards there were 
usually a few districts, most often the Tai Po district, with reproduction number higher than 1 among 
other low infection districts. In both the within-community and hospital-to-hospital transmission, I 
observed that even at the late stage of the epidemic, there were sporadic increases of the 
reproduction number to greater than 1 (in Rcc or Rhh, e.g. week 11, 13, 14 in Figure 6.21, week 10 and 
13 in Figure 6.23).  
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Figure 6.18 Reproduction number by transmission setting by district. 
 
Figure 6.19 Composition of the district reproduction number. 
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Figure 6.20 Spatiotemporal trend of the overall reproduction number by district by week. 
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Figure 6.21 Spatiotemporal trend of the hospital-to-hospital reproduction number Rhh by district by week. 
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Figure 6.22 Spatiotemporal trend of the hospital-to-community reproduction number Rhc by district by week. 
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Figure 6.23 Spatiotemporal trend of the community-to-community reproduction number Rcc by district by week. 
 
 
  
 202 
Figure 6.24 Spatiotemporal trend of the community-to-hospital reproduction number Rch by district by week. 
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Table 6.4 shows the results of sensitivity analysis to different assumptions about the weighting of hospital-
acquired infection for hospital infected cases, hospital visitor per bed ratio, the proportion of time spent in 
hospital by working healthcare workers, and the use of bilateral movement mixing instead of infector driven 
mixing. The method was found to be very robust to these assumptions. 
Table 6.4 Results of sensitivity analysis on different assumptions of the parameters and movement mixing.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
The modified spatial Walling and Teunis method developed and applied here captures spatial 
heterogeneities to individual hospital level, and in the community to individual residential location 
level, supported by the source of infection and hospitalisation data. Overall the method appeared to 
perform well. Variation in an individual’s transmissibility was captured in the individual reproduction 
numbers, overcoming the over-smoothing issues generally observed in the Wallinga and Teunis type 
method, including the partially extended method developed in last chapter. The evolution of the 
epidemic across transmission settings and over time were revealed through the estimates of 
reproduction number by transmission settings, and these estimates at the individual level were 
indicative of the secondary epidemiological clusters related to the cases, not only of clusters of 
considerable size, but also smaller clusters and not restricted to those occurred at the beginning or 
Difference in RH(t) RC(t) R(t) RH(t) RC(t) R(t)
(alternative assumption - baseline)
Assumption
25th percentile -0.003 0.000 -0.001
75th percentile 0.000 0.003 0.001
Assumption
25th percentile -0.002 -0.027 -0.035 -0.003 -0.027 -0.034
75th percentile 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003
Assumption
25th percentile -0.007 0.000 -0.008 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
75th percentile 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005
25th percentile 0.000 -0.015 -0.015
75th percentile 0.000 0.007 0.009
Weighting of hospital-acquired infection for hospital infected cases (baseline =0.99)
Working healthcare worker proportion of time in hospital (baseline =0.8)
Bilateral movement mixing (baseline: infector driven movement)
=0.5 =1
=0.6 =0.99
hospital visitor per bed ratio (baseline )
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end stage of the epidemic, suggesting good sensitivity of the method. Higher percentage of within 
district transmission was also produced with the spatial details captured in the method.  
My findings confirmed the importance of transmission between hospital and community (i.e. 
hospital-to-community and community-to-hospital) in the outbreak. In fact, they triggered the two 
super-spreading events in the outbreak. This validated my previous findings (chapter 3) that some 
areas near PWH and AHN started as a hospital spatial cluster, and then subsequently became 
common clusters of hospital and community transmission. The community-to-hospital transmission 
was identified most prominently using this method when the secondary cases generated at the first 
location of SARS infection – the Metropole Hotel – were hospitalised. Hospital transmission then 
appeared to keep “leaking” back to the community throughout the epidemic. The extent of hospital-
to-community transmission could be underestimated in this study because the method attributed 
the index case of the Amoy outbreak to a community-acquired case living in the Amoy district rather 
than a released inpatient, though they have the same symptom onset date. However, the index case 
of PWH outbreak was correctly identified. My findings are also consistent with Lloyd-Smith et al.’s 
hypothetical study (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003) that the transmission between hospital and 
community accounted for around one-third of total transmission, excluding the super-spreading 
events. 
Hospital-to-hospital transmission was estimated to have been mainly sustained through healthcare 
workers, who had average hospital reproduction number of slightly over 1, and were also the key 
contributors after the index case in the PWH outbreak. Compared to inpatients who also spent a 
long time in the hospital, the duration and type of exposure and contact the healthcare worker 
made due to their job nature was estimated to have resulted in approximately twice as much 
transmission from this group compared to inpatients. However, their transmissibility in community 
was estimated to be lower than hospital visitors and released inpatients. This could due to the 
higher infection control awareness of the healthcare workers, their lower community contact during 
the outbreak, for instance, by living in hospital provided quarters (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome Expert Committee 2003), and their shorter time interval from symptom onset to hospital 
admission (Lee, Hui et al. 2003; Poutanen, Low et al. 2003; Tsang, Ho et al. 2003). Therefore, besides 
targeting hospital infection control at healthcare worker and reducing their mixing with the 
community (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003), my findings suggest that control measures aiming to 
reduce the contact between the community and hospital visitors and inpatients discharged from 
hospital could also be important. 
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Amoy cases were estimated to have reproduction numbers over 1, and a typical community infected 
case at around 0.8. Community transmissions were fuelled by different transmission settings (e.g. 
household, residential building, close contact etc.) at different times. Whilst the community 
transmission dynamics were more difficult to establish, as unknown contacts or clusters are not 
traceable, the fully extended method was able to estimate transmission links that were not revealed 
by existing data, and overcome the limitations in using contact tracing and epidemiological data 
collection to establish the epidemiological links. In particular, in super-spreading events, 
conventional reports tend to attribute the majority or the whole cluster of cases to the index case, 
ignoring the transmission by later generations of the cluster. In contrast, the method presented here 
tends to capture the transmission cluster or super-spreading events as a portion of cases - especially 
those with early onset relative to the cluster start, and to identify this subset as having high 
reproduction numbers.  
Using the index case of a district and its source of infection to establish the underlying mechanism of 
between-district spread, I observed a mixture of spread by population size hierarchy and wave-like 
diffusion with PWH as the important the focal point. In the composition of transmission type by 
district, hospital-to-hospital transmission was the most dominant in majority of the districts. The 
districts of and around Amoy on the other hand generated mostly community-to-community 
transmission, which suggested the localised and diffusive spatial spread of such transmission type. 
The credibility of the results in this study are not only supported by consistent findings from studying 
the spatial distribution and cluster in chapter 3, but also by the robustness demonstrated to 
alternative assumptions – including the reduction of the time a healthcare worker spent in the 
hospital, the increase in the chance that hospital infected cases actually acquired the infection from 
the community, the increase of hospital visitors who were found to generate more community 
transmission than in the hospital, and a bilateral spatial mixing. 
There are a few limitations in the study. Hospitalisation data from private hospitals were not 
available, and travel history data were not captured in the method, potentially affecting the correct 
attribution of sources of infection. Also the initial degree of community transmission could be 
underestimated because secondary cases infected in the Metropole Hotel by the Hong Kong index 
case onset in other countries and therefore were not captured in the dataset (Shannon and 
Willoughby 2004). The use of a gravity model to determine the probability of contact in the 
community ignored the duration and type of contact made as a result of the journey. Furthermore, 
in the hospital setting, individuals are assumed to be homogenous despite certain types of contact 
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potentially being riskier. Lastly, the method is yet to establish clearly the effects of control measures 
implemented on the containment of the outbreak.  
To conclude, the infection network inference method I developed had successfully regenerated the 
transmission dynamics and mechanisms of spatial spread between community and hospitals. 
Insights on the important drivers of transmission in different settings were attained, which could 
inform the formulation of infection control strategies for the future outbreak. 
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Chapter 7 - Discussion  
The importance of capturing spatial heterogeneity in the modelling epidemics is increasingly 
recognised (Ferguson, Cummings et al. 2006; Colizza, Vespignani et al. 2009). However, spatially 
stratified data on all cases in an epidemic is rarely available. Resource limitations makes the tracking 
of cases difficult once epidemic size exceeds a certain point, and sub-clinical infection means the 
infection network observable from the epidemic curve is incomplete. Both issues affected case-
based surveillance in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic in many countries (e.g. the UK and US). Data 
collected during the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong provides a fairly unique opportunity to study 
spatial transmission dynamics at the case level with a relatively complete dataset. 
The SARS epidemic was characterised by considerable nosocomial transmission in most countries 
(World Health Organisation (WHO) 2004). In the Hong Kong outbreak, because all identified cases 
were hospitalised, hospitals became a high-risk context for transmission. Previous studies showed 
that the distribution of cases in the outbreak was generally clustered spatially, though the degree 
varied (e.g. the Amoy cases were more localised than the PWH cases) (Lai, Wong et al. 2004). 
However, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the dynamics of transmission between the 
hospital and community, and in particular the spatial scale over which transmission occurred. 
Therefore, my work focussed on investigating the spatial transmission dynamics of SARS, with a 
particular focus on how hospital-acquired infections drove onward spread in the community, and 
whether this could be attributed to the type of hospital infection, or community-related 
demographic or geographic properties.  
In examining the spatial dynamics of the epidemic, I used different approaches that required 
different levels of spatiotemporal data and revealed different aspects of the transmission dynamics. 
The Kulldorff’s scan statistic (Kulldorff 1997) requires only simple spatiotemporal data on incident 
cases (residential location and symptom onset date), and identified the locations and time of the 
spatial clusters. Under the same data requirement, the partially extended Wallinga and Teunis 
method probabilistically infers epidemiological linkage between cases, using a gravity model as a 
proxy of the probability of contact between individuals. With more detailed spatiotemporal data on 
cases (including which hospital they visited or were admitted to and when, and their likely source of 
infection), I reconstructed the dynamics of transmission between and within hospital and 
community. Overall, my work gives a more complete picture of the complex transmission dynamics 
seen in Hong Kong in 2003, and the consistency of some findings obtained with different methods 
strengthened the credibility of the results.  
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7.1 Dynamics of spatial spread and transmission risk factors 
The distribution of cases during the epidemic was heterogeneous, showing significant 
spatiotemporal clustering. The foci of the key spatiotemporal clusters identified via use of Kulldorff’s 
scan statistic included Amoy Gardens (which accounted for a quarter of the total cases), and the two 
hospitals with major outbreaks - PWH and AHN, where half of hospital infections occurred. The 
clusters around these hospitals included a considerable proportion of community-acquired cases. 
From the reconstructed infection tree derived from the spatial Wallinga and Teunis method I 
developed, I have argued that this community spread was due to the secondary transmission by 
cases who were themselves infected in hospital (as inpatients, visitors or health care workers). It was 
interesting to note that community transmission was more spatially localised than hospital 
transmission in general (in terms of the distance between residential locations of infector and 
infectee). Secondary community transmission in these areas eventually developed into more 
sustained community transmission, making these areas dominate the outbreak for weeks. 
Community transmission sourced from hospital-acquired cases also occurred in other hospitals 
throughout the outbreak after early cases were hospitalised, and I estimated this to have also 
accounted for a quarter of community transmission. Also community transmission caused by 
hospital-acquired cases was more likely to be localised in their residential areas than those caused 
by typical community-acquired cases (i.e. non-Amoy cases). Inpatients who were infected when 
hospitalised for non-SARS conditions and discharged during the SARS incubation period and hospital 
visitors were more important than healthcare workers in driving this type of transmission. On 
average they generated more secondary cases in the community per person, though overall there 
were more healthcare workers infected than visitors and inpatients.  
Results from gravity models suggested that residential locations of hospital visitors tend to be 
furthest to the hospital where they acquired the infection, while that of the inpatients were closest, 
suggesting a great spatial range of secondary infection could be generated by hospital-acquired 
cases in the community. However, community transmission caused by infectious discharged 
inpatients in the community and hospital visitors were more likely to be localised in their residential 
areas than those caused by healthcare workers. This could probably be explained by the findings 
from other empirical studies which showed that hospital visitors were more likely to infect their 
household members than healthcare workers (Ho, Sung et al. 2003; Goh, Lee et al. 2004; Lau, Lau et 
al. 2004; Wilson-Clark, Deeks et al. 2006), possibly due to their lower awareness of infection control 
procedures, whereas some healthcare workers reduced their contact in the community during the 
epidemic  (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003).   
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I estimated that hospital transmission caused by cases who acquired infection in the community 
accounted for a quarter of hospital infections overall, but this result is heavily biased by the PWH 
index case (infected in the Metropole Hotel). Hospital transmission was mainly sustained through 
hospital-acquired cases after the start of the PWH cluster. On average, community-acquired cases 
generated 0.22 secondary cases when they were hospitalised for SARS treatment.   
Half of hospital infection was in healthcare workers based on the tracing data I used on likely source 
of infection. The spatial Wallinga and Teunis method suggested that healthcare workers were the 
most important driving force in transmission within hospitals (including for the PWH outbreak post 
the infections caused by the index case there). Their average hospital reproduction number was 
higher than 1 at the peak of the PWH, AHN and NDH outbreaks, and even excluding the PWH 
outbreak it was 0.8 over the epidemic - much higher than that of the inpatients who also had 
extended stays in the hospital. Healthcare workers were estimated to have generated more than 
half of all hospital infections (in other healthcare workers, inpatients and hospital visitors). Their 
relatively high infectivity and susceptibility was likely to be due to their high level of exposure, and 
more frequent and riskier contact with others due to their job. Other work has shown that the bed 
location of inpatients in a hospital ward relative to infectious inpatients was a risk factor of being 
infected by other inpatients, if the possibility that they were infected by healthcare workers was 
ignored (Yu, Wong et al. 2005).  
Transmission within the community occurred in a range of different settings associated with a 
variety of spatial scales - from localised (e.g. household transmission and outbreak in residential 
buildings) to more dispersed and random (e.g. social contact, unidentifiable community source). 
Excluding the super-spreading events in Amoy Gardens, transmission in the community was 
dominated by different transmission settings at different stage of the epidemic. On average, a 
typical community-acquired case was estimated to generate 0.55 secondary infections in the 
community, and an Amoy case 0.91.  
Modelling the size of outbreaks with a hurdle negative binomial model suggested that there were 
two intrinsic risk factors of community transmission for an area – population structure (i.e. age 
distribution), and distance to the hospital that treated the cases. The latter was also supported by 
the findings that key outbreak hospitals also triggered formation of community spatial clusters in the 
surrounding area, and by the fully extended spatial Wallinga and Teunis method which suggested 
one-third of secondary transmission in the community generated by hospital-acquired cases was 
highly localised.  
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Previous work has highlighted a range of possible patterns to spatiotemporal disease spread, 
including diffusive (generating clear spatial waves), population hierarchy based (city to city then 
spreading to local commuter belts then rural areas), or a mixture of both (Cliff, Haggett et al. 1986). 
My findings using the reconstructed infection tree to identify the most probable infector of the first 
case of each area suggested that hospitals may have acted as hubs for a quasi-hierarchical pattern of 
spatial spread. PWH was the initial focal point of spatial spread to uninfected areas in the first few 
weeks of the epidemic, and caused by approximately the first quarter of the cases, with other 
hospital outbreaks seeding local community outbreaks later. Areas with high population size or 
densities, or adjacent to an infected area tend to be infected earlier.  
My analysis estimated the relative contribution of different transmission settings at different stages 
of the epidemic. The initial cases of the outbreak (mainly imported from outside Hong Kong) 
exhibited higher transmissibility in the community, partly due to their late hospitalisation compared 
with cases identified after SARS had been recognised. The second generation of cases (who were 
mostly infected in the community) generated large numbers of hospital infection, most notably in a 
super-spreading event in PWH of more than 100 cases, in which healthcare workers were estimated 
to contribute substantially in further transmission besides the index cases of PWH. Once infection 
control measures in PWH (including the transfer of non-SARS patients to other hospitals, a no visitor 
policy in SARS wards, and other measures targeting healthcare workers) were put in place, 
transmission within hospital was much reduced. However, infection was brought by the hospital-
acquired cases back to the community (mainly causing household transmission), in particular 
through inpatients released during the incubation period and hospital visitors. One of such incident 
occurred in Amoy Gardens, which triggered a disease cluster of more than 400 cases, first through 
environmental contamination and then possibly via secondary transmission to household members 
and close contacts subsequently. This outbreak eventually spread to the housing estates nearby and 
caused small local outbreaks there. As community-wide control measures were introduced, 
transmission in the community subsided, and the effective reproduction number fell to below 1. 
After that point there were a few outbreaks in hospitals of smaller scale, with healthcare workers 
being estimated to be the key driver of these outbreaks, albeit briefly. 
7.2 Implications for control measures 
The rather theoretical study by Lloyd-Smith et al. (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani et al. 2003) also identified 
the importance of healthcare workers in driving the epidemic, though this could have been 
exaggerated by that study’s assumptions that hospital was a single physical unit, and no 
transmission could have taken place between inpatients and hospital visitors. They suggested 
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control measures reducing infection of healthcare workers would be most effective, and if that was 
not adequate to contain the outbreak, mixing of the healthcare workers with the community should 
be reduced. Correlating my results with the timing of control measures implemented during the 
epidemic, I find that hospital infection remained the key driver of the epidemic even after the 
transmission potential of SARS in hospital became clear in the PWH outbreak. Possibly this could be 
partially explained by the less stringent infection control implemented in hospitals which were 
thought to be infection free (McDonald, Simor et al. 2004) when infection was in fact latent in the 
hospital. In addition, compliance of healthcare workers to control measures (e.g. wearing personal 
protection equipment) was also imperfect (Lau, Fung et al. 2004).  
Restricted hospital visitor policies were imposed for a period of time during the outbreak (Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Expert Committee 2003). Given the importance of hospital visitors in 
bringing transmission from hospital to the community, such a policy could have been implemented 
for a longer period of time, and introduced immediately once hospital transmission is detected.  
Quarantine could be also considered for those who had recently visited or been discharged from 
hospitals where infection was detected.  
Prior knowledge on the potential high-risk spatial clusters could provide valuable early insights on 
the transmission dynamics and characteristics of an epidemic (Mammen, Pimgate et al. 2008; Riley 
2008). My findings suggest the geographic and demographic properties of areas with intrinsically 
higher risk of infection. In a general uncontrolled epidemic, the final attack rate in areas with high 
transmission risk as a result of their demographic characteristics or travel behaviour of their 
residents is insensitive to the seeding location of the epidemic (Mao and Bian 2010). However for a 
truncated epidemic such as SARS (where only a small fraction of people were eventually infected), 
random chance plays a more major role in determining which areas are worst affected – dependent 
on where the first cases are hospitalised, and at what stage of the epidemic controls start to reduce 
transmission. Once hospital cases are first detected in a high risk area, community surveillance 
should be heightened in that area, and community control measures considered.  
These suggestions are applicable for any severe emerging respiratory infectious disease which 
routinely requires hospitalisation of cases and thus makes hospitals a high risk context for 
transmission. In the H1N1 influenza pandemic in Hong Kong in 2009, around 18% of the confirmed 
cases were hospitalised for the first 4 months during the pandemic as a precautionary measure 
(Cowling, Lau et al. 2010), causing sustained transmission in most of the hospitals treating the cases 
(The University of Hong Kong 2010), despite infection control measures being in place.  
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The real-time tracking of spatiotemporal clusters of cases of an emerging disease using Kulldorff’s 
prospective scan statistic might be useful to inform health officials of areas which might warrant 
closer monitoring and more intense application of control measures. Because epidemiological 
clusters often exhibit spatially clustering, the method has the potential to pick up important 
transmission events early. Control measures therefore can be formulated and implemented 
promptly in these areas, and this could make a difference to the time-scale and spread of the 
epidemic.  
7.3 Spatially explicit infection tree methods 
The interaction between hospital and community transmission and its effects on the spatial spread 
of the epidemic can be studied by infection tree inference methods in which hospital and 
community settings are explicitly incorporated. Current methods of infection tree inference that do 
not require population data (Wallinga and Teunis 2004; Fraser 2007) assume people with the same 
symptom onset date are identical and that mixing between individuals is homogenous, causing the 
reproduction number estimates to be smoothed over time. I chose to extend the Wallinga and 
Teunis method spatially, as it is formulated on individual case rather than on daily incidence basis as 
in Fraser’s method. The fact that SARS cases tended to only become infectious upon symptom onset 
makes the Wallinga and Teunis method particularly suitable to study the SARS epidemic, because 
otherwise the imputation of who infected who would be more complicated due to the added impact 
of uncertainty in the infection time of the infector as well as the infectee (Chis Ster, Singh et al. 
2009). The negligible level of sub-clinical infection (Leung, Chung et al. 2004) seen in all SARS 
outbreaks in 2003 also implies that the case data can be consider as complete upon which to 
reconstruct the infection tree.  
The first spatially extended method I developed captured the spatial and individual heterogeneity 
that affect one’s likelihood to have infected others. The method uses an infectivity profile to 
describe the development of infectiousness of an infected individual over time. Combined with an 
assumed constant incubation period and the use of a gravity model to describe the relative 
probability of contact as a function of distance between residential locations and their population 
size, this function is critical in inferring the probability that one case infected another. Therefore I 
modified the original Wallinga and Teunis method from case-to-case based to infection-to-infection 
based. Hospital and community transmission were not separated in this model, however.   
Gravity models are widely used to model trip patterns in human geography and spatial interaction 
modelling. The gravity models I derived capture the different flow patterns to the key commercial 
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and leisure areas compared to other areas with an adjusted scaling component of the population 
size that significantly improved the model goodness-of-fit. Previous studies (Xia, Bjornstad et al. 
2004; Viboud, Bjornstad et al. 2006; Balcan, Colizza et al. 2009) that incorporated gravity coupling in 
epidemic models used a variety of spatial mixing assumptions without verifying their 
appropriateness. I compared the spatial patterns of mixing generated by models assuming 
susceptible move, infectors move, both move to the other’s residential location (bilateral 
movement) or both can meet in any location (multilateral movement), and found that assuming 
infectors moved to the residence of suceptibles gave the most reasonable results. This was because 
that version of the gravity model conditioned on the number of inward journeys to each area, and 
this form of conditioning gave spatial contact patterns that mostly closely reproduced the spatial 
distribution of the cases with respect to the individual reproduction number compared to the 
observed distribution and the characteristics of the epidemic. I also found that travel data (e.g. work 
flow) that do not include people who did not make that type of trip and remained in their residing 
area (e.g. those retired) could underestimate the within-district contact. Adjusting the trip data to 
capture this group of people as within their residing area could resolve the problem.  
My model produced more realistic estimates of aggregate time-dependent estimates of the effective 
reproduction number, and of the reproduction number of individual cases, and was able to produce 
higher individual reproduction number estimates for the index cases of known super-spreading 
events. Therefore, my method shows that even when limited data are available (e.g. case onset date 
and residential location), person-to-person variation in transmissibility can be more accurately 
estimated by a spatially stratified model. 
Hospitals are a very different transmission setting from the wider community. Hospitals are spatially 
confined environments containing limited numbers of people, and contact patterns between 
individuals vary according to the subgroup one belongs to (healthcare worker, inpatient and visitor). 
To distinguish transmission in hospitals and the community and the interaction between these 
settings, I further modified the spatial Wallinga and Teunis model by explicitly including individual 
hospitals as distinct mixing groups, making use of data collected in the outbreak on which setting 
particular cases were likely to have been infected in, and which hospitals cases visited, were 
admitted to or worked in.  
The model used the hospitalisation data and the potential source of infection data to infer the 
location of the cases over time (i.e. which hospital or community area they were in each day). Mixing 
within individual hospital was assumed homogeneous, and in the community individuals interacted 
with the same gravity-model derived probability as used in the previous model. The resulting 
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analysis is the most detailed spatiotemporal study of the Hong Kong SARS epidemic thus far, and is 
able to reconstruct the spatiotemporal transmission dynamics at a fine-grained level (setting and 
location). 
The method performed well in estimating how transmission changed over time by transmission 
setting, and in imputing the epidemiological links between cases in large clusters with good 
sensitivity. It overcomes the over-smoothing problem of non-spatial infection tree methods, and is 
robust to different parameter assumptions on the spatial mixing, hospital population size and on the 
probability of alternative infection source having caused a case other than the probable source of 
infection identified in the input data. 
7.4 Beyond infection trees - modelling the susceptible population 
The spatially explicit infection tree methods I developed are conditional on the observed case data, 
the hospitalisation data and the source of infection data. The partial likelihood derived with these 
constraints simplifies the mathematical formulation and lessens the computational burden of the 
method. While the use of these data imply a more accurate infection tree inferred for the epidemic, 
the results are specific to the cases of the observed epidemic and their characteristics, and the 
conditioning process restricts the generalisation of the results beyond the observed cases and 
epidemic. Put simply, such methods say little about people who were not infected (the vast bulk of 
the population) and the risks of infection in different groups. To overcome this, a full epidemic 
model using the population data and using a full likelihood for the observed epidemic needs to be 
developed  (Chis Ster, Singh et al. 2009; Griffin, Garske et al. 2010), as discussed in more detail later 
in this section. 
My assumption of a constant incubation period also simplified the mathematical formulation of the 
spatial models. The model could be further extended to capture variability in incubation period, 
however. With non-constant incubation period distribution, an incubation period could be sampled 
for each case independently by bootstrapping, thus creating a simulated set of incubation period 
data for all cases. With replication this generates sets of incubation period samples for the whole set 
of cases. From each incubation period simulated dataset, the infection times of each case can be 
imputed, and the existing model rerun to derive an imputed infection tree. Analysis of the results 
would require examination of the ensemble of infection trees generated.  
The spatial resolution of the area units used in my analysis was restricted by the availability of 
complete trip data for the gravity model. Trip data for finer spatial scales is partially available, and it 
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is possible that constrained gravity models could be fitted on this data with some modifications of 
the likelihood function for the parameter estimation. 
Real-time monitoring of the epidemic development, facilitates evidence-based control measures 
formation (Ong, Chen et al. ; Fraser, Donnelly et al. 2009; Cowling, Lau et al. 2010). My spatial model 
could be modified for real-time application during an epidemic to track reproduction number 
estimates by area and transmission settings by taking into account the censored cases. A previous 
study developed such an extension on the Wallinga and Teunis method (Cauchemez, Boelle et al. 
2006) by using the probability distribution of the serial interval to predict the number of censored 
cases during an epidemic over time. For my model, this prediction would need to be stratified by 
spatial location and transmission setting. Assuming the spatial trend to be independent of the 
temporal trend, the spatial distribution could be predicted using a mixture of both the distribution of 
the existing cases, and the trip patterns of the general population. A real-time case dataset adjusted 
for censored cases using such methods might also be used for the analysis making use of Kulldorff’s 
prospective scan statistic, because currently cases in their incubation period are not captured in the 
outbreak dataset for cluster detection until their symptom onset, and this indirectly lowers the 
power to detect clusters early. However, it is likely that confidence bounds around incidence 
predictions correcting for censoring will become unusually wide if too fine a stratification was used 
(since case numbers might be very low in single areas or hospitals). 
It is possible to apply or further modify spatially and socially stratified Wallinga and Teunis methods 
for other pathogens and alternative transmission settings (other than the hospital). The models I 
developed are able to capture cases who belong to more than one spatial or social groups at the 
same time (for instance, school and community), and allows different mechanisms to assign the 
probability of contact in the spatial groups. However, in the absence of a complete likelihood or 
contact tracing data, the relative weighting of different settings to transmission would need to be 
assumed. The location by time data (analogous to the hospitalisation data) might be simulated if 
actual data is not available. 
As mentioned previously section, the models I developed here condition on the observed cases and 
their properties, and do not model the susceptible population. Hence they can say little about 
susceptibility risk factors of individuals or spatial locations, nor properly assess the effectiveness of 
control measures. It is possible to address these issues with a full, spatially explicit individually based 
infection model designed for inference, for instance using a modified version of models used for a 
recent reanalysis of the  2001 Foot and Mouth epidemic in Britain (Chis Ster, Singh et al. 2009). As 
such models have to be parametric, some aspects of full-likelihood models tend to have to be 
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simpler than models that solely impute infection trees; most notably, it is usually not possibly to 
allow transmission coefficients to vary arbitrarily over time. However, models including both 
susceptible and infected populations can have arbitrarily complex formulations of the likelihood and 
yet be guaranteed to produce unbiased estimates, while partial likelihood models are only 
guaranteed to produce unbiased estimates of the full infection tree under a restrictive set of 
constraints that are unlikely to  be fulfilled in reality (Griffin, Garske et al. 2010); for instance, that all 
cases have the same infectiousness.  
In a full epidemic model, a hazard of infection is used to captures the risk of infection based on the 
location and timing of cases and the transmission setting. Individuals when in the community would 
most simply be coupled using a gravity model, and in hospital homogeneous mixing would be the 
simplest assumption, as in the spatial models I developed here. Super-spreading events may require 
special treatment (Riley, Fraser et al. 2003; Cori, Boelle et al. 2009). Infection time imputation and 
other parameter estimates would require MCMC methods given the complexity of the model 
structure. Given the size of the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong, such an analysis would be feasible 
given current computing resources. Infection trees could be inferred the under such a model, and 
the predicted spatial distribution of the cases can be compared to the observed patterns in addition 
to the conventional model comparison methods. 
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